

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Problem Background

Combating terrorism has become a major concern of the United States (U.S.) policy makers aftermath the 9/11 heart-breaking tragedy. ‘War on terror’ yet is the most common discourse repeatedly stated by the U.S. leaders in every publication and speech in bilateral and multilateral meetings. Invasion to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were the outcomes of the U.S. commitment to succeed this effort.

The U.S. has arranged strategic partnerships with a lot of states and International Organizations. And one of the most important partners of the U.S. in South Asia region is Pakistan. Pakistan is chosen at the first place due to its very pivotal geographical location which is directly bordered with Afghanistan. Some of its tribal areas (Federally Administrated Tribal Areas / FATA) also become the haven of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups.

Pakistan is the mean of the U.S. to dismantle Taliban rule in Afghanistan. As known from the history, Pakistan was the warm-ally of Taliban between 1994 and 1996. It was the strategy of Islamabad to counter the influence of Russia and India in the South Asia region that potentially intended to destabilize Pakistan¹. Since General Zia Ul-Haq until the early of General Perves Musharaf

¹*Terrorism in Pakistan*, Citation Center of Defense Information, at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pakistan.cfm>. December 10, 2008.

administration Islamabad was known as the backup of Taliban. Therefore it is important for U.S. to gain Islamabad support to win war on terror and permanently smash up Taliban from the earth surface.

Pakistan is now in the top list of the largest recipient of the US foreign military assistance. In June 2008, the U.S. government reported that nearly \$11 billion in military and economic assistance grants have been delivered since 2002, the vast majority channeled through Pakistan's military for security-related programs². According to the agreement signed in 2003, Pakistan would receive over \$ 300 million a year from U.S.³.

Pakistan is a pivotal partner of U.S. Major General Muniruzzaman, President of Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, noted that South Asia is now becoming a hub of radical ideology⁴. Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, stated that the next attack of Al-Qaeda toward U.S. is most likely planned under the leadership in Pakistan⁵. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna named Pakistan as the 'Terrorist Disneyland'⁶. The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) contains numerous terrorist training camp and most of them are confirmed being related to Al-Qaeda⁷.

In other words, Pakistan is the key to achieve shining victory in the war on terror. It is the place where the most dangerous terrorist organizations base and

² *US-Pakistan Military Cooperation*, Citation Council on Foreign Relations of United States, at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/>. November 23, 2008.

³ *U.S. Agrees to Increase Military Assistance*, Citation Dawn, at <http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/21/top15.htm>, December 25, 2008.

⁴ Ms. Katie Minor, "U.S. Policy Options to Counter Terrorism in Pakistan", paper was presented in *Asia-Pacific Homeland Security Summit Fellows Program*, 31th October 2008. p. 3.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

run their leadership and cadres training. No one in the U.S. ever expect the tragedy of November 9th 2001 will be repeated someday. Thus the only option available is to tear down the basis of terrorism in South Asia by cooperating with the host country which has very limited capability in counter-terrorism, Pakistan.

The U.S. secondary interest in Pakistan is to maintain the stability of Afghanistan. After the invasion in 2001 most of Taliban forces were driven out to Baluchistan Province in Pakistan. They become a threat now due to some maneuvers they made to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and then escape back to Pakistan. The cost is multitudinous. Therefore, it is necessary to keep the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan under-control because over three-quarter of the U.S. supplies for Afghanistan come through or over Pakistan (Kronstadt: 2008)⁸.

Unfortunately, the result of this cooperation does not meet the expectation. The situation in Pakistan particularly in Tribal Areas, where most of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters are hiding, is getting worse since the implementation of this cooperation in 2003. South Asia Terrorism Portal reported that from 2003 to 2008 the casualties of terrorist violence in Pakistan shown the trend of increasing. The victim amount in 2003 had reached 189 along the year. In 2004, unexpectedly the victim numbers were rapidly raising to 863. In 2005 it decreased to 648 victims. But Islamabad was terrified by the numbers of victims in 2006 that reached 1471.

⁸ Ibid. p. 4.

2007 and 2008 were the most terrible years in Pakistan history regarding the amount of victims of terrorist violence, it resulted 3599 and 4516 victims⁹.

These following tragedies are some instances of terrorist assaults in Pakistan in the three latest years. In November 8th, 2006 a suicide bomber blew up himself in army-training center in Dargai in North West Frontier Province (NWFP). This incident killed 42 and injured 39 recruits of Punjab Regiment Centre (PRC) and their instructors. It was claimed as the biggest terrorist attack in Pakistan after Islamabad join U.S. war on Terror¹⁰.

In December 27th, 2007, Pakistan people cried due to one of their central figures of democracy and former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by gun shoot and suicide attack in the middle of her campaign for Pakistan People Party (PPP). More than thirty persons were killed and over 100 others, including Benazir's political secretary Naheed Khan and Sherry Rehman, wounded when a suicide attacker riding on a motorbike blew himself up after firing at Benazir who was waving to her supporters from her vehicle's sun roof¹¹.

Another attack happened in April 25th 2008. About three people were killed and 26 injured when a car bomb exploded near Mardan City Police Station in the NWFP. Mardan district Superintendent of Police Ijaz Abid stated that the bomb, planted in a car parked near the police station, detonated around 6 am, killing two civilians and a police official, and injuring around 17 policemen and nine civilians. He also noted that nearly 35 to 40 kilograms of explosives were

⁹ *Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan*, Citation South Asia Terrorism Portal, at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm. January 15, 2009.

¹⁰ *Major incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan*, Citation South Asia Terrorism Portal, at <http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents.htm>. January 25th, 2009.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

used and the police station and adjacent shops were badly damaged. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed of being responsible for the attack. “This attack was carried out by our mujahideen to avenge the earlier killing of one of our commanders by police in Mardan,” TTP spokesman Maulana Omar told Reuters by telephone¹².

Terrorism actions were mostly concentrated in three major locations FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan. FATA is obviously the place where many intelligence expertise claimed as the haven of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Within FATA, terrorist violence and subversion affects all of the seven Agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, in varying degrees¹³.

NWFP is another battleground. The year of 2007 witnessed the transformation of NWFP as a major battleground for radical Islam. At least 1,190 persons, including 459 civilians, 538 militants and 193 SF personnel, were killed in 2007. Significantly, 27 of the 56 suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2007 occurred in the NWFP¹⁴.

The last is Baluchistan province which was affected by an encompassing insurgency. Currently, all 30 Districts of Baluchistan are affected either by a sub-nationalist tribal insurgency or, separately, by Islamist extremism. Most of the violence in Baluchistan is, however, related to 'nationalist' movement and there is no cooperation between pre-dominantly Pashtun Islamist militants in the North

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *Pakistan Assessment 2008*, Citation South Asia Terrorism Portal, at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/>. January 10, 2009.

¹⁴ Ibid.

and the Baloch nationalist insurgents. The root of problem in Baluchistan was the structural and constitutional biases¹⁵.

The billions of dollars granted by the US since cooperation was started seem useless. The weapons supply and training by the US military to Pakistan forces results none. The violence cannot be handled. The amount of people died due to terrorist actions is enormously unstoppable.

The situation is definitely severe. Many of Pakistan's regions are out of government's coverage. A simple truth in vast regions of Pakistan today is that the state has withered away. A wide array of anti-state actors is currently engaged in varying degrees of violence and subversion. A zoom in look at the map indicates that the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan are witnessing large-scale violence and insurrection. Violence in parts of the Sindh, Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan has also brought these areas under the security microscope. Well over half of the territory presently under Pakistan's control, including Gilgit-Baltistan and 'Azad Jammu & Kashmir', has passed outside the realm of civil governance and is currently dominated essentially through military force¹⁶.

The impact of this chaotic situation is not only in security wise. Islamabad, under General Musharraf regime was known as one of the most economically problematical state in Asia region. Pakistan's slide under Musharraf is dominated by increasing macro-imbalances, high levels of poverty, and poor human development indicators. With very vulnerable security stability the investment is

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

likely impossible to be invited. Consequently, the failure of government to provide security indeed affects all sectors of people's life and makes them suffer.

From the problems above, the question raises is that why with all assistances and supports of U.S. military Pakistan is still incapable to combat terrorism in its areas? This question indicates that the U.S. – Pakistan military cooperation has failed to achieve its ultimate goal which is to provide security by tearing down terrorists organizations which hide under the incapability of the Islamabad government.

B. Research Question

From the exploration of problem background above, the research question rising is that, “Why did U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism Cooperation fail to combat terrorism in Pakistan?”

C. Theoretical Framework

There are two major concepts that should be elaborated to find the reasons beyond the failure of U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism Cooperation to combat terrorism in Pakistan, namely: *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism*

1. Terrorism

There are many debates concerning the definition of terrorism. Experts usually defined it as:

“The use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim to induce a state of a fear in the victim, that is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy” (Laquer 2003)¹⁷

¹⁷Charles W. Kegley with Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 427.

The U.S. Department of State's Office of Counter-terrorism, which definition is broadly followed by International Community, defined terrorism as premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence audience¹⁸. By those definitions, terrorism that is meant in this writing is the strategy, method, or tactic used by certain groups to achieve their goals: the strategy to use violence and terror.

Some stated that terrorism is a tactic of powerless against powerful. According to Charles W. Kegley at least three major impulses can turn one movement to use terrorism as strategy. *First* is those seeking independence and sovereign statehood, such as the Basques in Spain, voicing aspirations through terrorist activity.

The second reason is Religion. Religion sometimes rationalizes the terrorist activities of extremist movements. The instances are the Sikh groups who wish to carve out an independent state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian territory, the most popular terrorist movement in the new age: Al-Qaeda, and of the Islamic extremist group HAMAS to destabilize Israel and sabotage peace negotiation among Israel and Palestine¹⁹.

The last reason, in the industrialized and urbanized world, terrorism often occurs where disparity of income is severe and distribution of the cake of economy is uneven and where minority groups feel alienated and deprived of the political freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the majority. Guerrilla war-fare –

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 427.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 427.

normally associated with rural uprisings – is not a rational choice but terrorist tactics are²⁰.

But, putting terrorism as the object of study, the analysis shall be distinguished between terrorism prior and after 9 / 11 tragedy. For the purpose of this writing, the terrorism that will be focused is terrorism after September 11. There are some substantial differences on the method and characteristics of the terrorism movement. Kegley noted that prior September 11 terrorist primary goal was not death but publicity, to elicit attention and sympathy for the terrorist cause. Now it is conducted by ideological terrorist acting trans-nationally and for greater purpose: to transform international status-quo²¹.

The detail differences on today's terrorism characteristics are:

- Global, in the sense that with the death of distances borders no longer serve as barriers to terrorism
- Lethal, because now terrorists have shifted their tactics from theatrical violence acts seeking to alarm for publicity to purposeful destruction of a target populated entirely by civilian non-combatants, to kill as many as possible for that purpose of instilling fear as many people as possible
- Waged by civilian without state sanction in ways and by means that erase the classic boundaries between terrorism and a declared war between states
- Reliant to the most advanced technology of modern civilization to destroy through those sophisticated technological means the modern civilization

²⁰ Ibid. p. 428.

²¹ Ibid. p. 433.

seen as posing a threat to the terrorist's sacred traditions

- Orchestrated by trans-national non-state organizations through global conspiratorial networks of terrorist cells located in many countries, involving unprecedented levels of communication and coordination (Sageman, 2004)
- Pursued by fanatical extremists to annihilate through maximal bloodshed rather than to persuade, by carrying out crimes against humanity by suicidal methods requiring the terrorists to sacrifice their own lives in acts that cannot be deterred or prevented through negotiated compromise
- Driving out hatred to target – by terrorist' desire to make the target suffer for what the target is, what it does, and the values for which the target stands²²

The definition and characterization of terrorism is used to support the analysis regarding the causes of the uprisings of terrorism movements in Pakistan. Many organizations, with various purposes and objectives, are involved in terrorism movement in Pakistan. *South Asia Terrorism Portal* divided the organizations into three types: Domestic Organizations (i.e.: Lashkar-e-Omar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Muslim United Army, etc), Trans-national organizations (i.e.: Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jammu & Kashmir National Liberation Army, Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen, etc), and Extremist Groups (i.e.: Al-Rashid Trust, Al-Akhtar Trust, etc)²³.

²² Ibid. p. 433 – 434

²³ *Terrorism and Extremist Group in Pakistan*, Citation South Asia Terrorism Portal, at

From three causes of terrorism addressed by Kegley, I argue that the problem of terrorism uprising in Pakistan is more likely related to economy. This argument is supported by the statement of Perves Musharaf, the Pakistan Former President, who stated at Stanford Auditorium (January 17th, 2009) that the roots of terrorism in Pakistan are poverty, illiteracy, and unresolved political disputes²⁴.

The methods used by these Terrorist movements in Pakistan are definitely included in the new style of terrorism post September 11. The major purposes are no longer publicity; it involves systematic violence demanding death of senseless people. We can take the example of the Marriot Five-star Hotel Bombing in Islamabad. *CBS News* reported that at least 38 people died and 250 injured at that tragedy. Analyst said that the attack was a warning from Islamic extremists to the new civilian leadership of Pakistan that it should already strain cooperation with United States to pursue Al-Qaeda and Taliban Militants entrenched in the lawless tribal region along the border with Afghanistan²⁵. Some of these groups are trans-national movement which linkage are related to international commando outside Pakistan. The operation was lethal. It carried out certain ideological characteristic. The purpose was to send message by murdering people.

Besides failing to function as a 'state', Pakistan's approach in dealing with terrorism also contributes to the failure to combat it. The affectivity of Islamabad cooperation with Washington under U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm. January 29th, 2009.

²⁴ *Poverty, Illiteracy Causes Terrorism – Musharaf*, Citation Palo Alto On Line, at http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=10802. January 31st, 2009.

²⁵ *Truck Bomb Destroys Marriot in Pakistan*, Citation CBS News, at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/20/terror/main4462437.shtml>. January 31st, 2009.

Cooperation which emphasizes military approach and assistance will be examined below.

2. Counter-terrorism

U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism cooperation was made under the concept of Security Community. Security Community was introduced by Political Scientist Karl Deutsch in 1957²⁶. He defined Security community as “a group of people” believing “that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’”. But this definition does not fit to the purpose of this research, so that the definition of Security Community in this research is taken from Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. They redefined the Security Community by shared identities, values, and meanings, many-sided direct interactions, and reciprocal long-term interest. U.S. – Pakistan cooperation is the representative of the direct interaction between two states which have same long term interests²⁷. For Islamabad this cooperation will help to stabilize the country and for Washington is to support U.S. military operation in Afghanistan and tear down Taliban and Al-Qaeda from earth.

Talking about counter-terrorism is an obviously difficult job. Experts said that terrorism cannot be combated until its causes are accurately diagnosed. The dilemma upon what is the most effective way dealing with terrorism is heatedly debated by intellectuals and practitioners.

²⁶ Andrej Tusicisny, *Security Community and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously*, Citation Wikipedia. at http://tusi.szm.sk/research/tusicisny_security_communities_and_their_values.pdf. February 12, 2009.

²⁷ Emanuel; Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_community. February 12th, 2009.

According to Charles W. Kegley, there are two poles in this dilemma: Those who believe in repression and at the other side those who advise conciliation²⁸. Kegley noted that those advocating harsh approach see terrorism springing from rational decisions of extremists to rely on political violence, and they advise prevention and even pre-emptive strikes that promise surgical attacks to kill terrorists and failing that, swift and serve retaliation²⁹.

In contrast are those who see terrorism is rooted on certain causes such as frustrations with political oppression and deprivation or economic unfairness. They recommend addressing these root causes in order to contain terrorism, taking as their point of departure the November 2nd, 1972, the United Nations resolution that concluded: “measures to prevent international terrorism [require] study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair.” To those persuasions, long-term reforms and short conciliatory policies are proposed³⁰.

On this dilemma, I argue that the reason beyond the failure of U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism Cooperation is due to it is too focus on harsh approach or repression (military). It forgets the root of terrorism which is actually grounded on prosperity of the people. The assistance of U.S. toward Pakistan under this cooperation is concerned on increasing the capability of Islamabad to combat terrorism by increasing arms technology and counter-terrorism operations. The economic assistance (though exists) was slightly neglected.

²⁸ Charles W. Kegley with Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 435.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 435.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 435 – 436.

According to Raphael Perl, a comprehensive National anti-terror strategy must cope with many issues. Included are the appropriate roles for military force, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of social and political equality, and nation and institution building within the context of policies promoting national security³¹. Bush Administration had determined four pillars of National Anti-terror strategy — **defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending.**

This is the detail of U.S. National U.S. anti-terror strategy as quoted from Raphael Perl report for U.S. Congress:

“Together with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.

Components include (1) identifying and locating terrorists by making optimal use of all intelligence sources, foreign and U.S., and (2) destroying terrorists and their organizations by capture and detention, use of military power, and through employment of specialized intelligence resources, as well as international cooperation to curb terrorist funding;

Denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safehavens.

A central strategy objective is to ensure that other states take action against such elements within their sovereign territory. Elements include (1) tailoring strategies to induce individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; (2) promoting international standards for combating terrorism; (3) eliminating sanctuaries; and (4) interdicting terrorist ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities;

Diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, by fostering economic, social, and political development, market-based Economies, good governance, and the rule of law.

Emphasis includes (1) partnering with the international community to alleviate conditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism; and (2) using public information initiatives to de legitimize terrorism; and

³¹ Raphael Perl, *Anti-terror Strategy and 9/11 Commission Report*, Citation U.S. CRS Report for Congress, at www.usis.it/pdf/other/RL32522.pdf. last updated at February 4, 2005.

Defending U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad to include protection of physical and cyber infrastructures³².”

As mentioned in the background, Pakistan is now in the top list of U.S. Military Assistance’s recipient. Since 2003, there have been \$ 11 billion given to Pakistani government to increase its counter-terrorism ability supporting U.S. war on terror in the Afghanistan border. Pakistan has used the money to purchase helicopters, F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, and anti-ship and antimissile defense systems³³.

Besides for purchasing military equipments, the money was used to build capable forces to combat terrorism in some hot spot such as NWFP and FATA. The Pakistani government formed a new paramilitary troop to help combating terrorism in those areas called Pakistan’s Frontier Corps. The members of this Corps are recruited from local people considering the cultural closeness to the areas. Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani government official who is now a research fellow at Harvard University, notes that Washington has funded a program to transform Pakistan's Frontier Corps into an effective counterbalance against terrorist elements. Training of the corps—part of a broader \$400-million effort to improve security in the region—was expected to start in late 2008³⁴.

Economic assistance, though given, was not significant to raise the living standard of Pakistan citizens particularly in tribal areas where poverty and illiteracy cuddle their everyday’s life. This is one of the reasons why terrorism is difficult to tear down in Pakistan. The conclusion is U.S. ignores to tackle the

³² Ibid. Page 3 – 4.

³³ *U.S. – Pakistan Military Cooperation*, Citation Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/uspakistan_military_cooperation.html. January 29th, 2009.

³⁴ Ibid.

third pillar of the U.S. National Anti-terror strategy which is **fostering economic, social, and political development, market-based Economies, good governance, and the rule of law.** Those are the elements that terrorist group exploit to gather local support and recruiting new members. That is why in Pakistan terrorism is increasing year by year since 2003 to 2008.

D. Hypotheses

The fact is the U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism cooperation failed to achieve its goal: combating terrorism in Pakistan. By considering my analysis through the theoretical framework above, I argue that the cause of the failure of U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism Cooperation is that: “It puts excessive emphasizes on military approaches while neglecting economic and poverty eradication particularly in the epicenter areas of terrorism namely FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan.”

E. Research Method

This is a content analysis research. In this model researcher is allowed to research the object from afar without involving in it³⁵. The conclusion will be taken by counting the appearance of key words needed in articles, academic journals, speeches, official statements, etc. In this model, analyzed data will be taken from books, encyclopedia, magazines, newspapers and journals. In addition, the internet media will be valuable resources used in order to obtain data, reports, surveys, because updated information related to the topic is only available through the internet media. From these sources, I try to elaborate the research.

³⁵Earl Babbie and Theodore C. Wagonaar, *The Practice of Social Research Method*, California: Wadsworth, 1983, p. 274.

F. Writing System

The outline of this thesis is described as follows:

CHAPTER I will discuss about the problem background, research purpose, research question, theoretical framework, hypothesis, research model, and writing system.

CHAPTER II will explain about the general picture of terrorism in Pakistan, the places where terrorist attacks are mostly appeared, and kinds of terrorist organizations move in the land of Pakistan.

Chapter III will elaborate the concept and application of U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism cooperation. This chapter will dig the chosen approach, which is harsh approach in the form of military force, of the U.S. and Pakistan in dealing with terrorism which basically contributes to the failure of this cooperation.

CHAPTER IV provides explanation about the mistake of U.S. – Pakistan Counter-terrorism cooperation that puts excessive concern on the military approach while neglecting economic and social development in the epicenter areas of terrorism in Pakistan. This chapter will also explain the relation between poverty and terrorism uprising and the real roots of terrorism uprising in Pakistan.

CHAPTER V is the closing part of this thesis that contains the conclusion.