CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A. Background of Issue

The armed conflict between the Government of Republic of Philippines and Leftist Parties has been an old and classical issue. The rise of this armed conflict was triggered by the emergence of communist insurgent in Philippines in 1968. It was, in its beginning, established as the impact of chronic unearth situation created and left by the Marcos regime. The Leftist Parties have struggled for social justice which was ever embraced in unfair wealth-distribution during the authoritarian regime stayed in power. Very often, the communist insurgent tried to realize their struggle and their political mission through force and coercive approaches to the government.

The struggle of communist movement in Philippines is a part of its national independence history. The first communist movement in Philippines was named Hukbalahap (Huk). 1 This communist movement struggled for the unhappiness of Filipino toward Japan colonialism. Japan colonized Philippines from 1941-1945. During the time, the Huk - supported by the Filipino - struggled for decolonization toward Japan. After Japan resigned from Philippines and the United States of America replaced the power, communist movement and the rest of Filipino signed the different behavior upon the colonialism. They assumed and blamed that the existence of the United States of America was a signal of being independent, further economic betterment by a kind of helpful assistances and

¹ For detail, see Adriana Elizabeth in Dilema Pemerintah Filipina Dalam Menghadapi Pemberontakan Komunis.

proper social cohesion within the community. Automatically, since the end of Japan power in Philippines, *Huk* was over at that time.

The fall of *Huk* as the first communist movement in the Philippines did not directly end the Diasporas of communist ideology in that country. In 1968, Jose Maria Sison who was supported by the Filipino youth leaders established the new communist movement called Communist Party of Philippines (CPP). CPP was the breaking of PKP which stands for *Partido Komunista ng Philipinas*. CPP has struggled through political constitutional and supported by army forces. Hence, in order to strengthen its power, CPP expanded its power through the establishment of National People Army in 1969.

During Marcos era, the communist insurgent was treated by coercive and militaristic approaches through martial law. Yet, the decision of declaring Martial Law in 1970s was a prominent reason for the sustaining of the armed conflict with CPP-NPA and other separatist groups. The CPP-NPA grew from a small group of about 1,100 in 1971 prior to the declaration of martial law with an armed component of 310 in 1973.⁴ Based on the resources we got, the movement grew to 7,200 regular members and a mass base of 480,000 by 1983.⁵

² Ibid,p.76

³ Ihid

⁴ From an AFP recapitulation of the CPP-NPA strength, February 2005, cited from Carolina G.Hernandez, PhD in paper of Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2005.p.5. The paper was not publicized. Downloaded on 14 February, 2008.
⁵ Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000), p.576 cited by Carolina G Hernandez PhD in Institutional Responses to Armed

Marcos viewed the national policy of Martial Law as a strategic position. As Marcos intensively opined and realized that national development was a major program rather than diminishing the communist insurgent. However, the communist insurgent was not urged as a national potential to assist the government for national reconciliation. As the impacts, massive military approach was high on the list of Marcos national agenda. Martial law during Marcos regime affected a huge number of victims for both sides.

The martial law, however, argued as a modest alternative taken by the government of Philippines. In contrary, such offensive strategic did not merely open for the peace talks between the government and the CPP-NPA. The authoritarian regime of President Marcos did not help to solve the problem and its underlying causes until finally the power of Marcos collapsed.

In 1986, the people power released Marcos lost his power as the President. As the collapse of authoritarian regime of Marcos, Corazon Aquino, as the wife of Benigno Aquino, was directed as the new president. Aquino was supported and assisted by the leftist parties which also demanded the fall of Marcos regime. Then, the rise of Aquino as the president, after people power in 1986, had been decisively favored the process of conflict resolution between the GRP and CPP-NPA.

Along with her political speech in many national agenda, Corazon Aquino had always mentioned her political wills to condemn the leftist parties without

side, Corazon Aquino indirectly also stressed that the wills of government to declare peace talks with CPP-NPA was not merely tracing that the government would give up to the communist power.

In the very beginning of her presidency official, Corazon Aquino provoked the CPP-NPA that today's government was seeking for peace establishment in Philippines. The path toward peace establishment by Corazon Aquino was introduced through the jargon of national reconciliation and ceasefire. Indeed, in order to show the curios and serious intention, Corazon Aquino declared on ceasefire with CPP-NPA on December 10, 1986 and only survived for about 60 days. Yet, propose of getting ceasefire was negatively responded by many people and politicians of the Philippines. They assumed that the CPP-NPA would acquire the intention of Corazon Aquino on ceasefire as a momentum to enlarge its power and to escalate its influences in the rest of Philippines.

Nevertheless, the intention of Corazon Aquino on ceasefire and peace talks through national reconciliation was not positively respected by the CPP-NPA. The CPP-NPA opined that ceasefire would be realized if the government wills to guarantee the release military dependency toward United States of America within the state which is presented by the existence of US military bases in Subic and Clark, national policy on land-reform, and the restoration of people's freedom.

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The attempts of conflict resolution between GRP and CPP-NPA were always facing fragile condition in which the condition toward the ripeness momentum seemed effortless. The calculation of Corazon Aquino that argued her capacity to eliminate the armed conflict until at the end of Aquino's presidency was unrealized. It was proven by the negative respond from CPP-NPA toward the government of Philippines under Corazon Aquino presidency.

After the end of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos came to the political atmosphere as the new leader in Philippines. Since Ramos intensively appeared in democratic sense and promised to continue the struggle of the previous national reconciliation. Then, in the last of his power, Ramos successfully condemned the CPP-NPA to minimize confrontation with GRP by addressing path way toward peace condition.

To get through the peace condition promised by Ramos regime, Ramos presidency tried to combine the militaristic and civil involvement. Ramos effectively learnt the lessons from the previous presidents on making military as the ultimate solution. As it was proven by his strategy which was more holistic and developmental in nature as they integrated into the Social Reforms Agenda (SRA)⁷

On the contrary, Ramos era had left the pathway on peace establishment to Estrada as the new president. But, the effort toward peace establishment was still beyond so far. Estrada, in the beginning, had successfully conducted and signed

the peace agreement based on the principle of human rights and humanitarian laws.

The agreement was undertaken as the product of the ripe situation faced by both sides. The ripe condition was traced by the rising demand of international humanitarian group such as Amnesty International to stop the violation on human rights done by GRP and its military troops. For CPP-NPA, the international demand toward GRP was a symbol of success on gaining international recognition.

The negotiation process for a peace agreement among the conflicting parties was likely to take years to come to fruition. The fruition was a CARHRIHL that stands for Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws was signed in March 1998. It was in talks before September 1992 in which the GRP and the National Democratic Front (NDF) argued that they already harvested such further riots and destructions⁸.

The agreement holds a burden for both sides which similarly apply human rights principles. The Philippine government was dominated by a politico-economic elite composed of powerful families that manipulate elections through patronage, corruption, and violence. Meanwhile, the CPP-NPA-NDF seeks to overthrow the government and establishes a people's democracy based on Stalinist-Maoist one-party dictatorship. Then, the agreement lies on a solution by

⁸ The NDF is the politico-diplomatic front of the communist party of the Philippines (CPP), the

the third party forces; civil society organizations and international political entities.⁹

However, the points appeared in each item of that agreement on human right recognition do not significantly contribute to the changes. The condition even worsened. CARHRIHL as the institution which internationally acknowledged is believed fail in bringing the peace back. The conflict is not deescalating. The conflict switched onto human rights violations crafted by both parties.

The condition in post-negotiation process should be remarked by significant number on cease-fire. But, the condition seems different. During the era of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, serious armed-conflict remained a low frequency. Yet, the scale and intensity of the NPA's insurgency declined gradually since the early period of democratic government done by Fidel Ramos. But, the political assassination on the suspected leftist parties has been rocketing year by year.

The recent conflict flourished as massive political killings. The political assassination does not subject on who the real actor is. As what *Karapatan*¹⁰ has reported recently that as much 244 killings covered journalists, human rights workers and lawyers and other leftist parties' activist during the period of Arroyo

⁹ Nathan Gilbert Quimpo on "The Use of Human Rights for the Protraction of War", 2006.p.1.

¹⁰ Karapatan or Alliance for the advancement of People's Right is alliance of human rights advocates. This alliance complies on documenting and exposing human rights violations

took the power in 2001 until July 2006¹¹. While, getting the real nature backed this political assassination and to seize the scale of killings are difficult one.

Moreover, the pattern of political killing has been gradually intensifying. It was reported that a series of unnamed killing targeting human rights activist appeared in a high frequency. A number of fatal attacks exposed other leftist parties such as *Bayan Muna*, *Anakpawis*, *Bagong Alyansang Makabayan* (BAYAN—the New Patriotic Alliance) and others to a serious and hard damage.

However, Amnesty International also reports that political circumstance in the Philippines is now being worse since the numbers of political killing is rocketing. It has become a trend for the GRP and its military forces for embracing a political impunity. Initial investigation conducted and compiled by the Philippine Commission on Human Rights by March 2006 found that in their estimation at least 42 of 143 complaints of murder and summary executions lodged with the Commission since 2005 by cause-orientated groups including Karapatan, Bayan Muna and Anakpawis were politically motivated and that at least seven had been directly attributed to the military through witness statements. 12

Karapatan, again, documented that at least 80 members of progressive leftist parties were killed during 2005 alone. These included leaders, members or supporters of Bayan Muna that 28 killed. Karapatan 2005 Human Rights Report

¹¹ PDI, 4 August 2006.

yielded that at least 16 killings of Bayan Muna members in 2004; 36 in 2005 and 26 from the beginning of 2006 until 5 July. The National Lawyers Guild reported that at least 25 lawyers, including 10 judges were killed since 2001 (Public Statement; the National Lawyers Guild condemns the killings of members of the legal profession in the Philippines, 2 August 2006). The Promotion of Church People's Response reported at least 21 clergy and lay church workers were killed since 2001. The center for Trade Union and Human Rights printed at least 31 union leaders, union party list organizers and supporters were killed in 2005 (the Year of Living Dangerously: Trade Union and Human Rights 2005 Reports: Center for Trade Union and Human Rights) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) reported at least 44 journalists were killed since 2001 (IFJ Media Release, 20 June 2006). 13

B. Research Question

Why did CARHRIHL and its implementation fail in deescalating the armed conflict between Government of the Republic of Philippines and the Leftist Parties?

C. Objective of the Research

The objectives of this research are as follows:

1. To explain the non-compliance with CARHRIHL done by the Arroyo Regime and the Leftist Parties (CPP-NPA-NDF) in Philippine.

 To explain the influence of those non-compliance with CARHRIHL toward the failure conflict resolution of the armed conflict between GRP and Leftist Parties in Philippine.

D. Conceptual Framework

Within this research, the writer is seeking to explain the reasons triggering the failure of parallel implementation of peace agreement between the GRP and the CPP-NPA-NDF. Through this research and giving clear direction in modeling the explanation of the problem appeared, the writer would trace and highlight the theory of conflict resolution especially in dealing with theory of compliance bargaining or negotiation in post-agreement and the model on management school.

1. Theory of Post-agreement Negotiation

Theory of post-agreement negotiation in relation with the compliance bargaining is an appropriate theory seeking for the reasons and explanations why implementation of final peace agreement between the GRP and the Leftist Parties failed. Post-agreement negotiation process is likely similar with other negotiation process in many concerns. The process which should be appeared during the sign of agreement includes a condition with mixed motives, the absence of a clear,

Bertram I. Spector ¹⁴ defines the meaning of this post-agreement negotiation as the dynamic and cooperative processes, systems, procedures, and structures that are institutionalized to sustain dialogue on issues that cannot, by their very nature, be resolved by a single agreement. Raiffa (1985) also introduces the concept of post-settlement settlement which similarly insists the significance of continuation on agreement. Raiffa argues that the returning back to the table after an agreement has been reached to seek an improved settlement; the goal of post-agreement negotiation encompasses this function plus the additional tasks of reaching mutually acceptable solutions concerning implementation, feedback, and adjustment of agreed-upon formulas over the longer term.¹⁵

Yet, the Postagreement negotiation functions to prolong and continue the dialogue to push forward the development of the agreement and its implementation. The characters of this post-agreement negotiation as opposed to the preagreement negotiation are;

o The substance which distinguish the Postagreement negotiation with preagreement negotiation focuses on "getting it done" as contrary to "getting it yes".

Very often, the parties seek broad and general frameworks to be put in the agreement so that all actors can agree to, but they often shift the burden of some difficulties to the Postagreement negotiation. They even ignore the

¹⁴ See Bertram I.Spector on Deconstructing the Negotiations of Regime Dynamics in Getting It

difficult tasks and substitute it as practical things. The difficult tasks including devising implementation processes, procedures, rules and standards; building institutions and approaches to implement them; monitoring and enforcing the impact of these new approaches; and coordinating with other actors.

- o The Postagreement negotiation deals with the continuities. This postagreement encompass the sustained negotiation in which this negotiation does not only initiate the implementation of agreement that were struck in the earlier discussion but also deal with the intractable issues that cannot be settled by the parties.
- o Post agreement negotiation also consists of a major factor called the multilevel or multi-theater complexity of the latter. It includes political willingness of domestic leaders in government, industry and nongovernmental organizations to comply with negotiated agreements reached at the international level is a major driving force in the postagreement phase. ¹⁶
- o The last prominent factors distinguishing postagreement with preagreement negotiation is evolution. The evolution addresses such a phase of transition including; from initiation of a regime agreement to its implementation; from uncertain expectations to establish relationships;

interdependence; from creation of new formulas to their transformation into details; from regime formation to regime operation.¹⁷

Bertram I Spector traces the two types of postagreement negotiation as such implementation negotiation and expansion negotiation. ¹⁸ The first negotiation — implementation negotiation — seeks for disputes settlement, handle misunderstanding, dealing with future adjustment to the agreement, and managing the day- to - day governance of the agreement among the signatories as it follows the successful conclusion of the agreement. This implementation negotiation attempts for making sure that the negotiated outcome is well conducted. The expansion negotiation is to expand and extend the initiating agreement, deals with issues that are not addressed in sufficient detail, improve and flesh out the agreement, and make a partial accord more complete. ¹⁹

The regime formulation and its dynamic in a postagreement negotiation are leveled by domestic and international level. In domestic level, there are some spheres which embodied during the talks between national government and its administrator. Those spheres are ratification negotiation²⁰ or domestic ratification

¹⁷ Ibid, pg.58-60.

¹⁸ Ibid, pg. 60.

¹⁹ Ibid.pg.61.

Ratification negotiation or domestic negotiation remains each domestic government is required to achieve the internationally negotiated agreement as it is a state level. These negotiations involve participation and cooperation by various stakeholders, including government ministries and

rule-making negotiation 21, and finally negotiation concerning monitoring, reporting and enforcement roles.22

In the international atmosphere, the postagreement negotiation is processed through some steps; regime formation negotiation involves the implementation and institutionalization of the agreed-upon rules and procedures. Then, regime governance negotiation is the next stage including the information concerning participant action is collected; compliance is monitored, verified, and enforced, and finally dispute is resolved.

2. Theory of Compliance Bargaining.

Discourses on negotiation and bargaining in post-agreement have been becoming an important issue but escape from the international relations focus. In order to strengthen the compliance in post-agreement, a bargaining is more applicable to assist a negotiation as it lies on very different but supportive circumstances. Negotiation replays formal political talks, face-to-face and direct discussion between the two parties. The substance of negotiation underlies a different principle with the role of bargaining. Bargaining constitutes both formal and non-formal talks, can be directed or represented and mediated, and involves the matter of political as well as cultural essences.

²¹ Rule-making negotiation is also a state or domestic level by which laws and regulations are enacted to obey the demands and clausal of the regime.

The last process of this postagreement negotiation in domestic level is monitoring, reporting and the enforcement tools. These process attempts to give a feedback to the national and international agencies on the failure or the success of laws and regulations.

The compliance bargaining theory compromises the two formal management school and enforcement school. Each of models e passes different principles by which management school eliminates the existences of sanctioning authorities clausal inside the treaty and the enforcement school contrarily coordinates the importance of sanctioning authorities as a tool to enhance the compliance of both parties

Figure 2. The Summary of the two theories

Post-agreement Negotiation Theory

- The ultimate negotiation is the negotiation in the aftermath when an agreement is being ratified.
- The post agreement negotiation covers very much continuity.
- Post agreement prefers "getting it done" to "getting it yes".
- The post agreement negotiation includes the process of implementing, monitoring and enforcing.
- The post agreement negotiation seeks for MAS (Mutually Acceptable Solution).

Compliance Bargaining Theory

- Compliance is a paramount important factor in the process determining the outcomes.
- Compliance can just be upheld by a bargaining as negotiation is not enough to accommodate compliance applicable.
- Bargaining insists on formal and informal talks, cultural and political approaches, to monitor and to enforce.
- Hence, compliance bargaining constitutes two schools;
 management school and enforcement school.

According to management school, non-compliance with international regulatory agreements will ensue in mixed-motive settings unless effective enforcement is provided.²³ Management school notes some basic principles. The first is management school urges that the compliance with international agreement is generally quite good. Second, management school emphasizes that the compliance will be achieved in the absence of enforcement. As referred to what Chayes and Chayes conclusion based on their research on 125 international treaties that sanctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used. Third, as if compliance struck in a trouble the management offers, according to this argument, better solution than enforcement school.

Enforcement school addresses the importance of emphasizing the sanctioning authorities to be put into the agreement or the treaty approved by the

in Compliance and Post Bargaining, European

regimes. Here, the sanctioning authorities embodied in clausal or each chapter of this agreement possesses the clearer condition by which every party should uphold the compliance to implement the treaty itself. The clearer condition consists of the substances of allowance to use threat by effective force.

Moreover, enforcement school elaborates that non-compliance with international regulatory agreement will ensue in mixed-motive settings unless effective enforcement is provided.²⁴ The mixed-motive settings beset by the dilemma of common interest in which states would prefer that all parties comply. In order to sharpen the existence of compliance toward the agreement, strategy favored and overwhelmed by punishment, enforcement and effective coercion is sufficient to enforce a treaty when each party realizes that if the other cheats and violates it will trigger the consequences of being suffered from the punishment that the net benefit will not be indefinitely positive.²⁵

Adopting the two theories, the writer will trace an analysis of the failure of the parallel implementation of CARHRIHL by constituting the degree of noncompliance by each party. More importantly, the writer opines that the enforcement school is more appropriate and suitable to draw and analyses the determinant factors why CARHRIHL is less implemented as the absence of the sanctioning authorities within the agreement. Also, this weakness is triggered by the lack of compliance bargaining in post-agreement negotiation.

²⁴ See Christer Johnson and Jonas Tallberg in Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining, European Journal of International Relations, 1998.pg.374.

²⁵ Downs et al., 1996.pg.385

E. Hypothesis

The failure of the implementation of CARHRIHL as a peace agreement in deescalating the (armed) conflict between the Governments of the Republic of Philippines is due to:

- The existence of non-compliance of the GRP with the CARHRIHL
- The absence of the sanctioning authorities in each clausal of CARHRIHL which leads this agreement onto such ambiguity.

F. Method of Research and Collecting Data

This research is grouped as a qualitative research. Thus, this research is analytical descriptive research. Qualitative research, according to Casel and Simmon, is a kind of social research method which is aimed to describe and do an interpretation accurately toward the meanings of phenomenon in terms of social and political issues.²⁶ They argue that qualitative method is suitable with social-political research. In many decades, political study has been grouped as a qualitative research.

In order to be able to describe the phenomenon as well as the analysis, the writer will use study-literacy as the main method of collecting data. The writer will collect data and supporting resources from journals, books, and internet-based

resources. During conducting this research, the writer has to find and get more information on the final peace agreement which can be printed from the Embassy of Government of Republic of Philippines. Fortunately, this data can be easily searched through internet.

Thus, this research will be taken in and through some places such as university library, local government library, or national library and private library, some particular department and institutions, and the last, mass media. Then, the writer will collect data. Data that needs to be searched is first, data on the causes of the armed conflict happened between the GRP and Leftist Parties in Philippines. Secondly, data on how the final peace agreement taken by both sides, here, the writer will more focus on post-negotiation or in implementation-period. After collecting and gathering all data that the writer needs, the writer will make such categorization or grouping data that are already taken.

The step of categorizing data covers the interpretation of the writer toward the given data. The data will be interpreted into some assertion in order to support the argument. In order to give an accurate analysis, the writer will use content-analysis to interpret the content of Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws. Thus, we would be able to trace whether or not the existence of sanctioning authorities is upheld in this

In addition, the writer decides content analysis as a strategy to collect data that is necessary for analyzing the content of CARHRIHL and its relevance. Content analysis is an asset to make the inference more reliable, systematic and objective. Content analysis is a medium for bridging the validity of hypothesis and inability to formulate the hypothesis, prefers the flexibility of analysis procedures to the fixed procedure. Content analysis is usually to get the descriptive information, discover cross-validity and to examine hypothesis. The resources for content analysis are speech, campaigns, newspapers, documents, books and pictures. Yet, in this research the writer will examine and conduct the analysis by using important document such as agreement between the GRP and the Leftist Parties.

In order to be able to conduct such an accurate analysis upon the content of analysis thus, some steps are necessary to be placed. The first step is determining the objects of analysis. For example, the writer will identify the agreement that "human rights" is more often to be written than "land-reform". Then, this object is localized as the writer will identify it in every single provision of CARHRIHL. The next step is to choose and code. The writer will make some categorizations. As an example, if the "human rights" is mentioned for almost 50 times and more it means that human right is the most important issue addressed by the negotiating parties. That is why, if human-right is mentioned for almost 50 times or more it means that human right is useful to resolve the conflict. Yet, such kind of steps will be conducted in this research and further comprehensive

G. Range of Research

In order to be able to do this research clearly, the writer would like to make the range of this research narrow. The writer will determine that the scope of this research is during 1986 until the recent presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 2007. Meanwhile the description of dynamics of the armed conflict during the regimes in Philippines will be drawn as supporting explanations.

H. Presentation of Paper's Writing

Presentation of paper is aimed to itemize the systematic of writing in order to answer the research question and the hypothesis mentioned earlier in this chapter. The systematic of writing is:

Chapter I. Introduction

In this chapter, the writer will present:

A. Background of Issue

This chapter explains the background of the case taken by the writer and tracing shortly the condition of the armed conflict between the GRP and the Leftist Parties during the Marcos regime until the Arroyo regime.

B. Research Question

Research question will be triggering the writer to conduct this research.

C. Purpose of Research

This part explains the purposes of the writer to do this research.

D. Conceptual Framework

The writer highlights and uses two theories; the postagreement negotiation and compliance bargaining. Thus, the model of the compliance bargaining that will be used in this research is enforcement school-model.

E. Hypothesis

Hypothesis of this research gives the temporary answer of the research question in this research.

F. Method of Research and Collecting Data

This part seeks to explain the way and the method used by the writer to conduct this research.

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Chapter II The Dynamic of the Armed Conflict in Philippines from 1980s – Today's Era

This chapter seeks to explain the history of communist movement in the Philippines, the history of armed conflict between Leftist Parties and the GRP as well as its dynamic of conflict resolution in pre-negotiation process.

Chapter III The Dynamic of CARHRIHL and Its Parallel Implementation as

A Peace Agreement

The dynamic of CARHRIHL and its implementation as well as the circumstances including the armed conflict in postagreement are the main concerns of this chapter.

Chapter IV the Determinant Factors of the Failure of CARHRIHL
Implementation

In order for brief explanations, this chapter will highlight the determinant factors of the failure of CARHRIHL implementation. Yet, this chapter concerning to proof the hypothesis by which elaborating the non-compliance of the GRP with CARHRIHL and the absence of sanctioning authorities inside CARHRIHL.

Chapter V Conclusion

In this chanter the writer will conclude the research and moles it as the