

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Egypt is a country that could not be removed from the issue of the coup. Various problems occurred in Egypt are part of the political turmoil which indeed the surface not only in the region of the Middle East but also in the international arena. The fascist regimes of authoritarianism, which occurs in the era of Government a year ago, the new era that occurred in Egypt. The Era indicates that democracy begins to come alive and grow. Because from the regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat, until Hosni Mubarak democracy does not exist completely. Various problems was faced by the leader and the dictator in Egypt. One of them is the issue of terrorism which occurred in the international arena since the 9/11 tragedy. In which, at the time of Egyptian came under the leadership of Hosni Mubarak. A variety of policies and views by the regime of Hosni Mubarak's responding to the issue of terrorism began to show.

One form of responses shown by Hosni Mubarak to 9/11 tragedy was that the Egyptian President appeared on Egypt's state television with his cabinet to condemn the attacks on America and all forms of terrorism. Mubarak also conveyed his condolences to President George W. Bush and the American people. Two days later, Mohammed Sayyed al-Tantawi, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Islam's most important seat of learning, also publicly denounced the attack. Tantawi said,

“Attacking innocent people is not courageous ... and will be punished on the Day of Judgment.”¹

What is more interesting than the official government response was the reaction of ordinary Egyptians to the 9/11 and subsequent developments in the war on terrorism. Many Egyptians were simultaneously shocked, horrified and amazed at the attacks and how they were carried out. Others had mixed emotions, expressing feelings of ambivalence; not condoning the murder of innocent civilians while taking pleasure in the fact that America, the most powerful country in the world, had been attacked. Finally, many Egyptians simply did not believe that Arabs or Muslims had carried out the attacks.²

In terms of domestic politics, one might conclude that September 11, 2001 and the rhetoric of terrorism as a new global scourge have provided the Egyptian government with another excuse to limit political freedoms and maintain Egypt’s Emergency law (Law No. 162 of 1958), which has been in place since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. The Emergency Law gives greater powers to the police, suspends certain constitutional rights in the name of security, allows the state to detain individuals and censor and close newspapers more easily and allows authorities to try civilians in front of military and security courts under certain circumstances. Egyptian officials have gone so far as to point to the attacks on America and claim that Egypt’s heavy-handed response to Islamic militants, including limitations on political freedoms, was appropriate and constituted a model

¹ See <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/terrornet/04.html>

² See The Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing (The Gallup Poll of the Islamic World), Princeton New Jersey, February 2002. accessed September 4, 2014

to be duplicated. The Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Abeid, for example, remarked that, “After these horrible crimes committed in New York and Virginia, maybe Western countries should begin to think of Egypt’s own fight against terror as their new model.”³ Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for example, had reported that since 9/11 more Egyptian civilians had been referred to military courts, a violation of international law and standards for fair trial.⁴

In 2012, Mohammed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood movement (IM) which was a leading Islamic organization in Egypt won election democratically in the President election for the first time, after beating Ahmed Syafiq. This was a great victory of the new history by Morsi, not only for Egypt but also for democracy trip to Egypt’s current political map. Morsi proved more interested in consolidating the Brotherhood’s grip on government rather than governing himself, and he drove Egypt into a dead end — so dead that Egyptians took to the streets on June 30 and virtually begged the military to oust Morsi.⁵

Relating to the issue of terrorism, Morsi’s government did not take measures or policy that was intensive to the terrorism. Add it all up and there was a message from the Egyptian majority: No more dead hands; they wanted a government that aspired to make Egypt the vanguard of the Arab world again. No more deadheads; they wanted a government that was run by competent people who could restore order and jobs. No more dead ended; they want a government that would be

³ See http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/war_terrorism.html, accessed September 4, 2014

⁴ See also Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 at <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/>. accessed September 4, 2014

⁵ See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/opinion/friedman-egypts-three-revolutions.html?_r=0, accessed September 4, 2014

inclusive and respect the fact that two-thirds of Egyptians were not Islamists and, though many were pious Muslims, they did not want to live in anything close to a theocracy.⁶

However, the era of Morsi just survived for a few times, since a coup attempt occurred, where Morsi were asked to come down from the office of President. The overthrow of Morsi was also done through the mobilization of the people who wielded by the elite in the era before Morsi. This time, mobilization and the demonstration acts aimed at Islamic Political leadership under Morsi. For the people of Egypt, Morsi have failed to realize what being a fundamental reasons for the people. No wonder if the claims that their act while lowering Mubarak in Tahrir square, echoed back to show that there is no significant difference between the powers of Islamic Politics by Morsi and the power of authoritarian by Mubarak.

On the organizational level, the Brotherhood's way of thinking did not change, nor did the power balances within its decision-making bodies, the [General] Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau in particular. The conservative wing remained dominant, and the Brotherhood interfered in the presidency, issuing statements and adopting positions that conflicted with it. This badly damaged Morsi's image, and made him seem subordinate to the Brotherhood. In a country where the office of president historically enjoyed considerable prestige, the Brotherhood many political and strategic errors that helped to prematurely bring

⁶ See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/opinion/friedman-egypts-three-revolutions.html?_r=0, accessed September 4, 2014

their rule to an end.⁷ As a revolutionary situation, there is never any such thing as an ideal conditions in the Revolution itself. Although Morsi was derived by desire and effort of Egypt people's on the road, however, Egypt military intervention in the process of decreasing Morsi made the process of the revolution could not be assessed easily.

The military of Egypt that originally supported the Government of Morsi ultimately withdrew his support through the ultimatum of General Abdul Fattah El-sisi against Morsi in order to comply with the wishes of the opposition demanding his resignation as President of Egypt. The attitude of Egypt's military could not be released from the attitude of the Morsi that were interfered with the business interests of the military. Even so, Morsi remained obstinately to maintain his position. Finally, on 3 July 2013, Egypt's military under the leadership of 67-General El-sisi did the takeover of power, holding the Morsi, and appointing a temporary President Mansour Adly.⁸

The effort finally makes Morsi to be overthrown and the power of Egypt under the control of the military. Action to take over power by force carried out by Egypt's military made the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) regarded as a party in opposition threatened the Government that recently following power Morsi. And it also gave effect to the domestic conditions of instability to occur, for the large number of civilian casualties that were tumbling. Even the Egyptian Government had already

⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood after Morsi, Series: Research Paper (Siyasat Arabia, No.4: September 2013, pp. 17-23)Khalil al-Enani | October 2013, accessed September 4, 2014

⁸ See S2-2014-339936-chapter5.pdf, accessed September 4, 2014

issued a policy that the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization which resulted in a large number of victims of the attack that occurred in some places.

Policies that consider the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist is demonstrated by the decree, (Apr 17, 2014) On April 8, 2014, the Council of Ministers of Egypt issued Decree No. 579-2014, implementing a court decision issued on December 24, 2013, classifying the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.⁹ The Decree provides that any individual who promotes orally and in writing the membership or activities of the Muslim Brotherhood organization will be punished according to the penalties established under the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 97 of 1992. It also calls for the punishment of any one who finances or joins that organization. (Decree No. 579-2014; Anti-Terrorism Law, Law 97 of 1992, 29 AL JARIDAH AL RASSMAYAH 3 (July 18, 1992).)¹⁰ In addition, the Decree requires the Egyptian government to notify all the Arab countries that joined the Anti-Terrorism Convention of 1998 of the December 2013 court decision and of any Council of Ministers decrees implementing that decision. (Id.; Decision of the President of the Republic No. 279 of 1998 on Joining the Arab Convention to Combat Terrorism, 18 AL JARIDAH AL RASSMAYAH 1312 (May 6, 1999). Finally, the Decree orders law enforcement personnel, including members of police forces and the army, to protect government property from any future attacks that

⁹ See www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403930_text, accessed September 5, 2014

¹⁰ Ibid

might be carried out by individuals affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) organization. (Decree No. 579-2014.)¹¹

B. Research Question

Based on the research background, the formulation of the problem is as follows: Why does Egypt's government decide a policy to declare Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization?

C. Theoretical Framework

The writer prefers to employ concepts for analyzing the research question. Therefore, to analyze the question above, the writer would like to propose the concept of decision making process to answer the hypothesis.

The writer used the theory of political system in order to know the causes of the policy by the government choose a policy to declare Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization.


1. Political System Theory

In 1957, David Easton presents a model of the political systems stressing on the processes of the system which is a function of the roles and balance of power among the actors within the system (see appendix for model). The simplified system is a system of activity transforming input (demands and support) to output (policy) through a complex political process referred to as the black box. (Easton 1957) Focusing on the impact of the three actors

¹¹ See www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_1205403930_text, accessed September 5, 2014

comparable influence on the decision making process using the policy cycle model (Caramani 2008:500-506).

Figure 1. 1 Model of the Political System by David Easton




Easton separate political system with society as a whole, For Easton, political system is a system which is trying to allocate values within the society authoritatively. The allocation of value is only done by institutions having authority vested legitimate (authoritative) nationals in the sight and the constitution. A political system work to produce a decree (decision) and action called policy to allocate value. Units in a political system according to Easton is the political actions on condition of making law. Supervision of the legislative against president, demands elements against the government, and the like. Earlier ex-coworker, a political system obtain feedbacks of the unit of input.

Input is an influence giver against political system. Input consists of two kinds: demand and support. Demands can emerge both in political system and

the internal and external environment. These claims are regard to goods and services (e.g. wages, law employment, road, needs, regard to regulation (e.g. general security, industrial relations), or regard to participation in a political system (e.g. established political parties freedom organize).

Demands have been stimulated then be directed by the actors in a political system to define the important issues to discuss through channels that is in the political system. The other side support is action or orientation to preserve or refuse political system. It can be mentioned that support has two shades of the positive and negative performance of a political system. Once a processed and support systems of the political, at the output called as output, which under Easton range at two entities namely decree (decision) and action. This output on the further conditions would bring a feedback from both parties in the system and political and the environment. This reaction will translated back into format demand and support, and is further forwards performance political system. So work process is happening in patterns cycles.

Figure 1. 2 Model of the Political System by David Easton



So, related to the topic, the writer tries to apply the theory by Easton into the issue. The policies issued by the Government of Egypt's toward Muslim Brotherhood (IM) based on the system and the interests of the regime that strongly oppose the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM), in this intervention carried out by the support and demands of the interest party. After that, the authoritarian attitude shown by the Government after the era of Morsi toward the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) makes every policy that comes out the more encouraging that support came not only domestic but there is also some external factors that affect to any policy making.

The input comes from the demands and support. The demands party come from the strength of the liberal, nationalist, and secular power and the military is the supported party. In the political system, there is a government

under the leadership of General Abdul Fattah El-sisi which is handling the control of every regulation to make policies to declare Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization because, when the Morsi Era, El-sisi actually take the coup action against Morsi's Government.

D. Hypothesis

By examining the theoretical framework and data mentioned previously, the writer takes a tentative statement that, Egypt's government decide a policy to declare Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization because of the political system which affect to the decision making process by the Egypt's government consists of:

- 1) There are Interest from the liberal, nationalist, and secular power in Egypt as the Demands party, and also the Egypt's Military as the Supported party which give the Input to the Government as the decision maker to make a policy as the output.
- 2) It also indicated that since the leadership of Mubarak until the Post-Morsi, Egypt was a close ally of the U.S. in the Middle East and the most significant is the cooperation of Egypt-US Military. Furthermore there is a support by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the policy of Egypt's Government toward Muslim Brotherhood.

E. Scope of Discussion

In terms of the discussion material, the discussion emphasize on the background causing the Egypt government choice about the policy to declare

Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization because it could not get to the main causes as well as the coup problems and crowded action cannot be solved until now in Egypt. Discussions will begin in the era of the issue of terrorism inducted into international issues and as a threat then, the policy by Egypt's government to the terrorists also be essential especially in domestic circumstances in Egypt. Moreover, in Egypt there are some group or the Islamic movements. But, in Morsi era, there is no serious response by the government against terrorism, and recently a year in power, Morsi was deposed, because he is not willing to share the cake of power along with the other party even if they also have a role in the revolution of the people. The time of research is limited from 2001 up to 2013. In 2001, the terrorist attack on 9/11 made the domestic situation in Egypt as well as international arena put more attention in addressing the issue of terrorism. The writer also tries to explain how the process of a coup against Morsi and the policy of Egypt's government in Post-Morsi against the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) and of course the writer will try to find the answer about the policy of Egypt's Government in post-Morsi declare the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as terrorist organization.

F. Research Method

The research employs analyzing method that is using content analysis research which means that the researcher is allowed to research the object without involving in it. It will also follow the development of scientific international relations and their perspectives in observing the topic. The information is gathered by an extensive of relevant published materials such as books, journal, reports,

newsletter, official websites and other resources on a wide variety of topics related to the subject of the research.

G. Writing System

The research paper is as follows:

Chapter I outlines the background of the research, research question, theoretical framework, hypothesis, research method, and writing system.

Chapter II discusses about the policy of Egypt's government to the Islamic Movement in Egypt.

Chapter III discusses about the coup against Morsi and its policies towards Muslim Brotherhood (IM).

Chapter IV provides an analysis and explanation about why does Egypt's government decide a policy to declare Muslim Brotherhood (IM) as a terrorist organization.

Chapter V will concludes and summarizes the research paper.