

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The Mindanao conflict between Government of Philippines (GPH) and Moro Liberation Front had not met a solution yet. The conflict had been lasting since many years ago before the independence declaration for Philippines as a State from American government. Before integrated to GPH, Mindanao Island was still governed by a Sultan and according to historical record; the Island was settled by 13 different linguistic ethnics using Islamic values as the way of life. Even though they held Islam as their belief, in fact, Islam was not the first religion introduced in the Island. Several religions, cultures, and traditions of society in that Island had existed before. This was an evidence of the glory of Islamic civilization settling several regions in Asian Peninsula, although on the other hand the arrival of states colonizer to Mindanao also had become an evidence of the demolished Islamic civilization and triggering issues of Mindanao conflict¹. In that Island, there was also indigenous society called Lumad.

According to historical record, the existence of Islam in Philippines began in Southern Island of Philippines. The spread of Islamic religion was initialized by

¹Parahening, Lintang. 2008. *Sejarah Islam Di Filipina dalam PEMIKIRAN ISLAM KONTEMPORER*. Retrieved on July 8, 2011 at 11.43 PM from <http://cintailmoe.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/sejarah-islam-di-filipina/>

Baguinda King (a prince from Minangkabau-West Sumatera) and Kamirul Makhdum (an Islamic scholar and traditional healer from Arab). The Baguinda King started his influence after successfully spreading Islamic religion in Basilan and Zambonga Island². One result of his success was that King of Manguindanao converted to Islam and changed his title to be Datuk (the title a King in Islam). After the King Manguindanao converted to Islam, he was spreading Islamic religion into North Island and all coastal areas in Philippines Island at that time. Consequently, Islamic authority was dominant in almost all of Islands and was led by Datuk.

When the glory of Islam in Philippines was strongly felt, Spain came to the Philippines with the idea of scientism expedition and tried to colonize the Philippines areas slowly on March 16, 1521. The arrival of Spain received bad responses from South Island society. Spain showed several bad attitudes by using military force to subjugate the Muslim people in Mindanao Island. Actually, Spain held a secret mission of Catholicism and wished to Philippines to be part of Roman Catholicism as their governmental system. Although Spain had succeeded to subsequent Luzon and Visayas Islands to become its colonialist areas, it had failed to subsequent Mindanao Island whose society strictly believed in Islamic perspective. This invasion had lasted at least 300 years beginning from North Island of Philippines through several political strategies to influence the people. Based on the history, the wife of Humabon King from Cebu Island was the first to

² ibid

people who convert to Catholicism³. Muslim Mindanao people had called Moro by Spain and from that moment it became the term to refer to Muslim Mindanao which then changed into Bangsamoro.

The Islamic struggle to fight against colonizer did not stop in that period yet. The arrival of United State substituted the Spain invasion after the former defeated the latter in a war and after the signing of Treaty of Paris in 1898 between United State and Spain. The Treaty of Paris mentioned that Philippines as Spain colonialized areas had to be handed to the United States. The arrival of American colonizer made condition worse for Mindanao society especially for Muslim Moro. Muslim Moro faced new enemy and new competitor smarter than before who showed good manner to them. They implemented the idea of democracy which gave the freedom to worship according to each belief, freedom to express their opinion, and also facilitated the education for aristocrats of Mindanao Island. The American colonizer used soft political strategies to get a position in Mindanao society. It did not last long; American colonizer faced the onset from revolutionary group which led by Emillio Aguinaldo. The onset began when American colonizer implemented the new policy in the land registration and this was followed by the migration of Christian society from Luzon and Visayas to the Southern Island.

Finally, American colonizer changed the political policies for Moros by conducting open colonization with impartiality. The war against American colonizer by Muslim Moro took place along that period. From 1914 to 1923

³ ibid

several disputes between American colonizer and Muslim Moro could not be avoided. Before the end of its colonization, the US prepared to give the independence to Philippines by creating commonwealth from 1935 to 1946 under the Tydings McDuffie Act. The authority to control Philippines as a whole had been mandated to Christian people in the North Philippines. The continuation of American colonizer policies toward Muslim Moro in Southern Philippines made the condition worse. Moreover, Manuel Quezon had made a policy to abolish the native law, cultures and value system in Mindanao and replace them with positive law, cultures, and values that referred to New Philippines State regulations.

The policy of United States to give independence to Philippines meant to shape new authority in order to control Philippines as a whole. Christian people held their authority in north Philippines by making several policies that somewhat oppressed Muslim Society especially in the case of Land Registration. This caused conflicts in the period of Manuel Quezon who wanted to abolish the native law, culture and values in Mindanao and then replaced them with positive law, culture and values system of Philippines⁴. This policy was responded by several onsets from Muslim Mindanao Empire which strongly disagreed with that policy. And it made the conflicts in Mindanao continue for several years between Mindanao Muslim and Manuel Quezon military.

The integration of Mindanao Island to Philippines after the independence did not resolve the Mindanao conflict but invoked complicated problems. Muslim

⁴ Surwandono. 2011. *Kegagalan Regime Negosiasi Final Peace Agreement 1996 dalam Pelembagaan Konflik Mindanao*. [Phd Thesis]. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University

Moro wanted to separate from Philippines territorial integration. As the conflict progressed, several opposing movements emerged in Mindanao region. Some of those movements declared themselves as the representatives of Muslim Moro and had been established with the purpose to seek independence from Philippines government. They named themselves the liberation movement or the Moro Front. The first influential Moro liberation movement had been started by the emerging Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972 under Nur Misuari Commander. The establishment of MNLF represented the feeling of unsatisfied to the government of Philippines and fought for the right of Muslim people, and it showed the willingness to separate from Philippines government by learning from the past when Muslims revived independence movement in the 1920's. In the establishment of MNLF, Misuari believed as follows⁵:

Misuari assessed that the failures of previous movement were not wholly rooted in the callousness of the state in its treatment of Muslim minorities and discriminatory policies that favor of the Christian majority but also partly caused by the "collaboration" of their own Muslim leaders with the Manila "politico-economic elite" Misuari set him apart from the rest of the Muslim leaders. He conceived a rebellion that has two fundamental objectives: to set up a single independent homeland covering the 13 ethno-linguistic Muslim grouping in the Philippines and to wage war against Muslim traditional politicians and aristocratic leaders who cooperated with the state.

The leadership of Nur Misuari was not running well since 1972 because of the internal conflict in MNLF was appeared after the signing of the Peace

⁵ E. Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of *Moro* Separatism," in *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 160.

Agreement in 1976 between GPH and MNLF. In the progress of stalemate peace talks between GPH and MNLF, there were two factions in the internal body of MNLF. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had formed as the response to unsatisfied to those agreements and became the first splinter group from MNLF in early 1977. The MILF believed that the purpose of MNLF after signing those agreements was changed and out of the main purpose of Muslim Mindanao. In fact, Nur Misuari's goal in MNLF was to reclaim BangsaMoro (Moro Nation), the Muslim homeland that had been "unjustifiably annexed by the Philippine state"⁶. His vision for Mindanao in the future was strictly secular in orientation rather than Islamic. This was one of the reasons that MILF believed that MNLF did not represent Muslim Mindanao's desire to be separated from Philippines territorial integration.

Another response was the establishment of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as the group who seemed to have the same reason with MILF in 1991 that operated in Sulu Archipelago. It had a different way to achieve its main purpose to separate from Philippines government and to strengthen purely Islamic government that was by conducting terrorism action. These radical actions were to end any kind of oppressive, injustice, capricious, and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslim⁷. As a result, the U.S and the Philippines Government had decided that the Abu Sayyaf

⁶ Quoted from article of Rizal G. Bueindia, *The State Moro Armed conflict in the Philippine* page 11.

⁷ S. Tan, "*The Juma'a Abu Sayyaf: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle*," (Paper presented at the National Defence College of the Philippines Strategic Studies Group meeting, 2 May 2000).

Group (ASG) was the terrorist organization that became common enemy. Consequently, the ways of ASG were also not supported by MNLF and MILF.

In its progress, the Signing of FPA 1996 did not settle the Mindanao conflict at all. It became the momentum for MILF to be the next representative of Moro society replacing MNLF. This front was led by Hashim Shalamat and was headquartered in the former MNLF office that operated in Southern Mindanao. Different from the former Moro Front (MNLF), MILF had complex bodies of organizational structure; it was not simply a form of Moro Liberation Movement. They claimed their own authority and structural bodies as well as a state with a supporting body like an armed force. The MILF armed force had about 120,000 fighters (80 percent was armed) and 300,000 militiamen in the late 1990s⁸. It means that the MILF had strong power to replace the position of MNLF in the Philippine Government and in International circumstance as well.

The first time after MILF was split from MNLF led by Nur Misuari from 1972 to 1996; MILF did not officially become the representative of Muslim Mindanao although since the MILF was formed, President Ramos had conducted back-stage/informal negotiation with MILF on July 18, 1997 and successfully brought MILF into negotiation table. It discussed about cessation of hostilities between them and created the Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH). It was followed by the General Framework of Intent in Augusts 27, 1998 under Estrada's administration and was continued by the acknowledgement

⁸ Quoted from article of Rizal G. Bueindia, The State Moro Armed conflict in the Philippine page 13.

of the MILF's camp in 1999. Actually the formal peace talk had begun in the President Estrada era in early 2000. The peace talk stalled after the military offensive was delivered by Estrada on April-July 2000. He that policies were against MILF and he would capture its camps.

Finally, MILF became new Moro Front as the representative of Muslim Moro and had legal authority since the Arroyo's administration. Arroyo declared all out peace in her policy for the conflict of Moro and invited MILF to settle the conflict with negotiation in 2001. The implementation of peace talk could not be separated from other countries that supported the peace talk agenda. The negotiation process among GPH and MLF took several times ago since the Ramos administration in 1996 and continued in the Estrada's in 1998. But, the negotiation process was violated when Estrada initiated a war in April 2000. Arroyo's administration continued the negotiation process by continuing previous peace talks. It started from the resumption of the peace talks between Arroyo's administration and MILF sides held in March 2001 by composing the General Framework of Agreement that signed by Presidential adviser and MILF vice chair for military affairs. In June 2001, the agreement of peace had been signed in Tripoli, Libya.

The negotiation process was still continuing by the implementation of the guidelines of Philippines Government and MILF about each point of Tripoli Peace Agreement. The first aspect of Tripoli Peace Agreement (TPA) 2001 talked about security aspect. It discussed about the implementation of ceasefire agreements between GPH and MILF referred to several agreements of cessation

of hostilities in 1997 and involved the acknowledgement of MILF camp areas in August 2001. Both parties agreed to formulate institution that could monitor their agreement as well as Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) and recognized the third parties intervention from OIC which was represented by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Libya in particular and other interested OIC member States to observe and monitor the implementation of all GPH-MILF agreements.

In May 2002, the rehabilitation aspect as the second aspect of the three aspects from TPA 2001 which talked about the rehabilitation and development project in conflict affected areas was discussed. This point concerned about the agreement to implement the previous agreement on cessation of hostilities in 1997. The main idea here was having a truce not only for negotiations but also for development, for rehabilitation and development to go hand in hand with the negotiations⁹. Both parties also agreed to obey the international humanitarian law which involved the recognition of human right and protection for the victims of the Mindanao conflict. It also covered about the Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and political status¹⁰. The next year, exactly on February 10, 2003, the draft of final peace agreement had been presented by the government peace panel that is Dureza to House speaker Jose De Venecia and senate president Franklin Dilon. However the next day, February 11, 2003, the Philippines armed forces launched a military attack on the Muslim

⁹ Quoted from Santos. Soliman M.2005. *Evolution of the Armed conflict on the Moro Front*. A Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report.

¹⁰ Tripoli Peace Agreement 2001

village and MILF camp at Buliok. In addition, it was continued by bombing Davao which was presumably done by MILF.

Those incidents had become the obstacles for the implementation of negotiation process between both parties. Moreover the government of Arroyo decided to cancel the peace talks in May 2003 and responded by MILF's declaring a 20 day' ceasefire. On July 13, 2003, Hashim Shalamat died and was replaced by Murad Ibrahim to lead MILF. The exploratory talks had been conducted in May 2003 which was one of those talks scheduled on the next agenda about ancestral domain. The ancestral domain agenda was discusses on December 20, 2004. It contained four strands that were concept, territory, resources, and governance. The third aspect of three aspects of TPA 2001 talked about Bangsamoro self-determination toward their homeland, politics, and economic matter. The ancestral domain aspect was assumed to be the greatest agreement that was predicted to solve and settle the Mindanao conflict. This third aspect was a more complex discussion between both parties even though the main issue was about indigenous peoples' right. This problem had been contentious factor since colonialism period and strictly inherent with the Bangsamoro's identities until now. On the other hand, although the ancestral domain aspect was not the last agenda to conduct peace talks, it could be an approach to that conflict and the whole draft of ancestral domain would be finished in March, 2006.

However, both parties also involved in several disputes around the negotiation process or joint statement process to implement the three aspects from that agreement. In fact, the process to hold the negotiation as the solution for the

conflict was not going well. It was showed by several military offensives launched by both conflicting parties. Moreover, Malaysia decided to cancel the peace talks because of the internal problem in the Philippines in June, 2006. Nevertheless, the peace talks between GPH and MILF continued in September 2006 to discuss the difficult problem about areas to be settled by Bangsamoro Judicial Entity. Several incidents happended during the negotiation process and made the peace talks delayed in December 2007 with the focus on Constitutional issues but reached a deadlock. In addition, the point about ancestral domain failed to be signed in July 25, 2008, by both parties after two days of negotiation process in Kuala Lumpur. It was caused by several refusals from Legislative and Judicative parties against ancestral domain points.

The greatest issue and the longest discussion between GPH and MILF was about the third aspect of TPA 2001 that lasted from 2004 to 2008, ancestral domain. It became the final momentum of the failure of peace agreement between GPH and MILF which lasted from 2001 to 2010 (the collapse of Arroyo's administration) after the unconstitutional declaration from Supreme Court. The dynamic of Mindanao conflict in Arroyo's administration was predicted to be due to the difficulties between conflicting parties to find the meeting point or agreement for settling the Mindanao conflict related to the realization of three important points of TPA 2001. Finally, until the end of the Arroyo's administration (2001-2010), they had no final agreement to finish the Mindanao conflict and TPA 2001 had collapsed. There were other supporting parties from both of them incompatible with the peace process of both sides. That was why this

writing discussed about the factors that caused the difficulties of to find the meeting point or agreement between GPH under Arroyo's administration and MILF from 2001 to 2010.

B. Research Question

Why did the negotiations between GPH and MILF under Arroyo's administration fail in resolving Mindanao conflict?

C. Theoretical Framework

In the idea of state, one could not forget about the idea of conflicts as a part of society. Conflicts are something usual in the pluralistic democratic society¹¹ because of any different interest, aim, and perception toward something. It could happen among societies, society and government, government and government (state versus state) and several issues of conflict such as separatism, religion, ethnic, etc. There are three main categories of conflict issues rising namely primordial, instrumentalism, and constructivism issues.

The existence of conflicts is influenced by the actors of conflict as what Kneitschel said:

¹¹According to Kneitschel, Dietmar. 2000. *Conflict Resolution Peace Studies (An Introductory Handbook); Foreword*. Edt. Jayadeva Uyangoda

They can violently confront each other in a zero-sum contest, expressing maximalist goals and intransigent demands, without the readiness to compromise. Or they can act in a flexible manner, by dialogue, negotiation and compromise, thus converting the win-lose-option of the violent alternative of conflict resolution into mutually beneficial win-win-perspective¹².

From that statement one can conclude that to settle any kind of conflict, there are different ways or approaches. Conflicting parties may use military forces for peaceful settlement, and the actors of conflict can determine the direction of conflict itself.

The Mindanao conflict, which involved the Government of Philippines (GPH) and Moro Independence Liberation Front (MILF), particularly in Gloria Macapagal Aroyo's administration (2001-2010), was brought the idea of peace way to settle the conflict. As the first stage, a negotiation was made between both actors producing Tripoli Agreement of 2001-2010. A negotiation could take part even though a war could happen after the negotiation process. According of fisher and Ury, "negotiation is the art of talking about different interest toward an agreement acceptable to the warring parties"¹³. Therefore, the meaning of negotiation is referring to both parties which make concession, it can be intervened by the third party as the mediator of negotiation before deciding to the next step (it can be preparing a war or terminating a war).

¹² ibid

¹³ Fisher, Roger, Ury, William and Bruce Patton. 2008. *Getting to Yes: Teknik Berunding Menuju Kesepakatan tanpa Memaksakan Kehendak* trans. Daniel Haryono and Gloria Situmorang. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia page 58

Although negotiation becomes one of peaceful settlement processes for solving any conflict, there is no guarantee for the success of that process. Sometimes, the negotiators will find themselves in the deadlock situation and the negotiation will fail especially in the case of ethnic and separatism conflict. As well as what Jayadeva Uyangoda states that “when the conflict is over identity – ethnic or religious – the room for compromise solutions becomes more constrained”¹⁴. This happens in several conflicts especially in separatism conflicts like what happened when Sri Lanka government fought against separatism conflict (Macan Tamil) and when Philippines government fought against separatist group such as MIM, BMLO, MNLF and currently those separatist groups was replaced by MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group and Communist group.

Based on Uyangoda’s study on the analysis of separatism conflict, the difficulty of negotiation process in the case of ethnic and separatism conflict is to get an agreement. Further, Uyangoda mentions four variables that become the factors why the negotiation process tends to fail in the case of separatism issues¹⁵.

1. Maximalist of Insurgents

Usually in the internal armed conflict or separatism conflict, the conflict is more difficult to solve because the resistance movement makes a hard bargaining in the negotiation process. The resistant movement has a particular demand to be a separated state or to be independent as their

¹⁴Uyangoda, Jayadeva. 2000. *Conflict Resolution & Peace Studies, (An Introductory Handbook): Negotiation in Conflict* Pg 26. Srilanka: Eriedrich Ebert Stiftung.

¹⁵Ibid page 27

objective. Because of that reason, both parties are difficult to get agreement between them.

When an insurgent movement has set a maximalist goal - for example, the capturing of state power, or establishing a separate state - there is usually reluctance on the part of that movement to revise its goal and to accept something less than the original, final objective.¹⁶

Such conflicts are also propelled by idealistic motivations. In the case of separatism issues in Mindanao, the MILF had the appropriate objective to get independence for Moro as well as Mindanao Island from the Government of Philippines (GPH). However, GPH had its own stance that there would not be separated state of Mindanao Island. It is supported by the idealistic framework that compromising and talking with the ‘enemy’ seem to be incorrect, immoral and harmful to the final goal of one conflicting party. Thus, in a negotiation process, to get consensus toward the idea for settling the dispute is not easy.

2. Inflexibility of the State

States often view insurgent challenges as law-and-order problems that should be solved by the use of military force and tend to see them as domestic problems. The negotiation processes tend to be viewed as the weakness of the state and give the legitimacy to the “enemy” (the existence of rebellion). Therefore, states often tend to be intransigent and uncompromising. This factor makes a negotiation difficult to result in an

¹⁶ Ibid

agreement of both parties. In this circumstance, the negotiation gives impacts such as, legitimating for the enemy and the dilemma of government in their confronting position in the case. This also supports the statement of Uyangoda on the inflexibility of the state:

In such circumstances, negotiations may be seen as (i) giving legitimacy to the enemy's claims, and (ii) the admission of the enemy's strength vis- a-vis the weakness of the state. Therefore, states often tend to be intransigent and uncompromising; until such time that the conflict itself compels the state to seek a negotiated option.¹⁷

It happened in Mindanao Conflict between GPH and MILF, particularly in separatism issues. The reluctance of GPH under Arroyo administration made the negotiation process fail. The condition above becomes the main factor of GPH in Arroyo administration in regarding the settlement processes of Mindanao conflict toward negotiation just compels condition. It showed unwillingness of Arroyo administration in responding the separatism issues in Mindanao.

3. Fear of a Settlement

This variable states that the actors of separatism group are really afraid of the idea of negotiation because they believe that a negotiation is not good way for them. A negotiation is a trap of enemies when they make a deal with each other and the negotiation with other parties; and actually it brings a bad impact toward internal group. When the

¹⁷ Ibid

negotiation process is done, several groups (hardliners) in internal parties come up. It is usually divided in two groups in internal parties that are hawkish groups and dove group. The dove groups tend to support the idea of negotiation but the existence of hawkish groups becomes the obstacle to conduct the negotiation process. They tend to defend their original purpose¹⁸.

This evidence is shown it with the existence of MNLF in the case of the Philippines. When MNLF conducted a negotiation with GRP in Tripoli Agreement in 1996, this policy created a conflict in internal parties which still defend their early purpose. The existence of MILF led by Hashim Shalamat and the existence of ASG led by Abu Sayyaf at that time are the examples of this variable. The reluctance to conduct negotiation was influenced by these problems, particularly separatist strictly struggle for their first purpose. It could happen in the negotiation process between GRP and MILF. The internal body of each conflicting party has been developed into two divisions of groups; dove and hawkish groups.

4. Uncertainty of the Negotiation Outcome

Actors of separatism tend to see the result of negotiation as uncertain and there is no clear implementation for the future in the after the meting of negotiation. Therefore, they do not conduct the agreement

¹⁸ Ibid, page 27

appropriately and they seem to have no trust for each other. Distrust among each other becomes wider against conducting negotiation and makes each have no faith in the negotiation process. This condition is also supported by the shared feeling from both conflicting parties; the doubt and distrust that negotiation process is just a manipulation for buying time or space for a recessing for each conflicting party and for gathering new power (relatively to become stronger than before). In the case of Arroyo's administration response to the MILF, there was inconsistency in the negotiation process with MILF. Several military attacks were thrown around the time of peace talk between GPH and MILF. The reluctance of both conflicting parties to continue and the effort of avoiding the peace process become the evidence that both GPH and MILF had shared skeptical views about the outcomes of their negotiation.

D. Hypothesis

My hypothesis is that the failure of the negotiation process between GPH and MILF in solving Mindanao conflict is caused by four factors, i.e.:

1. There was excessive goals or demand from both in the negotiation process that were difficult to be accepted by both parties.
2. The Inflexibility of the state show the government response to the separatism conflict as the law order problem and the military offensive has

been used to solve it. The reluctance of states to compromise with the separatists also made the negotiation process fail.

3. There was a fear of settlement in both parties which is shown from several splinters in the internal bodies of conflicting parties that emerged when the negotiation was conducted.
4. The negotiation did not generate positive impact toward conflicting parties and it was only the way to buy the time and strategy to prepare a power. As a result, the result of the negotiation would not be implemented in the case of separatism conflict (*uncertainties of negotiations outcomes*)

E. Scope of Research and Analysis

The research data focused on the dynamic of the settlement process between GPH under Arroyo's administration and MILF from 2001 to 2010. It stressed on analyzing both conflicting parties related to each perspective on the Mindanao conflict and answering the research question about the failure of the conflicting parties to settle Mindanao conflict from 2001 to 2010 (related to the TPA in 2001).

F. Method of Research and Analysis

In conducting the research, writer will use deductive method and secondary data for analysis source for the research. Theories were used as a tool of analysis and the basic stand of explaining the phenomena on the dynamic

conflict and process of negotiation between GRP and MILF. Data were gathered from resources such as books, magazines, journals, newspapers, available websites, and other relevant sources related to this case.

G. System of Writing

The first chapter discussed about the introduction of the paper. It consisted of simple explanation on the topic of research, research question, theoretical framework and hypothesis, scope of research, method of analysis, and research and system of writing.

Second chapter described the Dynamics of Conflict in Mindanao represented by several figures. This chapter described the process of conflict happening in Marcos administration until Arroyo administration. Further, this chapter also described the transition of separatism group that was MNLF group into MILF group as the representative of Mindanao Muslims.

Third chapter discussed about the Settlement and Hostility Process in Mindanao Conflict between GPH and MILF 2001-2010 which was intensively done. This part was followed by the negotiation processes of Mindanao conflict and several agenda were conducted by both parties.

Fourth chapter was used as part of analysis and it explained about the difficult factors from both sides to conduct negotiation or the inclination from the failure of negotiation process by using Uyangoda's perspective on separatism

conflict. It is a deep analysis on GRP-MILF's organizing peace settlement on negotiation stage to end conflicting matter and why it could fail with the time frame from 2001 to 2010.

The last chapter was the closing part which concluded the whole discussion.