# THE DEMAND OF POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASE STUDY SPECIAL AUTONOMY REGION STATUS FOR MALAY MUSLIM PATANI IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This thesis discuss about the demand of political rights: case study special autonomy region status for Malay Muslim Patani in southern Thailand, there are Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Malay Muslim Patani feelings about the unfair treatment of administration from central government. Therefore Malay Muslim Patani demand the right of self-determination as proposal of political solution in concepts of autonomy and recognition of their language, culture, religion, control of administrative system and their resources in Southern Thailand. By a change of administrative systems from centralization to autonomy status to determine decentralization administrative system to local government with elected governors and deputy governors by local people. The practical central government should present an act to promote the autonomy status to the provincial areas as the following give distribute the authority of responsibility into local provinces as what they needs and give decentralize the authority of decision-making in local needs.

The thesis tries to analyze two theories are employed to analyze the demand of political rights: case study Special Autonomy Status for the ethnic minority group Malay Muslim Patani in Southern Thailand (Patani), (1). Right of self-determination, (2). Autonomy Region. In this research, extensive of relevant published materials such as books, journals, reports, newsletters, official website and other are used sources a wide variety of references in related topics to conduct the analysis.

**Key word**: political rights, autonomy region, Malay Muslim Patani, right of self-determination, Southern Thailand

#### Introduction

Thailand is a multiethnic and multi-religious country, with a Muslim population of 5 to 7 million out of 67 million people. The majority of Malay Muslims live in Southern Thailand or Pataniland, which had previously gained its independence but later was dominated by Saim. There is a territory in part of the kingdom of Langkasuka which recently has been the part of Thailand. The border provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province. Have a combined population of about 2.5 million people; in which more than 2 million or 80 % of them are Malay Muslim Patani. They call themselves Malay Muslim Patani (*orae nayu*) who speak local Malay (*kecek nayu*), and consider themselves to be different from *orae siye*, ethnic Thai Buddhists who are the minority in the Southern Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

Thai Muslim<sup>2</sup> community in Thailand has been deified into two groups assimilated group and unassimilated group. The former one assimilated group, is Thai Muslims that display a high degree of cultural similarity with Thai- Buddhists ethnic. They live everywhere in Thailand and include a whole diversity of ethnic group such as the Muslim *Siamese, Haw Chinese, Bengalis, Arabs, Iranians, Chams, Javanese, Minangkabaus, Baweans, Pathans, Punjabis and Samsams*. The later one the unassimilated group, is Malay Muslim Patani who live in Southern Thailand. They have different culture, language and tradition form the former group such as Malayu language, Malay name, Malay folklore, Malay attire and Malay music.

As a brief history of Pataniland, in the past residents of the five southern provinces were multiple ethnic groups. However, Malay have been predominating for several centuries. After 1906, the kingdom of Siam annexed the Malay Muslim provinces in sultanate of Nong Chik, Ra-ngae, Raman, Sai Buri, Yala, and Yaring which were parts of the Malay Muslim Patani owned by the state of Patani. Next, Siam united the provinces into one to be known as "Greater

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pathan, Don. 2012. The Role of Civil Societies in Thailand's Deep South. Thailand: The Patani Forum

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The term "Thai Muslim" is seen as ethnically offensive by the Malay Muslims of the South because it was imposed by Bangkok after the declaration of the Patronage of Islamic Act of 1945. Deep southerners prefer referring to themselves as "Malay Muslims," but this has an ethnic, regional, and sectarian flavor that overlooks the other sections of the Thai Muslim community spread across the country, which differ along ethnic, provincial, and even theological lines from those in the Deep South. Therefore, this paper uses the terms "Thai Islam" and "Thai Muslims" when referring to the general profile of the Muslim community of Thailand, and "Malay Muslims" for those residing in the Deep South.

Patani" or a subdivision of Patani. The Siam annexation was further strengthened in 1909 by an Anglo-Siamese treaty that drew a border region between Pattani and the Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, and Perlis. According to this treaty, the Great British accepted kingdom of Siam sovereignty over Patani. In return, Siam gave up its territorial claim over Kelantan and recognized Great British control over the other Malay states of Kedah, Perak, and Perlis.<sup>3</sup>

Afterward the centralization policy, made the former Patani state to be divided into three provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province which now make up the three Malay Muslim majority provinces of the Southern Thailand. This period also saw the beginning of the Patani separatist movement, which was initially a royalist movement led by Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin, a prominent Pattani leader and the son of the last kingdom of Pattani.

The era of World War II witnessed the beginning of the Patani nationalist movement. Led by Haji Sulong, it was put down by the central Thai authorities. During the 1970s, the resistance evolved into a nationalist irredentism, and had become a form of ethno religious nationalism with a strong emphasis on Malay Muslim Patani ethnic and religious identity.

The Malay Muslim Patani have always wanted the Thai government to accept their identity, culture and religion. They demanded political right from Thai government to give precedence in their own autonomy power. In 1947, one Malay Muslim Patani, Haji Sulong demanded for local autonomy to Thai government. Its role as custodians of religious and ethnic tradition make him an important figure in the conflict.

## Haji Sulong Said:

We Malays are conscious that we have been brought under Siamese rule by defeat. The term "Thai Islam" with which we are known by the Siamese government reminds us of this defeat and is therefore not appreciated by us. We therefore beg of the government to honor us with the title of Malay Muslims so that we may be recognized as distinct from Thai by the outside world.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand,"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," p.22.

The first person to bring Malay Muslim nationalist ideas to Southern Thailand was the Islamic cleric Haji Sulong, who was a reformist and political activist educated in Mecca. Upon returning to Pattani in 1930, he was engaged in the reform of the Malay Muslim community and represented its interests to the government by seeking political autonomy within a federal system. In 1947, Haji Sulong made seven demands to the central government as followed:

The seven demands, which essentially were a request to re-establish an autonomous region for the Muslim South, were:

- The appointment of a person with full powers to govern the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun. This person must have the power to fire, suspend or replace all local civil servants. This person must be a native of one of the four provinces and must be elected by the inhabitants of the four provinces.
- 2. 80 per cent of all civil servants in the four provinces must be Muslim.
- 3. The Malay language must be an official language alongside the Thai language.
- 4. The teaching in primary schools must be done in Malay.
- 5. Muslim laws must be recognized and implemented under the aegis of an Islamic court, separated from the civil court where the *qadhi* (Muslim judge) is seating as an assistant.
- 6. All taxes and incomes collected in the four provinces must be used locally.
- 7. The establishment of a Muslim affairs bureau with full powers to manage Muslims affairs under the authority of the governor mentioned in the first point.

This demands were presented on 24th August 1947 by Haji Sulong, on behalf of the Malay-Muslim population of the South to a commission sent by Bangkok to investigate the complaints of Malay Muslim about the abuses of power by local government officials. The petition made clear that its intention was not to violate the Siamese constitution but to create better conditions of living for the Malay Muslims.

He was focusing on right of self-determination in political freedom for the Malays Muslim and the preservation of their language. His only religious demand involved the recognition and enforcement of Muslim law.<sup>5</sup> The demands of Haji Sulong were about the nature of political relations between the Malay Muslims Patani and central authority.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> M. L. Thomas, "Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand," in Forbes, op. cit., p. 21.

The beginning of political movement insurgency, conflicts had arisen between Siamese Buddhist rulers and the majority of the Malay Muslim residents Muslim. Differences are not confined to the languages and religions, but also on education systems and subsequent inequality to life opportunities and socio-economic disparities. They had caused Malay Muslim establish a separatist movement group in 1947-1948 for demanding the right for Pataniland. This separatist movement was known as Gabogan Malayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR, Greater of Patani Malayu Movement). The group was led by Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen, the son of the deposed raja of Pattani. After the death of the leader of GAMPAR in 1954, the members who were still active established a new group. Three major groups were formed during this period; The BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani or National Front for the Liberation of Patani) founded in 1959. The BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional or National Revolutionary Front) established in 1960, and the PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization) founded in 1968. Notably, during the period of 1960s to the 1990s was marked by guerrilla actions, political activism and the emergence of cell structures. The BNPP represented a coalition of the aristocracy and conservative Islamic class. The BRN adopted Malay nationalism as its driving force, aiming to develop the Malay identity of the people of southern Thailand and calling for solidarity with Malays in other countries of the region. During the 1980s, BRN suffered from an internal rift and split into three factions: BRN Ulama, BRN-Coordinate, and BRN Congress. The PULO focused more on secular nationalism than Islam. By the 1970s, PULO was the most violently active of all the separatist organizations. 6 So all of these separatist groups goal is to demand right of self-determination in Pataniland.

The southern Thailand conflict has become a hot-spot for insurgency against the Thai security forces. The causes of the insurgency were a different nation (imagined notions of an earlier Patani nation), a different religion (Islam rather than Buddhism) different ideology, ethnic conflict and political-interest. Insurgency began a low-intensity violent conflict since late 2001, with violence increasing sharply after January 2004. The conflict had been between government and insurgent group which aimed at establishing a movement of right of self-determination and to be separated from Thailand and to be grouted on autonomy system within Thai constitution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Funston, Malaysia and Thailand's Southern Conflict, p. 238.

So, several Malay Muslim demand the right of self-determination as proposal of political solution conflict in Southern Thailand. The concepts of autonomy and self-determination are related but not interchangeable and there is debate on whether either constitutes an actual right under law or not Malay Muslim demanded right as the local inhabitants and to legally claim self-determination under law. Autonomy was a potential solution for the conflict of Malay Muslim Patani ethnic minority group. There are also similarities with case of Aceh and Mindanao.

The demand of Malay Muslim is political right in Southern Thailand as it was considered as an important proposed argument in solving the political conflict. This proposal were to introduce governance reform action in Southern Thailand in a way that it was congruent with the problem and specific nature of local areas and population, By giving precedence of right of self-determination in autonomy form to local people. The demand of right were based on a notion that at core of the conflict that has been escalating into violence was the incongruous power relationship between the central government and local authority as the result of historical, cultural, and identity differences as well as the local feelings about the unfair treatment by past and present administrations.

However, this demand of special autonomy could be deemed to be the Malay Muslim Patani movement's strategic retreat. Surely, they had to deal with tough questions brought up by their constituent groups and political allies. But such stance could not easily satisfy Thailand's political leaders and the armed forces either.

These of demands of right of self-determination done in the past by Haji Sulong proposed the nature of political relations between the Malay Muslims and the Thai state. One among others was an essentials call for a review of the autonomy status of the Malay Muslims in the Southern Thailand and that their rightful place in the modern Thai nation-state was as equal citizens with distinctive rule and government. Other demands demonstrated their desire for respect and equal treatment for the Malay ethnicity and Islamic practice. Therefore, the government of Thamrong rejected the pleas saying they were a return to the previous old sultanate kingdom in which the power to rule resided in one person. At that time, the concept of autonomy and self-determination was rarely heard in the Thai political discourse. The key concept was (and still is) a unified one nation-state based on Thai nationalism. Since his mysterious death in 1954, Haji Sulong has become a symbol of resistance to the Thai state.

The peace dialogue initiate a led by both the Thai government's representatives led by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Patani liberation movement led by the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN) was started in late February 2013. Following the peace talk, one of the proposed approaches right of self-determination to the political reform of Southern Thailand like a special autonomy region.

The proposal referring to the ownership right was included in the detailed explanation of BRN's fourth demand whereby it principally called for the Thai authorities to recognize the existence and ownership right of Malay Patani nation to Pataniland. The detailed explanation also reiterated the acknowledgement of the existence of Malay Patani community and its ownership right connected with the history of the region and its population. Besides, an emphasis was put on the meaning of the right to self-determination to autonomy form, which was within the legal context of Thailand's Constitution and had nothing to do with the desire to separate the region from the Thai state's territory.

## **Research question**

Why did Malay-Muslim Patani demand a change of administrative system from centralization to special autonomy region status in Southern Thailand conflict?

#### Literature review

Duncan McCargo is professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leeds. He recently spent a year conducting fieldwork in Pattani, in journal title: Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thinking the Unthinkable? He explained about series of recent developments suggest that reformed governance arrangements and political solution for Southern Thailand Conflict were becoming more thinkable, though they have yet to gain strong political traction. Autonomy arrangements of various kinds had been adopted elsewhere in the region, including in Aceh in Indonesia and Mindanao in Philippines. Thai authorities Autonomy had been extremely reluctant to explore such options. He mentioned perceived the problem as a struggle of old power and new power competing against one another. He saw the Southern Thailand as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Duncan McCargo (2010), 'Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thinking the Unthinkable?' Pacific Affairs, 18 (2), pp. 261–281.

being influenced by network monarchy and that when Thaksin Shinawantra became prime minister. He also mentioned why Malay Muslim people against Thai government. It later led to violent conflict affecting Southern Thailand's Malay-majority and caused Malay Muslim Patani having no right in self-determination and political right in region. Some of Malay Muslim demand to solve violent conflict and proposed an argument as a political solution to this conflict. Such proposals were to introduce governance reform of the Southern Thailand in a way congruent with the problems and specific nature of local areas and population, by proposing approaches to the political reform of the Southern Thailand region like a special administrative region or special autonomy.

Therefore, McCargo, mentioned that Haji Sulong, the one who have been proposed form a special autonomy to Thai government produced a set of seven demand that articulated local demands for changes in governance and justice arrangements for region. Other had included Dr. Prawase Wasi (one of the architects of the 1997 constitution), former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former interior minister Chalerm Yubamrung, and Srisompob Jitpiromsri. Their proposals range from full autonomy for the Southern Thailand to a national project of regionalization, as well as the creation of a new ministry to oversee the area. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had offered mixed messages on the subject, but had indicated sympathy for some form of decentralization. This article argues that despite the controversial nature of such proposals, there is a slowly emerging consensus around the need for a political solution to the conflict. He also pointed the various figures who had proposed some form of autonomy or decentralization for the Southern Thailand could start to cooperate, Thailand might begin to find a way to transcend the country's apparently intractable political divisions and need to solve the political solution.

Thanet Aphornsuvan, mentioned in her book entitled: Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories,<sup>8</sup> Patani and Thailand (Siam) histories is lack of understanding about the nature of old rivalries and conflicts between the two states and cultures. Suggested that the history should be read and interpreted in light of the contemporary situation, He argued the Thai state accorded some degree of religious freedom to the Muslims Malay Patani, pluralism,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Aphornsuvan, Thanet. 2007. Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories. East-West Center Washington: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia.

culture identity, politics and self-government which had never been accepted. Before The central Thai authorities were satisfied with a degree of assimilation of individual Muslims largely through modern secular education programs and economic development policies undertaken by the Sarit government. But when Islam was equated with a non-Thai culture, as in the Malay Muslim south, misunderstanding and conflict between the Malay Muslims and the Thai state became a breeding ground for violence. Official by, Thai Muslim is acceptable as Thai citizens, Malay Muslims Patani are not accepted.

He also mentioned that Malay Muslim movement was not a rebellion but they acted out of their self-determination struggle whose aim is for demanding right of ownership and for Malay Muslims Patani to be regard of national self-determination as a fundamental right in Southern Thailand. And that The Thai state is the most important key to any lasting peaceful solution to the conflict. The way of solution conflict by political determination to resolve the conflict in the region give peaceful means. Armed force should be used only to support a political solution by establishing autonomy system and the Thai state need to accept right of ownership Malay Muslim in region.

Chaiwat Satha-Anand in article: fostering Authoritarian Democracy with Violence: the effect of violent solution to Southern Violence in Thailand. He sees the problem as having its roots from involved rebellion and uprising of separatist group against the Siam annexation of kingdom of Patani. He also sees the conflict as the long struggle fight for right of self-determination from the Thai state. This argument is widely supported by scholars who believed that historical factors are critical for the people of the Southern Thailand. Chaiwat also emphasized on how relationship between reality and violence have become a significant factor over the years of Patani's struggle for self-determination helps account for developments prior to 2004 upsurge in violence. Nevertheless, the dramatic change in position from 2004 has set of realities that involves by both internal and external factor. More than one set of realities now needs to be understood and explained.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Satha-Anand, Chaiwat. Fostering Authoritarian Democracy with Violence: the effect of violent solution to Southern Violence in Thailand, (paper presented as empire conference, National University of Singapore, September 23-24, 2004).

## **Theoretical Framework**

#### 1. Right of self-determination

The right of self-determination is one of the most important rights accepting selfdetermination as a legal right in international law and first found legal status in the Charter of the United Nations. However its application at this stage was still in the hands of colonial powers recognized as a right of peoples under colonial rule to gain independence. In the context of Decolonization when Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was passed by the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), it was adopted by the United Nations in 1960. The right of self-determination can be defined as "the right of all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development".<sup>10</sup> To simplify, what people demands through the demand of self-determination for freedom from colonialism is an independence state and a right for ethnic minority group in politic, economic and social cultural affairs by establish autonomy system to claim their right within state authority. The demand right of self-determination emerged due to the different historical, cultural identity, language and religion with other states. In the same context, the minority group of Muslim Malay Patani in southern Thailand they demanded of right to self-determination in politic, economic, and social-culture by establishing autonomy in their own land.

### 2. Regional Territorial Autonomy

In local administrative in pluralism specific for Malay Muslim Patani they are Muslim people live in southern Thailand. They claim right to self-determination in region bases of identity such as history, cultural, religion and political right to establish autonomy region and the opportunity Malay Muslim Patani demand autonomy region in southern Thailand under Thai constitution by following model Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). The idea of regional autonomy for Malay Muslim Patani in concept decentralization under "self-government" has certain features such as self-political administrative elected governors by

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  Kristina Roepstorff, Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples within the Human Rights Context: A Right to Autonomy?, p.  $^{10}$ .

representative local people, promoting social-culture identity and manage economic development to political participation. More than regional autonomy was achieved by giving regional autonomy have self-government more freedom in generating their own political administrative and economic development also then more promote and protect culture identity, natural resources, education system, environment and sanitation.

The autonomy for Malay Muslim Patani is a device to allow their ethnic that claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control over internal affairs and administrative of them to exercise those powers-sharing and interest. They call autonomy to be defined as a means of internal power-sharing aimed from centralization to local in preserving cultural identity and ethnic variety, under respecting the state. By permanently transferring from central government to local a certain degree of power suitable for particular purposes to a certain territory, giving its population the possibility of self-government and administration power.

The one of idea for resolving southern Thailand conflict was autonomous region (*khet pokkrong piset*) but not separate, such as in Patani peace process to solve conflict by political solution in context autonomy, Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, said: the conflict do not aim to put a definite end to the conflict but rather to transform it from a violent conflict to a non-violent conflict, he explain it is common for any society to have conflict, which is indeed a good thing and conflict could be a good drive for social transformation. The point is that one should not use violence to resolve in political solution such as form autonomy region. He said, political solution by establish autonomy or self-government is a process that various Thai government, insurgent group and local people have to come together. We shouldn't let conflict parties alone determine how to end the conflict. It is necessary to engage civil society groups, academics, local leaders, religious leaders. Most importantly, people need to be given space to voice their views on how to accept and find model of autonomy to way out from this conflict. <sup>12</sup>

The conflict solution should not be monopolized by the Thai government and insurgents group. Autonomy region proposals of conflict solution also need to come from the all of side, they have to move together and through various forms. This will strengthen the process and increase negotiation power to one option such as autonomy region and self-administration. If

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  Interview with Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

this process gains some traction, it could be a tipping point that helps reduce violence. This proposals from non-violent force are likely to have more legitimacy, which does not necessarily means that the insurgents group have to shut down their ideology for separate state but made common the political solution in form of autonomy.

The autonomy region in southern Thailand conflict need the political relationship between the Southern Thailand and the central state have been steadily presented as a possible out way of the conflict by political solution. The earliest instance in 1947 was the seven demands of Haji Sulong it was calls for political autonomy and devised by a committee of local leaders without much consultation of the people. But since 2009, several new proposals for a change in the political framework in Southern Thailand Conflict have been done either by political parties or by civil society groups. The main idea autonomy region is to implement a "special administrative" (Autonomy region) under Thai constitution for the Southern Thailand following the model already in place in Special Administration of Bangkok and Pattaya city. It means a direct election for governors and the establishment of people's assemblies. In one of its version, the proposal would borrow the concept of "Greater of Patani" and special autonomy by reform of the political administrative in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat would be regrouped in one entity managed by one elected governor. A council of religious leaders would advise both the governor and the people's assembly, also directly elected, on matters which have religious implications. In another version, each of the Southern Thailand province would have its own elected governor and deputy governor by local people. Alongside this administrative reform, the educational system would also be restructured with the introduction of a bilingual system, using Thai and Malay. Malay would become an official language, in parallel with Thai, and both languages used throughout primary and secondary levels.

## The international support administration system in southern Thailand

The Malaysia support peace process in Southern Thailand Conflict since 2005 namely Langkawi Pece Process<sup>13</sup> by former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, with a green-light from the Thai government, initiated the so-called, in which leaders from the exiled

<sup>13</sup> Patani Forum, 2012. Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State pg.

separatist groups were invited to a series of discussions to nail out a set of recommendations for a peace process with the Thai government. The process discussed a wide range of issues including Malay identity, social mobility, and use of Malay as a nation language, amnesty, education and economic development. The plan drafted by participants acknowledged Thai sovereignty while calling for greater political and economic space for Malay-Patani people in Southern. In this peace process the separatist group they demand right of self-determination and culture identity to establish autonomy in region.

The Indonesia also support peace process in Southern Thailand Conflict, under The Bogor peace dialogue by Vice President Jusuf Kallain in 2008. <sup>14</sup> This peace dialogue were meant to be a secret gathering between a group of 16 separatist leaders and Thai government representatives, led by a retired general-former Fourth Army commander General Kwanchart Klaharn and his team and the Indonesian was facilitated. In this process just talk about peace proposal and peace keeping in southern Thailand. So, Indonesia help made peace then also give scholarship to Patani student in area such as Muhammadiyah organization give scholarship in bachelor's degree special list to Southern Thailand Student each year since 2009.

#### Conclusion

The ten years of use violence have made this conflict a protracted one with endless loss. This research can mention the root cause of the conflict lies in ethnicity, history, and religion resulting in physical, structural administration, and cultural identity violence for decades. Suppression and deprivation of Malay identity by the state's apparatus not complying with local culture and practices have led to the legitimacy deficit of the governance the local feelings of being treated unjustly and consequently vicious violence committed by conflict parties. The solution to this prolonged conflict is to address the root cause by plainly exploring alternative governance arrangements establish autonomy, safeguarding justice, while sustaining peace dialogue.

The demand of right to self-determination is hot-spot issue in southern Thailand conflict have been Malay Muslim Patani to define ownership right under Patani land. Some of insurgent group demand to Thailand government in peace talk in 2013, one of the proposed approaches

 $^{14}\ Patani\ Forum, 2012.\ Negotiating\ a\ Peaceful\ Coexistence\ between\ the\ Malays\ of\ Patani\ and\ the\ Thai\ State\ pg. 32$ 

to the political reform of the southern Thailand region like a special administrative region (autonomy) this one of the demands was the Thai government to recognize the existence and ownership right of Malay Muslim Patani nation in Patani homeland. The detailed explanation also reiterated the acknowledgement of the existence of Malay Patani community and its right of self-determination connected with the history of the region and its population. Besides, an emphasis was put on the meaning of the right to self-determination, which was within the legal context of Thailand's constitution and had nothing to do with the desire to separate the region from the Thai state's territory. It should also be pointed such demand was a call for the acknowledgement or recognition of the political status of Malay Muslim Patani that was independent and the ownership right of Malay Patani nation to the homeland

However the demand of political right to a change administrative system from centralization to autonomy status in political solution of Malay Muslim Patani to solve conflict in region. They demand was about the nature of political relations between the Malay Muslims Patani and the Thai state. It essentially called for a review of the political status of the Malay Muslims in the Southern Thailand conflict and that their right of self-determination to Thai nation-state were as equal citizens in religion, culture, economy and political with distinctive rule and government. Other demands demonstrated their desire for respect and equal treatment for the Malay ethnicity and Islamic practice. The decentralization of Thailand under constitution the Plan and Steps of Decentralization Act 2001, local government can exercise their power to control and manage community activities can respond Malay Muslim Patani desire their local. Many proposals have become a part of mainstream debate. It would be implement a special administration for the southernmost provinces Greater Pattani City (Maha Nakhon Pattani) model similar with Bangkok administration to manage and control political, economy and culture issue by local determine decentralization administrative system to local government in form autonomy region with elected governors and deputy governors by local people. In addition, the practical central government should present an act to promote the decentralization to the provincial areas as the following give distribute the authority of responsibility into local provinces as what they needs and give decentralize the authority of decision-making in local needs. The autonomy region can be happened dependent upon the situation and agreement among the delegations in negotiation.

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## Biography



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