

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN
ADMINISTRATION 2000-2004 AND 2004-2008

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Sarjana Ilmu Politik
(S.IP) in the Dept. of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences, University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background:

Democracy is the system of rule by the ruled. It is derived from the Greek *δημοκρατία* (*demokratia*), which means "popular government" coined from *δῆμος* (*dēmos*), "people" and *κράτος* (*kratos*), "rule, strength".¹ In modern democracies, supreme authority is exercised for the most part by representatives elected by popular suffrage. The representatives may be supplanted by the electorate in accordance with the legal procedures of recall and referendum, and they are, at least in principle, responsible to the electorate. What is currently understood and most frequently is used, the rule by majority.

Even though there is no universally accepted definition of 'democracy', there are two principles that any definition of democracy is required to have. The first principle is that all members of the society are having equal access to power, and second all members to have the freedom to live their lives as they want to. If democracy is not restricted by a special system of check and balances, that rule can easily deteriorate and ceases to be a democracy and becomes something else, such as an aristocracy (government by the best) or an oligarchy (government by the few).

¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/democracy>

Russian Federation (*Rossiyskaya Federatsiya*) or Russia is one of the world's largest countries; it is almost twice the size of the next largest country, Canada. Russia is a state who tries to find their democracy since the Emporium of Russia until becoming Russian Federation. Russia sprawls across Eastern Europe and northern Asia. It possesses mineral resources unmatched by any other country. Some people who live in the European are a part of Russia, west of the Ural Mountains. The capital city, Moscow regained as capital status after the Russian Revolution in 1917.² Moscow is an administrative, commercial, industrial, and cultural hub in the heart of European Russia.

In 1922, Russia began as the world's first communist state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). At that time Russia was the largest and most powerful Soviet republic.³ After the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Russia emerges as a big country with full of problems of both political and economical problems. Russia began transforming itself into a more democratic society with an economy based on market mechanisms and principles. For many Russians the transformation brought a severe decline in the standard of living, and Russia became more integrated by the global economy and got benefit from improved relations with the countries of the European Union as well as its neighbors in Asia.

In the political life, Russia was a bit influenced by western political system. They start the political democratization where articulated on the direct general

² <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/russia>

³ Engelmann, KurtE., et al. "Russia." Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

election of president and members of parliament. In addition, the US parliamentary system is adopted by Russia through its bicameral parliament (Federal Assembly); the State Duma and the Federation Council which replace the Congress of People's Deputies.

State Duma is a constitution that gives more impact than Federation Council. It has legacy to control, advice and recommend to the Government. Beside that, this constitution has an authority in processing an impeachment to the president. Federation Council only has a legacy to review legislative in budget and financial along with the foreign policy issues which is ratifying some treaty or declaring a war.

The first president of Russia is Boris Yeltsin. He was elected shortly a month before the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 25 December 1991. Since 12 June 1990 he declared as an independent state. The period of Yeltsin generally showed the characteristic of transition from Soviet Union to democratic republic.⁴ In this period the relation between authorities which was not structured well after Soviet Union collapse was increasing political conflict that could not be avoided. Bad economy was an inheritance from Soviet Union became a crucial problem. Boris Yeltsin ended his career as a president of Russia before his term finished. He declared that Putin was his choice for the next president of Russia.

⁴ A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru menuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 198

Vladimir Putin the second president of Russia was born in 1952. He is a Russian politician who became the second democratically elected president of Russia in 2000. Putin was born in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). He joined the KGB, the secret police of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Putin graduated from law school at Leningrad in 1975.⁵ In 1990, he worked in the KGB's foreign intelligence service and invited to Moscow to work in the administration of President Boris Yeltsin. In 1997, he was appointed as the head of the department responsible for carrying out Yeltsin's decrees.⁶ A years later he became chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB), one of the two main organizations into which the KGB had been divided when the USSR broke up in 1991. In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin to become prime minister of Russia.

In March 2000, Putin was elected to a full term and won almost 53 percent of vote. During His first term, Putin continue what Yeltsin and Gorbachev did in reforming policy by his way. Russia's economy improved dramatically, and many voters credited Putin for this development. At the second term in March 2004 he succeeded again and won 71 percent of the vote.⁷ But The International election observer noted that the state-run media displayed a "clear bias" and Putin is denied access of the other candidate.

Putin has orchestrated several changes to the electoral system that he claims will create a strong and stable party system with fewer parties. These changes have

⁵ "Vladimir Putin." *Microsoft® Encarta® 2006* [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ "Vladimir Putin." *Microsoft® Encarta® 2006* [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

begun to result in party mergers, that small parties were joining together or joining larger parties in order to survive. The changes include giving parties the exclusive prerogative to nominate candidates, providing state funding that benefits parties that have received more votes.

At the same time, the Putin administration has moved against parties and activities which is he dislike. He was motivated at least in part by his political ambitions and his support for the democratic liberal opposition to a Party in the upcoming Duma election.

Putin seems to aim at blocking the oligarchs (leaders of the top private firms) and other entrepreneurs from gaining greater political influence through support for opposition parties and for candidates in single member district races. Since Khodorkovskiy's arrest and imprisonment, businessmen have sharply reduced their donations to opposition parties, and business groups have pledged fealty to Putin.

The president has a full power and should be advised or over viewed by the Federal Assembly (Duma, the constitution that has a legacy to impeach the president). But they were not done their obligation. It seems reversed and Duma is controlled by Putin.

B. Core Problems:

Based on the problem in the background, hence a core problem, emerge that is:

“Why is Duma under controlled by Vladimir Putin breakdown the democracy?”

C. Conceptual Framework / Theory:

Separation of Power

This is a principle in dividing three constitutional authorities, namely Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. It is in line with John Locke thought “Separating Powers” and Montesquieu who said “Liberty could last only where power was distributed among different department of government”. With that principle, they devide the authority in that three constitution will be independent and give interpedently.

The Russia federation government is composed of three branches⁸:

- Legislative: The bicameral Federal Assembly, made up of the State Duma and the Federation Council makes federal law, declares war, approves treaties, has the power of the purse, and has power of impeachment, by which it can remove sitting members of the government.

⁸ Mas' oed mohtar, *Ilmu Hubungan Internasional disiplin dan metodologi*. LP3ES. Jakarta, 1990 page 121

- Executive: The president is the commander-in-chief of the military, can veto legislative bills before they become law, and appoints the Cabinet and other officers, who administer and enforce federal laws and policies.
- Judiciary: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Arbitration and lower federal courts, whose judges are appointed by the Federation Council on the recommendation of the president, interpret laws and can overturn laws they deem unconstitutional.

Checks and Balances

This is a system which rows the interior structure in Government. It gives a mutual relation in structural government and as a tool to make the council stay on their place. It will cover one and the others from one act to the others, include the act of two legislative together.

According to the Constitution, which was adopted by national referendum on December 12, 1993 following the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, Russia is a federation and a semi-presidential republic, wherein the President is the head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government⁹. The Russian Federation is fundamentally structured as a representative democracy.

An Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chambers of the Federal Assembly. The government is regulated by a system of checks and balances defined by the

⁹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia>

Constitution of the Russian Federation, which serves as the country's supreme legal document and as a social contract for the people of the Russian Federation but when we saw at On the Concentric Circle, Duma the other legislative in Russia, people representative is not included. The structural, can be said that Russia government system supports the authoritarianism, because ideally the legislative that is people representative is controlled by government. The pattern in structural may not make that things happen.


Concept of Power

Political scientist have no agreement on the meaning of power, there is many definition of power from Political scientist. The definitions are:

- Power is a men control over the minds and actions of other men
(Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau).
- Power is a short of enabling device to carry out implement policies or decisions. (Michael Roskin)
- Power is the capacity to influence behavior throught the threat of coercion.
Power depends upon the use, or threat of use, of negative or positive sanction.
(Mark R. Amstutz).

From that definition writer took a point that definition in above that Power is a capability of a person or institution or a nation to control the others. It is a way to get political goal.

Main parts of power:¹⁰



There are three main parts in the concept of power: Force, Influence and Authority. Force is *an explicit threat or military power, economy or other ways that are used for threatening or pushing some one to get his/her political goals.*¹¹ In force there is coercion, it is a tools to show of force or the use of threat to intimidate person or group. Coercion means a man capacity to coerce the behavior of the other through the threat of sanction.

Influence is *persuasive tools (without violence) by an actor to guarantee someone acts are equal, with his/her political goals.* A person is said to have influence over another person when he can get him to do some thing he would not do the other wise and needs persuasion to convince a person that's equal with what he done.

Authority is *the capacity of a person or institution to command obedience without coercion.* The volunteer attitude from a person or institution those act equal with an order from a person who gives an order. Authority is a legitimate power, but this political power not always in close with legitimacy. Authority is not based on the

¹⁰Mas' oed Mohtar, *ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL Disiplin dan Metodologi*, PT pustaka LP3ES indonesia, Jakarta, June 1990. page 119

¹¹ *Ibid* page 118

superior force of those issuing commands but derives from the popular recognition that some people and situations have the right to issue commands. If the government authority is based on voluntary acceptance of the right to rule, the degree of authority is directly proportional to the level of legitimacy (*an attitude or behave from people that accept to the moral right of leader to govern, order, make and role the political decision*).¹²

Authority is power, but power not always authority. Authority in this statement is different with the part of power. A person who has power in politics can make a decision in politics. In authority the decision made always based on the source of moral (Power in position, capability, normative and popularity). The principle of moral is more than general value, it can be written law or tradition or every kind of thing that is unwritten. Moral is controlling the attitude of leader and people who accept the order. That means moral is decided who has a right to lead and who gets an order.

Source of authority¹³:

1. *Right from tradition*, it means a person needs a blue blood to lead. If he/she is not from the king or sultan or the past leader generation he/she cannot be a leader.
2. *Right from god*, this right of lead got from god that is chosen by a Sakral way. For example the Caesar Hirohito from Japan (and his replacement), people in Japan believe that he is the son of Sun (God).

¹²Surbakti, Ramlan. *Memahami ilmu politik*. Pt garamedia Widiasarana, Jakarta, 1992. Page 93.

¹³ *Ibid* Page 86.

3. *Right from charisma*, this is a special leader. Not every people have a charisma in to become a lead. A leader who has charisma ha self Quality to enchantment to every people who saw him/her. His physical posture and performance give him popularity.
4. *Right from people by rule*. It choice by procedure and requirement.
5. *Right from skill and rich*. The Skill means how to govern that is measuring on his science and knowledge of technology. The Rich is mean he/she use his/he money, land or wealthy to lead and become a leader.

The concept of power is use full to show the way of Putin in lead the Russia, Putin is a man who has Power to control, authority to lead and legitimacy from people in Russia. He use his charisma and skill to influence his group and force his opposite who threat his place and who want to brake the system that made by him and his group.

Putin has orchestrated several changes to the electoral system that he claims will create a strong and stable party system with fewer parties. These changes have begun to result in party mergers, with small parties joining together or joining larger parties in order to survive.

He controls every importance place that becomes a main place of politic. He manipulates the information in media to increase his popularity and block his opposite who want to fill on his govern, he several changes to the electoral system to win the election for him and his people, he block any activity such political

movement and NGO which is threat his politic. Putin and his group purpose are to sit on his governance and stay on his place as a leader. This will discuss more intent and give much evidence that show on chapter III.

Superpresidentialism

One of the most salient and consequential features of the Russian political system is superpresidentialism. It is a constitutional order that provides for an extraordinarily strong president and relatively weak legislature. In a superpresidentialism system, the president enjoys the power to legislative by decree, to determine the composition of government, and to shield the executive branch from parliamentary scrutiny.

The president also lords over a sprawling, multilayered, and multifaceted bureaucratic apparatus that is far larger than analogous structures in western democracies. Many Russians believe that a strong presidency furnished the firmest institutional basis for concentrating power and promoting governmental decisiveness and effectiveness.

Same as like presidentialism or parliamentarism, superpresidentialism is a form democracy.¹⁴ Superpresidentialism regimes provide for regular, open elections as well as for associational right and civic freedoms, including the right to criticize the president and to organized opposition parties.

¹⁴ Finan William W.Jr Current History A journal of Coneporary affair. October 1997. Page 326

Superpresidentialism lodges most of power of control and expenditure of state resources in the executive branch and provides for little or no oversight of the executive by legislature. It will give much opportunity to Putin to have a full authority in do his politics in role the official government.

D. Hypothesis:

Duma is under controlled by Putin that breakdown the democracy because:

1. Putin has a strong political power that can manipulate media, election and political movement. He infiltrates duma and some other political institution by his men.
2. Superpresidentialism in Russian government make the checks and balances mechanism between executive and legislative of governments in Russia are ineffective, so that the president that cannot be controlled by Duma.

E. Scope of research:

In this research, the writer will make time limitation related to the cases from the era of Russia Empire up to Putin government. The time limitation will facilitate the writer to explore and analyze the data, thus keeping the research focuses on the track. The reason why the data is taken from Russia Empire is to depict the beginning

of Russia, and why until Putin era Russia still finding their democracy, thus showing political decision and ideology to reach their democracy.

After all, it does not cover the possibility; the writer will enroll another data beyond the time and explain other phenomenon that has strong relation with this case. It is strongly recommended to sustain the completeness and the clearness of information.

F. Method of research:

This research is using a technical collective data from some document study that done it by gathering the secondary data. The information from every literature relevance with the problem of the research that considered by:

1. The technical collective data on this research are using qualitative data which is based on literature research and use a relevance literature, such as from book, magazine, journal, news and internet.
2. The characteristic of the research purpose is giving an explanation to answer the question “Why” that formed as collective evidence from qualitative data.
3. The writer tries to elaborate with the real facts happening in the world today, thus implementing the theory related to the case and the hypothesis will be taken from the empirical data.

H. System of Writing

Chapter I is the formulation of background of main problem and idea of framework and also proffering of main problem, hypothesis and theoretical framework which is related to problems background. This chapter also mentions writing purpose of this thesis, technique of collecting the data, scope of research and System of writing of this thesis.

Chapter II, in the first of this chapter author will explain about Russia Empire is to depict the beginning of Russia Empire to become Federation of Russia. In the further will explain about the history of Russia, Revolution, Russian Federation and the system of government.

Chapter III, first part of this chapter will explain about Putin Powers, Putin figure and how Putin role Russia. The second, author will explain about democracy in Russia and Trends in democratization. This part will give some evidence and discuss about the Election, Media Influence and Civil Society in arguing Russian democracy, Political Party, Public chamber and Public Opinion.

Chapter V as the last chapter in this thesis and also as the closing of the thesis. This chapter will mention conclusions from the explanation in chapter I, II, III, and IV which already explain before.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

A. Russian History

The Russia history began from the East Slavs, the ethnic group that eventually split into the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. They lived around Visla River, a place in the south Baltic.¹⁵ The first East Slavic state, Kievan Rus', adopted Christianity from the Byzantine Empire in 988, in the beginning of the Byzantine synthesis and Slavic cultures that defined Russian culture for the next seven centuries.¹⁶ Kievan Rus' ultimately disintegrated as a state, leaving a number of states were competing for claims to be the heirs to its civilization and dominant position.

After the 13th century, Moscow gradually came to dominate the former cultural center. In the 14th and 15th centuries a powerful Russian state began to grow around Moscow.¹⁷ It was gradually expanded west and southwest toward the Dnieper River, north to the Arctic Ocean to the east of Ural Mountains. In the 18th century,

¹⁵ A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru mrnuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 11

¹⁶ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia/History>

¹⁷ Engelmann, KurtE., et al. "Russia." *Microsoft® Encarta® 2006* [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

the Grand Duchy of Moscow was becoming a huge Russian Empire, stretching from Poland eastward to the Pacific Ocean.¹⁸ The Expansion in the Western direction sharpened Russia's awareness of its backwardness and shattered the isolation in which the initial stages of expansion had occurred. Russia gained a full control over a number of major rivers, giving it an access to the Baltic and Black seas. These conquests gave a huge impact to the countries that trade with it and brought the economic development.

The empire's heartland centered on Moscow and was the original homeland of the Great Russians, the chief ethnic component of the Russian Empire. To the east of the empire lays Siberia, which by 1914 had an overwhelmingly Russian population.¹⁹ The western borderlands were home to Ukrainians and Belarusians; the empire considered these Orthodox Slavs to be merely branches of the Russian people who spoke somewhat strange, regional dialects.

The Russian Empire was continuing to grow. The empire included more than 20 million sq km, nearly one-sixth of the land area of the Earth. Successive regimes of the 19th century responded to such pressures with a combination of halfhearted reform and repression.²⁰ Russian serfdom was abolished in 1861, but its abolition was achieved on terms unfavorable to the peasants and served to increase revolutionary pressures. At that time Peter Stolypin the head of Minister in Russia

¹⁸ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia/History>

¹⁹ Engelmann, Kurt E., et al. "Russia." *Microsoft® Encarta® 2006* [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.

²⁰ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia/History>

reformed the constitution of 1906 and State Duma introduced notable changes in economy and politics of Russia.²¹ The reform was signed by Tsar Nicolai II, but actually Tsar was not willing to cede autocratic rule.

In the northwest were Finland and the Baltic provinces (now Latvia and Estonia); their Protestant populations were very different from the Russians, both culturally and linguistically. Most of Poland, along with Lithuania, was acquired in the late 18th century. Transcaucasia, with its partly Muslim population, was absorbed in the early 19th century; most of Central Asia, almost entirely Muslim, was absorbed a generation later.

The Russian Empire fell in 1917. Most of its territory was inherited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union), a communist state that existed until 1991. When the USSR collapsed, the Russian Federation became its principal successor state.

A.1. Revolutionary movements and Marxist Idea

The beginning of Russian Revolutionary began in XX century. These movements were in opposition to the Tsar and stirred by people from every strata that they called them self as *Raznochintsy*. Revolution situation was resulted by Marxist people and pushed the condition to climax, such as demonstration which done by college students, Laborer breakdown, Farmer wriggler from their master field.

²¹ *ibid*

The first revolutionary movement which was wriggler from Tsar is Decembrist 1825 Revolt. This movement was fault because there was no concept and the leaders belonged to western, but it was an intro for revolution movements and gave a climax for the October 1917 revolution.²²

In the beginning Karl Marx was anti- Russia, because the Tsarist government is an imperialist and anti European liberalist regime. Tsarist gave more reaction to the Marx Idea. Beside those things Russia was an agriculture country with semi feudal system and was not develop capitalist. It was not equal with the setting of his theory. How ever those things were not appropriate with Karl Marx and his theory, the Russian language was the first Das Capital translated (1872) a Marx Ideas was take and give by Russian Intelligent, far away before Marx interested to Russia.²³

To inject the Marx Idea on Russian people, P.L. Lavrov (1823–1900) suggested making a minority revolution to educate people in understanding the Marxism. Meanwhile, P.N. Tkachev (1844-1885) supported making a professional revolutionary and decided to join the exploitation movement of national rebel to reach an authority and transforming people by confiscating every production means in the name of people.²⁴

²² A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru mrnuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 113

²³ Sturtley, D.m., *Short History of Russia*, New York: 1967, page 237

²⁴ A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru mrnuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 114

The first and biggest Marxist person in Russia is Georgy Plekhanov (1857- 1918).²⁵ Plekhanov that saw capitalist growth in Russia will give a proletariat birth and proletariat class will lead the revolution. Before it will happen, it must have democrat bourgeois revolution which becomes a direct goal for the revolutionary groups. Plekhanov perspectives was proved, in around XIX centuries industrial growth happened in capitalist lines and industry workers will take a part to leads the revolution in 1905 and 1917.²⁶

Pavel Akselrod (1850-1928), Thought that Russia did not have an enough proletariat at that time, while farmer wants a land and not socialism.²⁷ Besides, things there is no political freedom or middle class who could brings first phase from proletariat revolution same as like what Marx wants.²⁸

A.2. Revolution

There were three important steps which become an important aspect of Russia revolutions process and cannot be separate. The first step (9 January - September 1905) was strike and demonstration in every town, and was the first time Worker Constitution born in Ivanovo-Voznesenk. Second step (October – December 1905), was signed by national strike and manifesto Tsar on 17 October and ended by suppressed weapon revolt on December 1905 in Moscow.

²⁵ ibid

²⁶ ibid

²⁷ Ibid.,page, 115

²⁸ Sturley,DM.,Short History of Russia, New Rork: 1967, Page 240

A.2.1. First revolution (1905-1907)

In the first revolution in Russia there were 2 big bloody incidents, because of Tsar Adherent against Revolutionary groups. The revolution began by tragic incident in the Capital city of St-Petersburg in 9 January 1905, which people called it “*Bloody Sunday*”.²⁹ About 140.000 workers in St-Petersburg made a peaceful demonstration to get petition and answered by guns from Winter Palace Guard.³⁰ It caused big reaction from whole state.

In October 1905 there was a general strike from the whole place in Russia. About 3 million workers followed the general strike in insisting to get the right and freedom, including 8 hour work a day.³¹ The worker and military constitution was made up from every place of Russia to support what the people insist. Prime Minister S. Witte decided to make a manifesto October 17 to completing the national rule and answering what people insisted.

The bourgeois with intelligence groups sat together and decided to make a people freedom parties (Democrat Constitution). They insisted a democratic change by changing the system which was Absolute Monarchy into Parliament Monarchy. Meanwhile, opposite “reactionary groups” is an anti-Revolution, made religious-monarchy and nationalist groups, who was joined Russian People Union and Mikhail Arkhangel.

²⁹ A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru mrnuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 121

³⁰ Ibid.,page 122

³¹ ibid

A.2.2. February Revolution

This revolution broke out without definite leadership and formal plans, which may be seen as indication of the fact that the Russian people had quite enough of the existing system. Petrograd, the capital, became the focus of attention, and, on February 23 until 25 1917, people at the food queues started a demonstration.³² They were soon joined by many thousands of women textile workers, who walked out of their factories to protest against the severe shortages of bread.

Large numbers of men and women were on strike, and the women stopped at any still-operating factories to call on their workers to join them. During the next two days, the strike, encouraged by the efforts of hundreds of rank-and-file socialist activists, spread to factories and shops throughout the capital. By virtually every industrial enterprise in Petrograd had been shut down, together with many commercial and service enterprises. Students, white-collar workers and teachers joined the workers in the streets and at public meetings, whilst, in the still-active Duma, liberal and socialist deputies came to realize a potentially-massive problem.

They presently denounced the current government even more vehemently and demanded a responsible cabinet of ministers. The Duma, consisting primarily of the bourgeoisie, pressed the Tsar to abdicate in order to avert a revolution.

Saturday 25th in the evening, Tsar Nicholas II who refused to believe the warnings about the seriousness of these events sent a telegram to General Sergei

³² Ibid.,page 125

Khabalov (the chief of the Petrograd military district) command to stop the disorders in the capital, which were unacceptable in the difficult time of war with Germany and Austria.³³ Two days later workers in the streets, many of them now armed, were joined by soldiers, sent in by the government to quell the riots. Many of these soldiers were insurgents; however, they joined the crowd and fired on the police. In many cases little red ribbons were tied to their bayonets. The outnumbered police then proceeded to join the army and civilians in their rampage. Thus, with this near-total disintegration of military power in the capital, effective civil authority collapsed.

At night 27th, the cabinet submitted its resignation to the Tsar and proposed a temporary military dictatorship, but Russia's military leaders rejected this course.³⁴ Nicholas, meanwhile, had been on the front with the soldiers, where he had seen first-hand Russia's defeat at Tannenburg. He had become very frustrated and was conscious of the fact that the demonstrations were on a massive scale. He accepted defeat at last and abdicated on 2 March to end the disorders and bring unity to Russia.³⁵

Nicholas's brother, refused to become Tsar unless that was the decision of an elected government and if *the people* to want him as their leader. A minority of the Duma's deputies declared themselves a Provisional Government, chaired by Prince Lvov, a moderate reformist, although the leadership moved gradually to Alexander Kerensky of the Social Revolutionary Party.

³³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Revolution_of_1917

³⁴ *ibid*

³⁵ *ibid*

The effective power of the Provisional Government was challenged by the authority of an institution which claimed to represent the will of workers and soldiers. The model for the soviet was workers' councils that had been established in scores of Russian cities during the 1905 revolution.

The striking workers elected deputies to represent them and socialist activists began organizing a citywide council to unite these deputies with representatives of the socialist parties. Socialist Duma deputies, mainly Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, took the lead in organizing a citywide council. The Petrograd Soviet met in the Tauride Palace, the same building where the new government was taking shape.

The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet believed that they represented particular classes of the population, not the whole nation. They also believed Russia was not ready for socialism. So they saw their role as limited to pressuring hesitant "bourgeoisie" to rule and to introduce extensive democratic reforms in Russia (the replacement of the monarchy by a republic, guaranteed civil rights, a democratic police and army, abolition of religious and ethnic discrimination, preparation of elections to a constituent assembly, and so on). They met in the same building as the emerging Provisional Government not to compete with the Duma Committee for state power but to best exert pressure on the new government, to act, in other words, as a popular democratic lobby.

The relationship between these two major powers was complex from the beginning and would shape the politics at that time. The representatives of the

Provisional Government agreed to take into account the opinions of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, though they were also determined to prevent interference in the actions of the government and would create an unacceptable situation of dual power.

This situation in fact was precisely being created, though this "dual power" (dvoevlastie) was the result less of the actions or attitudes of the leaders of these two institutions than of actions outside their control, especially the ongoing social movement taking place on the streets of Russia's cities, in factories and shops, in barracks and in the trenches, and in the villages.

A.2.3. October Revolution (Bolshevik Revolution)

The Bolshevik Revolution was led by Vladimir Lenin and was based upon Lenin's writing on the ideas of Karl Marx, a political ideology often known as Marxism-Leninism. It marked the beginning of the spread of communism in the twentieth century.

The Bolshevik revolution came as the result of deliberate plan and coordinated activity to that end. Even Lenin was the leader of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin was not present during the actual takeover of the Winter Palace, it was Trotsky's organization who led the revolution because Lenin instigated within his party. Critics on the Right argued that the financial and logistical assistance of German intelligence through their key agent, Alexander Parvus was a key component as well, though historians are divided, for the evidence is sparse.

On November 7, 1917, Bolshevik Vladimir I. Lenin led his leftist revolutionaries in a revolt against the ineffective Provisional Government.³⁶ The Bolshevik revolution ended the phase of the revolution instigated in February, replacing provisional parliamentary government with government by soviets, local councils elected by bodies of workers. Liberal and monarchist forces, loosely organized into the White Army, immediately went to war against the Bolsheviks' Red Army.

Many members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, anarchists, and other leftists opposed the Bolsheviks through the soviets. Actually, Soviet membership was initially freely elected. Bolsheviks had little support outside of the industrialized areas of Saint Petersburg and Moscow. They barred non-Bolsheviks from membership in the soviets. The other socialists revolted and called for a third revolution. The most notable instances were the Tambov rebellion, 1919–1921, and the Kronstadt rebellion in March 1921.³⁷ These movements were made by a wide range of demands and lacked effective coordination and it were eventually defeated along with the White Army during the Civil War.

A.2.3. State Duma

The State Duma (Russian: Государственная дума (Gosudarstvennaya Duma), common abbreviation: Госдума (Gosduma)) which was first introduced in

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ *ibid*

1906 by Tsar Nicolas II and was Russia's first elected parliament.³⁸ in the Russian Federation is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia (legislature), the upper house being the Federation Council of Russia.

Tar Nicholas II dissolved the first Duma after 10 weeks. The second Duma (1907), even more hostile to the government, was also dissolved. The third Duma (1907-12) was the product of an electoral change that made it the tool of the government. It did, however, extend the peasants' rights and enact some labor laws. The fourth Duma (1912-17) had a conservative majority which was called at rare and brief intervals and was in constant conflict with the czar. It was dissolved again by Nicholas in March 1917, but refused to disband.³⁹

Revolution broke out, and the Duma, after electing a provisional committee, disintegrated. The committee and the Petrograd soviet appointed the provisional government. The current State Duma (est. 1993) is the popularly elected lower house of the Russia Federation's legislature.

In November 1907, the electoral reform the Duma. It was largely made up of members of the upper classes and radical influences in the Duma had almost entirely been removed. The establishment of the Duma after the 1905 Revolution was to herald significant changes to the Russian autocratic system. Furthermore the Duma was later to have a larger effect on Russia as it was one of the contributing factors in the February Revolution, which led to the abolition of the autocracy in Russia.

³⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Duma

³⁹ <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-duma.html>

Duma is headquartered in downtown Moscow, a few steps from Manege Square. Its members are referred to as deputies. The State Duma replaced the Supreme Soviet as a result of the new constitution introduced by Boris Yeltsin in the aftermath of the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993, and approved by the Russian public in a referendum.

The State Duma has special powers enumerated by the Constitution of Russia to approve or reject the President's nominee for Prime Minister of Russia , to approve or reject the President's nominee for the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, to appoint the deputy chairman of the Audit Chamber and half of its auditors , to file an impeachment against the President (Requires a two thirds majority), All bills are first approved here, to be further debated and approved in the Federation Council. Their duties are enumerated in Section 1, Chapter 5, Articles 100-108, in the Russian Constitution.⁴⁰

There are constitutionally 450 deputies of the State Duma (Article 95), each elected to a term of four years (Article 96). Russian citizens at least 21 years old are eligible to run for the Duma (Article 97). Seats are awarded on the basis of the percentage of election votes won by a party. The party then elects candidates to fill its eligible seats.⁴¹

⁴⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Duma

⁴¹ *ibid*

A.3. The Beginning of Russia Federation

The Revolution which was happened in the end of XX centuries was breaking Soviet Union. On December 25th 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev end his career as Soviet Union president.⁴² At that time Gorbachev was preserve the old culture in Soviet of traditional politic in new time exchange by modified it. People of Russia want more democratic than changing the traditional politic that will more use full in changing the new modern era. Gorbachev power was over taken by another resourceful and surprising Russians politic.

The public was supporting the new politician, Boris Yeltsin that gets full votes from the public. Public wants more democratic lead that automatically push Gorbachev from place as a Soviet president. The coup is inevitable for him because the Soviet need the revolution into better opened democracy.

Russia Federation was proclaiming their independent on June 12th 1990 along soviet were collapse.⁴³ Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and President Yeltsin at first maintained a strongly pro-American foreign policy. Yeltsin and Kozyrev initially had a calm attitude toward NATO expansion in eastward, which became the main military alliance of Western nations during the Cold War.

Soviet Union collapse and gave Russia a question of existence of this federation state. This question related from the past era, present and for their future. Russia rebirth was reach by three alternative ways. First is by the system of pre-

⁴² A. Fahrurroji, *Rusia baru mrnuju demokrasi: Pengantar Sejarah dan Latar Belakangnya*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta 2005, page 189

⁴³ Ibid.,page 191

Bolshevik by adopted the elements of emporium of Russia, hopes that Russia could reach again their honor and glory in the past. Secondly, re-back to socialist system of soviet. Soviet people argue that their system is the right answer to bring back Russia to the position as Power state (Derzava).⁴⁴ The last is democratic ways by adopting west democracy.

These three things is the way to answer Russia in finding their existence to the world. It was saw from their social politic activates after Soviet Union collapse. The second and third find their shape on sharp politic games until the ends of Boris Yeltsin as the first Russia Federation president. Reformation ways and market liberalization done in Yeltsin era and gave more power of these three verse ways in developing Russia. Democratization which is a pillar of perestroika was still continued after communist collapse. There are many efforts done by socialist groups to bring this state back to their main system.

People in Russia were influenced almost seventy years by communism, at the present the existence of people to communist seems gone. Even the Organization of communist still exist are free to active, People supports are decreasing. In two election the leader of Communist Russia Parties, Gennady Zyuganov defeated by Boris Yeltsin. Moreover in 2000 elecion after Boris retired, he still loss from Putin. He only got 29.21 percent of voice but Putin got more than a half, 52.94% percent of voice.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Ibid.,page 190

⁴⁵ Ibid.,page 190

Beside that the parliamentary elections in the December 1993 convinced that the public demanded a more nationalistic, less pro-Western approach to foreign policy.⁴⁶ There was Domestic pressure prompted who gave a foreign policy shift. People gave strong support for the ultranationalist candidate Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As the result, Russia resumed sales of arms and civil nuclear technology to developing countries, including Iran, which elicited disapproval from the United States. Russia began expressing loud support for Russians in the "near abroad" (as Russians call the outlying areas of the former Soviet Union) and strong opposition to NATO expansion.

The shift in Russia policy was more a question of rhetoric than one of practice. In 1997, Russia support for Russian-speaking secessionists in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova and become more moderate. The government was not encouraged Russian secessionists in Crimea. In 1993 and 1994 they threatened political stability in Ukraine and Ukraine's territorial integrity.⁴⁷ Russia signed a friendship treaty with Ukraine after settling the long-standing dispute over the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and confirming its recognition of Ukraine's post independence borders.

Russia multiple reasons for restraint, this country was conscious of its economic and military weakness and also aware of the potential for conflict within the former USSR if the national borders were challenged or ethnic conflicts

⁴⁶ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/russia>

⁴⁷ *ibid*

encouraged. Beside that, Yeltsin recognized that Russia was necessity to integrate them self into the world economy and furthermore Western-dominated institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, to regain economic prosperity and effective global influence. Russia's were dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands also reduced Russia maneuver rooms in international affairs.

In 1999 the relation between Russia's Western nations suddenly worsened after NATO were admitted Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland which were expanding into central and eastern Europe, and also attacked Yugoslavia to compel the Yugoslav government to halt military operations against Albanian separatists in that country's Kosovo province.⁴⁸ Russia denounced NATO as aggressive and expansionist and drew closer to China. However, Russian needs to attract Western investment and Russia government's rhetoric at times reflected the increasingly nationalist mood in Russian society, but its foreign policy remained cautious.

Russia's leaders were anxious in maintaining good relations with the Western powers. President Vladimir Putin pursued a foreign policy of closer cooperation with the West. Following terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Russia became a key ally in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. In May 2002 Russia and the United States reached their first arms-reduction treaty in more than a decade. Also that month, Russia became a limited partner in NATO. In November 2002 Russia did not object when NATO announced a further expansion to include several more

⁴⁸ ibid

nations in Eastern Europe, among them the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.⁴⁹

A4. System of Russian Federation

a. Constitution

Greatly increased the power of the presidency, it also established basic democratic guidelines, such as fixed terms of office, electoral procedures, and universal suffrage for all citizens aged 18 or older. In principle, the constitution also guarantees civil rights and the rule of law. Yeltsin's opponents regarded the constitution as illegitimate, and they disputed whether a majority of voters had in fact endorsed it in the referendum. After a few years, however, hostility to the constitution decreased somewhat.

b. Executive

Power is concentrated in the executive branch, which is headed by a president. He or she is directly elected by the people to a four-year term and cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. The president serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and chairs the Security Council, which is the central decision-making body for matters of defense. With the defense minister, the president has control over Russia's nuclear weapons. The president appoints the prime minister, who is second in command. The appointment is subject to ratification by the State Duma, the lower

⁴⁹ *ibid*

house of parliament; if the State Duma rejects the candidate for prime minister three times, the president can dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. The president has the right to dissolve the legislature under certain other conditions as well. In the event of the president's death or permanent incapacitation, the prime minister temporarily takes on the president's duties, but new presidential elections must be held within three months.

c. Legislature

The Federal Assembly is Russia's bicameral national legislature. It is composed of an upper house, called the Federation Council, and a lower house, the State Duma. The Federation Council has 178 members—two representatives from each of the 89 administrative units that make up the Russian Federation—who are appointed by the executive and legislative bodies of each unit.

The State Duma has 450 members. Voters elect half of the Duma members by casting a vote for a specific party listed on the ballot; these 225 seats are divided among the qualifying parties by proportional representation. The other 225 Duma members are elected individually from electoral districts throughout the country. Each of Russia's 89 constituent units has at least one electoral district.⁵⁰ Some densely populated units have more than one. Legislators are elected to four-year terms.

⁵⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Russia

d. Judiciary

The highest judicial body is the Constitutional Court, composed of 19 judges who are appointed by the president and approved by the Council of the Federation. The Constitutional Court's mandate is to rule on the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. In the early 1990s the Constitutional Court tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict between the legislature and the president. With the adoption of the 1993 constitution, the Constitutional Court's powers were reduced and its membership was changed.⁵¹

Below the Constitutional Court are the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court. The Supreme Court rules on civil, criminal, and administrative law, and the Supreme Arbitration Court handles economic suits. As with the Constitutional Court, judges for these high courts are appointed by the president and approved by the upper house of the legislature. By law, all judges in Russia are independent and cannot be removed from office. Although the judiciary has been freed from the direct political control that existed in the communist era, it remains financially weak. They are also very vulnerable to threats and pressures from the criminal world and from officials who are in league with organized crime.

e. Political parties

Since the late 1980s Russia has changed from a single-party, totalitarian state led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to a chaotic, factious,

⁵¹ *ibid*

multiparty democracy.⁵² Hundreds of political groups, factions, movements, and parties have emerged, spanning a wide political spectrum. Russia's political parties can be divided into five general categories: communist, Russian nationalist, reformist, centrist, and special interest parties. The parties range in size from a few members to more than half a million members. Some of the smaller political groups have lasted only a brief time. Alliances between groups are generally unstable, and coalitions shift frequently. Individual personalities influence political formations to a large degree, and the political agendas of many parties are vague and poorly documented. The CPSU was replaced by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which continued to be a powerful political force in the legislature. Centrist parties, notably the United Russia Party, have risen in prominence in recent years.

⁵² *ibid*

CHAPTER III

PUTIN POWERS

Not every people are born with a stare as same as Vladimir Putins. This Russian President's pale blue eyes are so cool, empty of emotion which his views must have begun as an affect, the gesture of someone who understood that power might be achieved by the suppression of ordinary needs, like blinking. His influence is now seamless, which makes talking to the Russian President not just exhausting but often chilling. In TIME's interviews, Putin shows him self that he is in charge.

A. Putin the most powerful man in Russia

In his dacha outside Moscow, Putin spoke candidly about corruption, religion and how he thinks the war in Iraq should end. Vladimir Putin is rarely meets with the foreign press. He gives the TIME's magazine about 3 1/2 hours of his time. Vladimir Putin gives a first impression of contained power; he is compact and moves stiffly but efficiently.

Putin is unmistakably Russian, with chiseled facial features and those penetrating eyes. Charm is not part of his presentation of self. He makes no effort to be ingratiating. One senses that he pays constant obeisance to a determined inner discipline. The successor to the boozy and ultimately tragic Boris Yeltsin, Putin is temperate, sipping his wine only when the protocol of toasts and greetings requires it.

He grew up in an officially atheist country, but he is a believer and often reads from a Bible that he keeps on his state plane. He is impatient to the point of rudeness with small talk, and he is in complete control of his own message.

1. Vladimir Putin

Putin was born in Leningrad, at the present called Saint Petersburg on October 7, 1952. He married with Lyudmila Shkrebneva along with he gets his undergraduate student of the Spanish branch of the Philology Department of the Leningrad State University and a former airline stewardess, who had been born in Kaliningrad on January 6, 1958. They have two daughters, Maria Putina (born 1985) and Yekaterina "Katya" Putina (born 1986).⁵³

Since 1992, Putin had owned a dacha of about 7 thousand square meters in Solovoyvka, Priozersky district of the Leningrad region, which is located on the eastern shore of the Komsomol'skoye lake on the Karelian Isthmus near St. Petersburg. His neighbours there are Vladimir Yakunin, Andrei Fursenko, Sergey Fursenko, Yuriy Kovalchuk, Viktor Myachin, Vladimir Smirnov and Nikolay Shamalov.

On November 10, 1996, together they instituted the co-operative society Ozero (the Lake) which united their properties. This was confirmed by Putin's income and property declaration as a nominee for the presidency in 2000. However, this real

⁵³ Fig.: Vladimir Putin and his wife Lyudmila during the celebration of Pascha, the Russian Orthodox Easter service, at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, April 2001. <http://www.payer/arbeitskapital/arbeitskapital0307012.htm>

estate was not listed in his income and property declaration for 1998 - 2002 submitted before the 2004 elections.

Putin's father was a model communist, genuinely believing in its ideals while trying to put them into practice in his own life. With this dedication he became secretary of the Party cell in his workshop and then after taking night classes joined the factory's Party bureau. Though his father was a "militant atheist", Putin's mother "was a devoted Orthodox believer". Though she kept no icons at home, she attended church regularly (despite the government's persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church at that time). She ensured that Putin was secretly christened as a baby, and she regularly took him to services.

His father knew of this but turned a blind eye. According to his statements, his religious awakening followed the serious car crash of his wife in 1993, and was deepened by a life-threatening fire that burned down their dacha in August 1996.⁵⁴ Along with Putin official visit to Israel, Putin mother gave him his baptismal cross telling him to get it blessed. Putin is regularly shown on Russian television attending Orthodox services, lighting candles in front of icons and crossing himself, though there is no credible information about his actual participation in the Church's sacraments.

His mother, Maria Ivanovna Putina, was a factory worker and his father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was conscripted into the Soviet Navy,⁵⁵ where he

⁵⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin.htm

⁵⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy.htm

served in the submarine fleet in the early 1930s. His father subsequently served with the NKVD in a sabotage group during the Second World War. Two elder brothers were born in the mid-1930s.⁵⁶ First died within a few months of birth and the second succumbed to diphtheria during the siege of Leningrad. His paternal grandfather, Spiridon Putin, had been Vladimir Lenin's and Joseph Stalin's personal cook.

Putin speaks German with near-native fluency. His family used to speak German at home as well. After becoming President he was reported to be taking English lessons and could be seen conversing directly with Bush and other native speakers of English in informal situations, but he continues to use interpreters for formal talks.

Putin spoke English in public for the first time during the state dinner in Buckingham Palace in 2003 saying but a few phrases while delivering his condolences to the Queen. He made a full English speech while addressing delegates at the 119th International Olympic Committee Session in Guatemala City on behalf of the successful bid of Sochi for the 2014 Winter Olympics.

Putin graduated from the International Law branch of the Law Department of the Leningrad State University in 1975. His final thesis was on an international law theme - Russian: «Принцип наиболее благоприятствуемой нации».⁵⁷ "The principle of most favored nation".

⁵⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin.htm

⁵⁷ *ibid*

Thereafter he was recruited to the KGB. At the University he also became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and has never formally resigned from it.

He worked in the Leningrad and Leningrad region Directorate of the KGB, where he became acquainted with Sergei Ivanov. In 1976 he completed the KGB retraining course in Okhta, Leningrad. The available information about his first years at the KGB is somewhat contradictory; according to some sources, he completed the other retraining course at the Dzerzhinsky KGB Higher School in Moscow and then in 1985 - the Red Banner Yuri Andropov KGB Institute in Moscow (now the Academy of Foreign Intelligence), whereupon (or earlier) he joined the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign intelligence branch).⁵⁸

From 1985 to 1990 the KGB stationed Putin in Dresden, East Germany, in what he regards as a minor position. Following the collapse of the East German regime, Putin was recalled to the Soviet Union and returned to Leningrad, where in June 1991 he assumed a position with the International Affairs section of Leningrad State University, reporting to Vice-Rector Yuriy Molchanov.⁵⁹ In his new position, Putin grew reacquainted with Anatoly Sobchak, then mayor of Leningrad. Sobchak served as an Assistant Professor during Putin's university years and was one of Putin's lecturers. Putin formally resigned from the state security services on August 20, 1991,

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ *ibid*

during the KGB-supported abortive putsch against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

In 1997, he was appointed as the head of the department responsible for carrying out Yeltsin's decrees. A year later he became chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB), one of the two main organizations into which the KGB had been divided when the USSR broke up in 1991. In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin to become prime minister of Russia.

In March 2000, Putin was elected to a full term and won almost 53 percent of the vote. During his first term, Putin continued what Yeltsin and Gorbachev did in reforming policy by his way. Russia's economy improved dramatically, and many voters credited Putin for this development. At the second term in March 2004 he succeeded again and won 71 percent of the vote.

2. Russia federation in Putin hand

In his eight years of his career as President, he has guided Russia through a remarkable transformation. He has restored stability and a sense of pride among citizens who, after years of Soviet stagnation, rode the heartbreaking roller coaster of raised and dashed expectations when Gorbachev and then Yeltsin were in charge.

In Putin's hands Russia's economy has grown an average of 7% a year for the past five years. This country has paid off a foreign debt that once neared \$200 billion. Russia's rich have gotten richer, often obscenely so. The poor are doing better too; the

workers' salaries have more than doubled since 2003.⁶⁰ This is partly a result of oil at \$90 a barrel, and oil is a commodity Russia has in large supply. But Putin were deftly managed the windfall and he spread the wealth enough so that people feel hopeful.

Many billionaires now play on the global stage, buying up property, sports franchises, places at elite schools. Moscow exerts international influence not just with arms but also with a new arsenal of weapons: oil, gas, timber. The Russia's revival is changing the course of the modern world. After decades of slumbering underachievement, the Bear is back. On global issues, it offers alternatives to America's waning influence, helping broker deals in North Korea and Iran. Russia just made its first shipment of nuclear fuel to Iran. It is a sign that Russia is taking the lead on that vex some issue, particularly after the latest U.S. intelligence report suggested that the Bush Administration has been wrong about Iran's nuclear-weapons development. And Putin is far from done. The premiership is a perch that will allow him to become the longest-serving statesman among the great powers, long after such leaders as Bush and Tony Blair have faded from the scene.


But wherever all this has a good side there has a dark side. To achieve the stability, Putin administration has dramatically border the freedoms. His government has shut down TV stations and newspapers, jailed businessmen whose wealth and influence challenged the Kremlin's hold on power, defanged opposition political parties and arrested those who confront his rule. Yet this grand bargain appeals to his

⁶⁰ http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757_1690766-2,00.html

Russian subjects of freedom for security, which had grown cynical over earlier regimes' promises of the magical fruits of Western-style democracy.

3. Putin Authority in make a decision

When we look at the Kremlin system (Russian Governmental System) we can see that Russia pattern is much support the President Authority.



The Illustration of Concentric of Kremlin decision making process⁶¹

On first circle, we get Putin as the prominent of decision makers and the higher authority in constitution. It means that President (Government) has power and superiority as a legislative.

⁶¹ <http://republikbabi.com/dibalik-politik-luar-negeri-rusia-liberalis-teknokrat-siloviki-dalam-kremlin/>

There are three groups in Kremlin that influence the Russia concept, there are liberalist people, technocrat, dan siloviki. Siloviki (силовики, Power) that become the most influencing on Kremlin government. Siloviki are in the second circle after Putin. Siloviki place sit by Igor Sechin as vice administration presidential, Viktor Ivanov, President advisor and Nikolai Patrushev as FSB director. The third is Liberalist people that influencing the economic policy whereas fill by German Gref trade and develop minister and Alexei Kudrin as funds Minister.

The last circles are technocrat people which fill by vice Prime minister and chairman Gazprom, Dmitry Medvedev and presiden Gazpom "Alexei Miller. This people are obligated to control the oil production of Russia and can monopolize Gazprom.

This Circle Pattern shown elite government in Russia, and not touch their people, it is a general patter on developing countries whereas decision making process on a nation are only hold by a few people. Ideally, there is a legislative which control the executive power as a check and balance between the executive and legislative. Duma, the Federal Assembly Council which are replacing the Congress of People's Deputies and a parliament who has legacy to control, advice and recommend to the Government are not included on concentric circle in deciding of decision making process.

We can see how Putin power as a president when defeating his opposite, Such Mikhail khordovsky and using hard instrument when facing demonstration of Russian people who are don't agree with Kremlin ways. For example on 15 march 2007, Gary

Kasparov, a Russian chess master in world level have went to the prisons because follow the demonstration.

Putin's popularity ratings are routinely around 70%. "He is emerging as an elected emperor, whom many people compare to Peter the Great," says Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center and a well-connected expert on contemporary Russia.⁶²

Putin certainly wants a seat at the table on the big international issues but he wants free rein inside Russia, without foreign interference, to run the political system as he sees fit. He is using force to quiet seething outlying republics, to exert influence over Russia's former Soviet neighbors. What he's given up is Yeltsin's calculation that Russia's future requires broad acceptance on the West's terms. It means sometimes Russia will be helpful to Western interests, and sometimes it will be the spoiler.

B. Democracy in Russia

People attention has focused on Russia's fitful democratization since it emerged in 1991 from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many observers have argued that a democratic Russia with free markets would be a cooperative bilateral and multilateral partner rather than an insular and hostile national security threat. At the same time, most observers have cautioned that democracy may not be easily attainable in Russia, at least in part because of a dearth of historical and cultural

⁶² http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757_1690766-2,00.html

experience with representative institutions and modes of thought. Concerns about democratization progress appeared heightened after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000.

Setbacks to democratization have included more government interference in elections and campaigns, restrictions on freedom of the media, civil as well as human rights abuses in the breakaway Chechnya region, and the forced liquidation of Russia's largest private oil firm, Yukos, as an apparent warning to other entrepreneurs not to support opposition parties or otherwise challenge government policy.

Democratization faced further challenges following terrorist attacks in Russia that culminated in the deaths of hundreds of school-children in the town of Beslan in September 2004. President Putin almost immediately proposed restructuring all three branches of government and strengthening federal powers to better counter the terrorist threat to Russia.

The proposed restructuring included integrating security agencies, switching to purely proportional voting for the Duma (lower legislative chamber), eliminating direct elections of the heads of federal subunits, asserting greater presidential control over the judiciary, and achieving more control over civil society by creating a "Public Chamber" consultative group of largely government approved non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁶³

⁶³ Open Source Information Center (hereafter OSIC), *Central Eurasia: Daily Report*, September 13, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-92. The judicial initiatives were unveiled later.

After this restructuring had been largely implemented, President Putin in his May 2006 State of the Federation address hailed it as “even out the imbalances that have arisen in the structure of the state and the social sphere.”⁶⁴ Much controversy has attended the restructuring of the political system. On the one hand, some Russian and international observers have supported the restructuring as compatible with Russia’s democratization. They have accepted Putin’s argument that his moves counter Chechen and international terrorist’s intent on destroying Russia’s territorial integrity and political and economic development.

On the other hand, critics of the restructuring moves have branded them as the latest of Putin’s democratic rollbacks since he came to power in 2000. In a sensational move, Putin declared in April 2005 that he would not seek reelection, stating that “I will not change the constitution and in line with the constitution, you cannot run for president three times in a row.” According to several observers, this declaration has spurred the maneuvering of Putin’s supporters to fine tune a system of “managed democracy” (see below for definitions), if not authoritarianism, in order to gain substantial influence over electoral processes ahead of Duma and presidential races in 2007-2008.

This paper assesses Russia’s progress in democratization, including in the areas of elections, media rights, civil society, and federalism and some scenarios of possible future political developments are suggested such continuation of the current

⁶⁴ *OSIC*, May 10, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950166.

situation of “managed democracy,” deepening authoritarianism, further democratization, or a chaotic interlude, evidence, arguments and issues for Congress are analyzed.

1. Russia’s Democratization

Most analysts agree that modern democracy includes the peaceful change of leaders through popular participation in elections. Also, political powers are separated and exercised by institutions that check and balance each others’ powers, hence impairing a tyranny of power. Democracies generally have free market economies, which depend upon the rule of law and private property rights. The rule of law is assured through an independent judicial and legal system. The accountability of government officials to the citizenry is assured most importantly through elections that are freely competed and fairly conducted. An informed electorate is assured through the government’s obligation to publicize its activities (termed transparency) and the citizenry’s freedom of expression.⁶⁵

In contrast, in an authoritarian state the leadership rules with wide and arbitrary latitude in the political sphere but interferes somewhat less in economic and social affairs. The government strictly limits opposition activities, and citizens are not able to change leaders by electoral means. Rather than legitimizing its rule by

⁶⁵ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2003, p. 103; Robert Barker, *Issues of Democracy*, U.S. State Department, August 2000.

appealing to an elaborate ideology, an authoritarian regime boasts to its citizenry that it provides safety, security, and order.⁶⁶

Some theorists have delineated a political system with mixed features of democracy and authoritarianism they label “managed democracy.”⁶⁷ In a managed democracy, the leaders use government resources and manipulation to ensure that they will not be defeated in elections, although they permit democratic institutions and groups to function to a limited extent.

Presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov and the pro-presidential United Russia Party have advocated use of the term “sovereign democracy,” which they define as a culturally appropriate form of government that is not influenced by other countries.⁶⁸ Russia certainly has made some progress in democratization since the Soviet period, but how much progress, and the direction of recent trends, are subject to dispute. Democratization has faced myriad challenges, including former President Boris Yeltsin’s violent face-off with the legislature in 1993 and recurring conflict in the breakaway Chechnya region. Such challenges, virtually all analysts agree, have

⁶⁶ Juan Linz. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

⁶⁷ Other labels for this hybrid include “partial democracy,” “delegative democracy,” “guided democracy,” “electoral clanism,” and “oligarchy.” See Neil Robinson, *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 149 — 166.

⁶⁸ OSIC, June 28, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950012. Andrey Vorobyev, chairman of United Russia’s Central Executive Committee, has stated that sovereign democracy is a system of rule “tried and tested through the many centuries of Russia’s history, for protecting the rights, freedoms, and moral values of citizens.” December 14, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-11001.

prevented Russia from becoming a fully-fledged or “consolidated” democracy in terms of the above definition.

Some analysts have viewed Putin as making decisions that have diverted Russia further away from democracy, but they have argued that the country is not yet fully authoritarian and may be described as a “managed democracy.” Others insist that he is clearly antagonistic toward democracy, not least because he launched security operations in Chechnya that have resulted in wide scale human rights abuses and civilian casualties.⁶⁹ The NGO Freedom House claims that Russia under Putin has suffered the greatest reversal among the post-Soviet states in democratic freedoms, and warns that the main danger to Russia’s future political stability and continued economic growth is an overly repressive state.⁷⁰ Other observers agree with Putin that stability is necessary to build democracy.

He stresses that the government’s first priority is to deal with terrorism and other threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity, such as corruption. Some suggest that such a “strong state” may be compatible with free market economic growth, even if it is not fully democratic.

⁶⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)*, September 20, 2004, p. A6.

⁷⁰ Freedom House, *Nations in Transit 2006*, June 13, 2006. Freedom House stated that “the major theme for 2005 was the state’s continuing crackdown on all aspects of political life in Russia, demonstrating that Russia is moving further from the ideals of democracy.” The NGO further downgraded Russia on several indicators of pluralism, including electoral processes, civil society development, and corruption.

2. Trends in Democratization

a. Recent Elections

Most analysts agree that Russia's democratic progress was uneven at best during the 1990s, and that the recent 2003-2004 cycle of legislative and presidential elections and subsequent elections in 2005-2006 demonstrate the increasingly uncertain status of democratization during Putin's leadership.⁷¹

Table 1. Duma Election Results

Party/Bloc	% Party List Vote	List Seats	District Seats	Total Seats
United Russia	37.57	120	104	224
Communist	12.61	40	12	52
Motherland	9.02	29	7	36
Liberal Democratic	11.45	36	0	36
Other Parties	24.65	0	32	32
Independents	—	—	67	67
Total	100*	225	225**	450

Source: Central Electoral Commission, December 19, 2003.

***4.7% voted "against all."**

****New races were held in 3 districts in March 2004, so seats do not total to 225.**

⁷¹ Colton and McFaul argue that the 1999-2000 election cycles (during which Putin was acting president and then a presidential candidate) marked the reversal of democratization rather than the consolidation of regular pluralistic processes. *Popular Choice*, p. 223.

The Duma Election. On December 7, 2003, Russians voted to fill 450 seats in the State Duma, 225 chosen in single-member districts and 225 chosen by party lists. Nearly 1,900 candidates ran in the districts, and 23 parties fielded lists. Public opinion polls before the election showed that Putin was highly popular, and it was expected that pro-Putin parties and candidates would fare well.

On Election Day, there was a low turnout of 56 percent and 59.685 million valid votes cast. The Putin-endorsed United Russia party won the largest shares of the party list and district votes, giving it a total of 224 seats.⁷² The ultranationalist vote was mainly shared by the newly formed pro-Putin Motherland bloc of parties and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (which usually supports the government). Candidates not claiming party affiliation won 67 district seats (most later joined the United Russia faction in the Duma).

Opposition parties and candidates fared poorly. The opposition Communist Party won far fewer seats (52) than it had in 1999 (113 seats), marking its marginalization in the Duma. The main opposition liberal democratic parties (Union of Right Forces and Yabloko) failed to reach the five percent threshold for party representation in the Duma, and were virtually excluded.⁷³ Election observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the

⁷² Robert Ortung, *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, June 2, 2004.

⁷³ The Union of Rights Forces and Yabloko won a total of seven seats in district races, too few to form a party faction in the Duma.

Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of Europe (PACE) concluded that the Duma race was less democratic than the previous one in 1999.

They highlighted the government's "extensive" aid and use of media to favor United Russia and Motherland and to discourage support and positive media coverage of the opposition parties. Such favoritism, they stated, "undermined" the principle of equal treatment for competing parties and candidates and "blurred the distinction" between the party and the state. They further considered the Central Electoral Commission's (CEC's) failure to enforce laws against such bias "a worrisome development that calls into question Russia's ... willingness" to meet international standards.⁷⁴

Before the Duma convened on December 29, 2003, most of the nominally independent deputies had affiliated with the United Russia party faction, swelling it to over 300 members. This gave United Russia the ability not only to approve handily Putin's initiatives, but also the two-thirds vote needed to alter the constitution without having to make concessions to win the votes of other factions.

The United Russia faction leader assumed the speakership, and its members were named to six of nine deputy speakerships and to the chairmanships of all 28 committees. The United Russia faction took control over agenda-setting for the chamber and introduced a streamlined process for passing government bills that

⁷⁴ OSCE/PACE International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, *Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma*, December 8, 2003; Final Report, January 27, 2004. See also William Clark, *Problems of Post-Communism*, March/April 2004.

precluded the introduction of amendments on the floor by opposition deputies.⁷⁵ Since the Duma convened, it has handily passed Kremlin-sponsored legislation requiring a two-thirds majority, including changes to federal boundaries. Even a highly unpopular government bill converting many in-kind social entitlements to monetary payments (but retaining them for officials and deputies) were overwhelmingly approved in August 2004.

The Russian newspaper *Moscow Times* reported that some Duma deputies complained that the bill was pushed through even though there was not a full text. Many senators in the Federation Council (the upper legislative chamber), who represent regional interests, raised concerns about the shift of the welfare burden from the center to the regions. They allegedly were warned by the Putin government, as were the regional leaders, not to oppose the legislation.⁷⁶ Other controversial bills easily passed by the legislature in 2005-2006 included the elimination of gubernatorial elections and single member district balloting for Duma races.

b. The Presidential Election.

The overwhelming successes of pro-Putin parties in the Duma election were viewed by most in Russia as a ringing popular endorsement of Putin's continued rule.

⁷⁵ Konstantin Demchenko, *Russkii kurier*, July 12, 2004.

⁷⁶ The senators objected even though they are appointees of the president. *Moscow Times*, August 4, 2004. Several polls indicated that a majority of the public opposed the monetization of benefits. *OSIC*, July 2, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-333; July 9, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-102; July 9, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-218.

Opposition party leaders were discredited by the vote, and Putin's continued high poll ratings convinced most major potential contenders to decline to run against him.

Union of Right Forces party bloc co-chair Irina Khakamada and Motherland co-head Sergey Glazyev ran without their party's backing, and Glazyev faced a split within his party bloc from members opposed to his candidacy against Putin. The Communist Party leader declined to run.

The party nominated a less-known surrogate, State Duma deputy Nikolay Kharitonov. Similarly, the Liberal Democratic Party leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, declined and the party nominated Oleg Malyshkin. The Party of Life (created by pro-Putin interests in 2002 to siphon votes from the Communist Party) nominated Sergey Mironov, Speaker of the Federation Council. Mironov publicly supported Putin and criticized the other candidates.

Table 2. Presidential Election Results

Candidate	% of Vote*
V. Putin	71.31
N. Kharitonov	13.69
S. Glazyev	4.1
I. Khakamada	3.84
O. Malyshkin	2.02
S. Mironov	0.75
Against All	3.45

Source: Russian Central Electoral Commission.

*69.5 million votes were cast.

Despite poll results indicating that Putin would handily win re-election on March 14, 2004 his government interfered with a free and fair race, according to the OSCE. State-owned or controlled media “comprehensively failed in provide equal treatment to all candidates,” and displayed “clear bias” favoring Putin and negatively

portraying other candidates.⁷⁷ Political debate also was circumscribed by Putin's refusal to debate with other candidates. Concern that the low public interest in the campaign might be reflected in a turnout less than the required 50 percent, the CEC aired "get out the vote" appeals that contained pro-Putin images, according to the OSCE.

While praising the efficiency of the CEC and lower-level electoral commissions in administering the election, the OSCE also reported that vote-counting appeared problematic in almost one-third of the precincts observed. Irregularities included penciling in vote totals for later possible alteration, and in one case, the reporting of results without counting the votes.

In six regions, including Chechnya, voter turnout and the vote for Putin were nearly 90% or above, approaching implausible Soviet-era percentages. The CEC instigated troubling criminal investigations of signaturegathering by Glazyev and Khakamada that were not resolved before the election, putting a cloud over their campaigning.

In the fall of 2006, there will be legislative elections in several regions, where the new electoral laws will be tested. According to some observers, these elections will be closely watched by the Putin administration and United Russia to ascertain popular sentiments and to work out strategy for retaining power during the subsequent State Duma election in 2007. Several dozen regional legislative elections

⁷⁷ OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. *Russian Federation Presidential Election, 14 March 2004: Election Observation Mission Report*, June 2, 2004.

have already taken place in 2005- 2006. These usually have witnessed the United Russia Party gaining the largest proportion of votes. This party in most cases has been strongly backed by the regional governors.

However, another small government-backed party, the Party of Life, has proven less successful. In March 2006 elections in six regions in which it ran for seats, it was only successful in two regions.⁷⁸ Elections to the Moscow City Duma (Moscow has federal regional status) in December 2005 resulted in United Russia winning nearly 50% of the party list vote and all 15 single member constituencies, giving it a majority of 28 out of 35 seats in the city Duma. The Communist Party remained viable, winning four seats.

Several liberal parties cooperated with Yabloko, and it won three seats. A party had to get at least 10% of the votes in order to win seats, resulting in the elimination of six parties, including the Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of Life. Reportedly reflecting the Putin administration's disfavor, the Motherland Party was disqualified from running. Some observers criticized severely circumscribed election monitoring and media coverage, which made it difficult to assess whether the vote was free and fair.

According to one report, when the city дума winners met to divvy up responsibilities, the winners in single member districts demanded that all the дума staffers serve them, since they represented constituents who had voted for them, and

⁷⁸ *OSIC*, March 21, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-11001.

the party list winners were forced to ally themselves with these deputies in the hope of obtaining staff support.⁷⁹

In the formerly breakaway region of Chechnya, legislative elections were held on November 27, 2005, as part of Putin's plan to pacify and control the region. More than 350 candidates ran in single member constituencies and on the lists of eight registered parties for 58 seats in the 2-house legislature. The Electoral Commission announced on December 3 that turnout was 69.6% of about 600,000 voters and that United Russia won 33 seats (a majority of the seats). The Communist Party gained 6, the Union of Right Forces won 4, and the Eurasian Union won one seat.

Candidates not claiming a party affiliation won the remaining seats. President Putin the day after the election proclaimed that "a legitimate, representative authority has been elected in Chechnya. This completes the formal legal procedure of restoring constitutional order." A small group from the Council of Europe evaluated the election. They raised concerns that administrative resources were used heavily to support favored candidates. Other critics charged that all aspects of the election, from the reported turnout figures to the reported winners, had been predetermined.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ *OSIC*, December 7, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-11001.

⁸⁰ *OSIC*, November 28, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27150; December 5, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27189; *ITAR-TASS*, November 28, 2005.

c. Freedom of the Media

During Putin's presidency, Freedom House has lowered its assessment of Russia's media from "Partly Free" to "Not Free." Most recently, the NGO gave Russia a score of six (where one represents the highest level of democratic progress and seven the lowest). It warned that in 2005-2006, the Russian government further tightened controls over major television networks, harassed and intimidated journalists, and otherwise acted to limit what journalists reported.⁸¹

In 2003, the government allegedly used its direct or indirect ownership shares to tighten control over the independent television station NTV, close down another station (TV-6), and rescind the operating license of a third (TVS). In 2005, the pro-government steel company Severstal and some German investors purchased Ren-TV, a television station with a national reach that had been permitted some editorial freedom. It had been owned by the government monopoly United Energy Systems and private investors. After the takeover, the new owners imposed a pro-government editorial stance. Not only does the government reportedly have controlling influence over these major nationwide television networks and other major broadcast and print media, but a Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications created in 2004 has major influence over the majority of television advertising and print distribution.⁸²

⁸¹ *Nations in Transit 2006; Freedom in the World 2006.*

⁸² *OSIC*, July 7, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-451; July 23, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-239.

The government has tightened its control over the press even though the subscriber base of newspapers and periodicals is small relative to the population. As mentioned above, the Putin government asserted major ownership control over all major national television networks in anticipation of the 2003-2004 cycle of Duma and presidential elections, and these networks inordinately provided most time and positive coverage to Putin and United Russia.

Additionally, regional television stations followed suit, because a majority of regional leaders backed Putin and United Russia. Media were further constrained by laws enacted in mid-2003 that strictly limited the reporting of news about candidates for political office, except for their paid advertisements.⁸³

In 2005-2006, the Putin government increased these efforts to shape and control media content. In his State of the Federation address in 2005, Putin called for his proposed Public Chamber to establish a watchdog group to monitor “broadcasters’ compliance with the principles of free speech and objectivity,” which some observers warned might further constrain editorial discretion.

One possible positive development included a law passed in 2005 mandating greater efforts by government agencies to open up their activities to public scrutiny, including through the establishment of internet websites. Perhaps indicating an

⁸³ Michael McFaul, *Journal of Democracy*, July 2004. Russian news anchor Vladimir Pozner asserted that managers at the state-owned Channel 1 television network had “strictly controlled” what could be discussed and who could be interviewed in the run-up to the Duma and presidential elections.

alternative motive, Putin also stressed that such governmental openness would provide “more objective information about the work of the state apparatus.”

The Committee to Protect Journalists, a U.S.-based NGO, in 2006 listed Russia among the ten “worst places to be a journalist,” citing the frequency of lawsuits and imprisonment, more than a dozen murders of investigative journalists during Putin’s rule, the suppression of alternative points of view, and biased coverage of the Chechnya conflict. Prominent cases include the July 2004 murder of *Forbes* reporter Paul Klebnikov, the September 2004 arrest of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Andrey Babitskiy after being attacked by government airport employees, the alleged poisoning in September 2004 of *Novaya gazeta* reporter Anna Politovskaya, and the murder of *Novoe delo* reporter Magomedzagid Varisov in June 2005. Babitskiy and Politovskaya had been en route to southern Russia during the Beslan hostage crisis, where Politovskaya hoped to help the government negotiate with the captors. The Klebnikov murder remains unsolved.⁸⁴

d. Civil Society

According to Freedom House and other observers, the status of civil society in Russia has worsened during Putin’s presidency. The government increasingly has constrained the operations and financing of human rights NGOs that lobby for reforms, and declining public participation in political parties and NGOs weaken their

⁸⁴ Committee to Protect Journalists, *World’s Worst Places to be a Journalist, Press Release*, May 3, 2004; ITAR-TASS, September 13, 2004; Peter Baker, Washington Post, September 11, 2004, p. A13.

influence over government policy. Worrisome trends have included Putin's criticism in his May 2004 state of the federation address that some NGOs receive foreign funding and "serve dubious group and commercial interests," rather than focusing on "severe problems faced by the country and its citizens." After Putin's address, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with several NGOs in June 2004 and called for them to present a united front to the world, such as by rebuffing criticism of Russia's human rights policies by the Council of Europe.

Critics alleged that Lavrov's call appeared to mark efforts to re-create Soviet propaganda organizations under the control of intelligence agencies, such as the Soviet-era Committee for the Defense of Peace (its successor organization, the Federation of Peace and Accord, took part in the meeting). They also raised concerns that many of the NGOs that met with Lavrov appeared newly created, and that the government's aim was for these groups to crowd out established and independent NGOs.⁸⁵

In July 2005, President Putin re-emphasized his concerns about foreign funding for NGO political activities, asserting that "no self-respecting state will allow this, and we will not allow it." In November 2005, the Duma began consideration of a draft NGO bill banning the presence of branches of foreign NGOs in Russia, forbidding foreigners from belonging to Russian-based NGOs, and strengthening the auditing functions of the government to monitor and control foreign and domestic

⁸⁵ *Moscow Times*, June 25, 2004. In March 2006, Lavrov reiterated this call for NGOs to burnish Russia's image abroad. *OSIC*, March 13, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-27099.

funding of NGOs. Other onerous provisions included a requirement for any group of three persons or more to register and report their aims, goals, and sources of funding.

Some observers suggested that the bill reflected the Putin administration's perception that foreign-based or foreign-funded NGOs helped trigger "color revolutions" that overthrew governments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and that such NGOs similarly were subverting the Russian government.⁸⁶ Following harsh criticism of the draft NGO bill from many Russian and international NGOs and others, including U.S. officials, President Putin (and many Public Chamber members) suggested some changes to the draft to permit branches of foreign NGOs to operate in Russia if they submitted regular reports of their funding and programs. Programs could be blocked if they were deemed to contravene Russia's interests.

President Putin continued to argue that this legislative change, like others he had orchestrated, was prompted by the need to protect Russia from foreign "terrorist ideology." The bill was approved and signed into law in December 2005 and entered into force in April 2006.⁸⁷

e. Creation of the Public Chamber.

In the wake of the Beslan tragedy, authorities endeavored to manage the large number of public demonstrations throughout the country to make sure they were anti-

⁸⁶ Claire Bigg, Russia: NGOs Say New Bill Threatens Civil Freedom, *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, November 23, 2005.

⁸⁷ *OSIC*, December 5, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27094.

terrorist, rather than antigovernment, gatherings. A few observers suggested that the demonstrations raised new fears in the Putin administration of public passions and spurred the proposal to create a “Public Chamber.” As urged by Putin on September 13, “mechanisms to bind the state together” to fight terrorism would include strong political parties to make sure that public opinion is heard and a Public Chamber composed of NGOs that would discuss draft laws, oversee government performance, and possibly allocate state grants.

The influence of public opinion also would be bolstered, he claimed, by setting up citizens’ groups that would pass on information to security and police agencies and help the agencies “maintain public order.”⁸⁸ A primary architect of the Chamber’s work, deputy chief of the presidential staff Vladislav Surkov, allegedly stated that it would help divert and ameliorate public passions. Rejecting the necessity of a Public Chamber, some democracy advocates called instead for strengthening legislative functions, parties, and NGOs to represent citizens’ interests.⁸⁹

The 126 members of the Public Chamber were selected in late 2005. One-third were appointed by President Putin. These 42 members in turn selected another 42 members (representing the heads of NGOs and other non-profit organizations), and these 84 members selected the final 42 (representing regionally-based

⁸⁸ *OSIC*, September 9, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-348; September 13, 2004, Doc. No. 92. Putin first broached the idea of a “public chamber” in May 2004. *OSIC*, May 26, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-67.

⁸⁹ Alexey Arbatov, *BBC Monitoring*, September 16, 2004;

organizations). Members included prominent artists, singers, scientists, editors, lawyers, businessmen, and religious leaders.

The first session of the Chamber was held in January 2006. It set up over a dozen public oversight commissions. Virtually all were headed by President Putin's appointees. Addressing the session, President Putin stated that the Chamber would ensure popular influence over state institutions, "real independence" of the mass media, public control over the use of budget funds allocated for presidential projects, input into law-making, and oversight over the activities of NGOs.

Some critics compared some of these reputed responsibilities to those of the Soviet-era People's Control Committees, which supposedly permitted workers to oversee the operations of state agencies and to publicize shortcomings.⁹⁰ Appearing to belie their reputed functions, the Public Chamber's newly created Commission for Public Monitoring of Law Enforcement and Military Structures, the Commission on Questions of Tolerance and Freedom of Conscience and the Commission on Media held meetings in February 2006 closed to the media.⁹¹

In August 2006, the Public Chamber began consideration of proposals from NGOs for funding from the Russian government. Following the Chamber's recommendations, the presidential administration will make the final decisions on funding. One criterion for funding is whether the NGO "cooperates" with the

⁹⁰ *OSIC*, January 22, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-27036, CEP-27007, and CEP-27048. Others compared it to the Soviet-era Congress of People's Deputies or the Supreme Soviet, rubberstamp legislative bodies. *OSIC*, November 30, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-6001.

⁹¹ *OSIC*, February 13, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-21002; February 17, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-21011.

government, which some critics argue will reward pro-government NGOs and deny funds to some non-favored democracy and human rights NGOs.

f. Public Opinion.

Polls in Russia have been interpreted as both proving and disproving that Russians value democracy. U.S. researcher Richard Pipes has concluded from his examination of polls conducted in 2003 that “anti-democratic and anti-libertarian actions” by Putin “are actually supported” by most Russians, and that no more than one in ten Russians value democratic liberties and civil rights. The disdain for democracy, he argues, reflects Russians’ cultural predilection for order and autocracy.⁹²

Other observers reject placing the bulk of blame for faltering democratization on civil society. Russian analyst Alexander Lukin has objected to Pipes’ conclusions, arguing that Russians embraced democracy in the late 1980s, and that while the term “democracy” since then has fallen into disfavor in political discourse, Russians continue to value its principles.⁹³ Recent polls seem to illustrate the mixed attitudes of Russians toward various aspects of democratization. Several polls by Russia’s privately-owned Levada Center over the past two years seem to indicate that most

⁹² Richard Pipes, *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2004; Dmitriy Babich, *Russia Profile*, August 23, 2004.

⁹³ Alexander Lukin, *Moscow Times*, July 21, 2004; Colton and McFaul, pp. 223, 228.

Russians value social rights more than political rights and do not object to the idea of well-liked President Putin holding substantial power.

According to polls taken by the Levada Center in early 2006, a majority of respondents thought the government should urgently address economic and social issues, while only 12%-13% thought that President Putin or a possible successor should emphasize democratization and human rights. The Levada Center concluded from the polls that “most people would like the country to follow the same course that Putin is taking it on.”⁹⁴

However, another poll by the Levada Center in November 2005, which asked whether President Putin was doing a relatively good job defending democracy and human rights, appeared to tap some popular concern about recent trends. In this poll, 46% of respondents viewed Putin as doing a good job, but 43% expressed reservations.⁹⁵ Popular attitudes toward democratization and human rights can differ according to the questions and issues addressed.

Some specific questions have revealed positive attitudes toward aspects of democracy among some fraction of Russians. Although polls suggest that Russians appear to uniformly trust President Putin, a March 2006 poll by the Levada Center found that 60-61% of respondents tended not to trust the court system or

⁹⁴ Leonid Aleksandrovich Sedov, *Opinions About the Country and the World*, *OSIC*, May 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-313002.

⁹⁵ *OSIC*, December 12, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-18003.

prosecutors.⁹⁶ According to late 2005 national polls by the Levada Center, 66% of respondents felt that there needed to be an effective political opposition, and 57% felt that the media should scrutinize the conduct of officials.

A July 2006 poll by the Levada Center found that 32% of respondents believed that Russia should return to a one-party system, while 42% favored at least a two-party system.⁹⁷ A late 2005 poll by the government-financed All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions (VtsIOM) found that one-half of respondents did not oppose democratization assistance from foreign countries.

However, only about one-third viewed such assistance from the United States as acceptable, in part because of suspicions about U.S. intentions. An early 2006 poll by the Levada Center found that 37% of respondents considered it acceptable for Russian NGOs to accept foreign grants, while 42% considered it unacceptable.⁹⁸

Several polls appeared to document the initial opposition of many Russians to the elimination of direct gubernatorial elections, but this viewpoint may have changed. Although nearly one-half of those polled nation-wide objected to eliminating such elections in late 2004, less than one-third objected in late 2005, perhaps reflecting growing resignation or indifference.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ *OSIC*, July 28, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-313005.

⁹⁷ Will Russia Have its Own Elephant and Donkey? *RIA Novosti*, August 22, 2006.

⁹⁸ *OSIC*, December 15, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-11002; July 28, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-313005.

⁹⁹ *OSIC*, September 15, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-11005.

g. Political Parties.

Putin has orchestrated several changes to the electoral system that he claims will create a strong and stable party system with fewer parties. These changes have begun to result in party mergers, with small parties joining together or joining larger parties in order to survive.

The changes include giving parties the exclusive prerogative to nominate candidates, providing state funding that benefits parties that have received more votes, requiring parties to have at least 50,000 members spread across the country in order to be legally registered (thus eliminating regional parties), making party list voting the only method of election to the Duma and raising the bar to gaining seats in the Duma from 5% to 7% of the vote.

At the same time, the Putin administration has moved against unfavored parties and activities. Many observers suggest that the arrest of Vladimir Khodorkovskiy, the head of the Yukos oil firm, in late 2003 was motivated at least in part by his political ambitions and his support for the democratic liberal opposition Yabloko Party in the upcoming Duma election.

In this view, Putin aimed to block the so-called oligarchs (leaders of the top private firms) and other entrepreneurs from gaining greater political influence through support for opposition parties and for candidates in singlemember district races. Since Khodorkovskiy's arrest and imprisonment, businessmen sharply have reduced their donations to opposition parties, and business groups have pledged fealty to Putin.

Apparent government manipulation of the party system included its substantial support during Putin's first term to bolster the appeal of Unity (renamed United Russia) as the "presidential party." In 2003, the government also was widely viewed as helping to create the Motherland bloc to appeal to nationalist elements of the Communist Party and to members of small fascist groups. Some observers speculate that the Putin government was surprised by the strength of Motherland's electoral support.

Although widely viewed as a creature of the Kremlin, Motherland claimed that it was a "loyal opposition" to the government in the Duma. The "opposition" component appeared to become a reality during early 2005 when Motherland sided with protesters who were against the monetization of social benefits (these benefits previously had involved free or discounted goods and services). Moving against this disloyalty, the Putin administration allegedly blocked the party from participating in most regional elections and orchestrated Dmitri Rogozin's ouster as party head in March 2006.

In July 2006, Motherland announced that it would merge with Federation Council chairman Mironov's Party of Life.¹⁰⁰ Paradoxical to the concept of democratic political parties, the merger was worked out in secret and was later announced to the party members as a *fait accompli*. Also paradoxical was the merger of a larger party possessing some electoral success with a smaller party with less electoral success.

¹⁰⁰ *OSIC*, March 24, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950192

According to one scenario, the Putin administration has projected that United Russia, the Communist Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party will likely win seats in a prospective Duma election in 2007 but that United Russia will fall short in winning two-thirds of the seats. In that case, United Russia hopes to rely on a kindred pro-government party to win enough seats (along with the Liberal Democratic Party) to form a super-majority in the Duma.¹⁰¹

Analyst Stephen White has suggested that because the large majority of Russian citizens do not belong to political parties or identify with them, the parties remain weak and highly vulnerable to manipulation by the government. This manipulation, in turn, harms the development of stable and legitimate party organizations, memberships, and platforms.

He argues that as long as this situation prevails, Russian citizens will lack one of the primary means in a democracy of influencing policy and personnel in the political system. Another analyst, Steven Fish, suggests that the constitutional system plays an important role in creating such a situation.

Russia's weak legislature, he argues, discourages citizens from participating in parties, while the strong presidency provides grounds for the growth of authoritarianism.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Dmitriy Badovskiy, *Gazeta.ru*, August 6, 2006, in *Johnson's Russia List*, August 7, 2006.

¹⁰² Stephen White, Russians and Their Party System, *Demokratizatsiya*, Winter 2006, pp. 7-23; Steven Fish, Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies, *Journal of Democracy*, January 2006, pp. 5-21.

h. Electing All Duma Members by Party Lists.

In August 2004, a working group of the CEC, with Kremlin support, proposed to eliminate single-member districts in the Duma in favor of having all seats determined by the proportion of votes each party won nationally. It argued that proportional representation would give more importance to minority parties and regions with small populations.¹⁰³ It also argued that proportional voting would reduce the alleged practice of “buying” single member seats.¹⁰⁴ After the Beslan tragedy, Putin in September 2004 included this proposal in his package of electoral “reforms,” claiming that proportional elections would strengthen public unity in the war on terrorism.

After popular dissatisfaction in Ukraine with vote-rigging resulted in an “orange revolution” there that brought reformists to power, the Putin administration appeared more committed to making Russia’s electoral code less democratic, according to some critics.

Another spur to efforts to limit and control popular participation may have been the mass protests in early 2005 over the monetization of social benefits. Major changes to Russia’s election system were enacted and signed into law in July 2005. Among the provisions, the law banned participation in elections by party blocs, raised

¹⁰³ *Kommersant*, August 30, 2004; *OSIC*, June 4, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-366.

¹⁰⁴ Mikhail Vinogradov, *Izvestia*, September 24, 2004; Maksim Glikin, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, October 4, 2004. This view is supported by CEC chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov, who claimed that eliminating single-member districts would prevent “buying democracy with dirty money.” *OSIC*, June 4, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-366.

the electoral barrier for parties to get into the Duma and regional legislatures from 5% to 7%, lowered the percentage of invalid signatures permitted in registering a candidate, and forbade parties or partisan groups from helping transport voters to the polls.

Perhaps ominously for foreign NGOs, it stated that their efforts “to assist or impede the preparations for, and conduct of, elections that will not be tolerated.” It also stated that foreign electoral observers had to be invited by the president, the Federal Assembly, or the CEC. Appearing to stifle free debate, the law stated that deputies had to adhere to party discipline as members of party factions in the Duma, and if they did not, they had to resign their seats.

Seemingly positive elements of the law included directing Federation Council and Duma members to endeavor to represent their assigned constituents, forbidding legislators from holding most executive branch posts, banning the use of government premises and property (without compensation or equal access) for campaigning, and stipulating days for elections at all levels. Virtually all attempts by opposition deputies in the Duma to change the draft law as submitted by the Putin administration were defeated by the pro-government United Russia Party.

Critics of the changes charged that they aimed “to redistribute, the deputy accountability from the voters to the (government loyalists) who compile the party lists.”¹⁰⁵ They also raised alarms that, in the condition where United Russia is the

¹⁰⁵ Nikolay Petrov, *Moscow Times*, September 15, 2004.

dominant party, elections may come to resemble Soviet-era elections where citizens were mobilized to vote for the roster of the Communist Party.

Some critics claimed that the Putin government's main aim was to eliminate the surviving minor party and independent "back-bench" deputies elected in the districts, who often were the sole critics of government-initiated bills. One Russian commentator viewed the law as indicating that the Putin administration equated the threat of terrorism to political opposition, and aimed to eliminate both.¹⁰⁶ Other observers familiar with party list voting for legislatures in democratic countries have taken a supportive or neutral stance regarding the new electoral law.

German analyst Alexander Rahr argued that party list voting was practiced in Europe and is "quite in line with the political practice of any democracy." Russian analyst Konstantin Simonov likewise asserted that "elections according to party lists, tested by experience in many countries, create perfect opportunities for the development of political parties." These observers argue that eliminating single-member district legislative elections at all levels will eliminate nonparty candidates, hence strengthening parties and making them better able to articulate citizens' interests.¹⁰⁷

In mid-2006, the State Duma considered more amendments to electoral laws that would widen the category of "extremists" subject to criminal prosecution. Other

¹⁰⁶ OSIC, August 18, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-215; September 5, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-379002; Robert Coalson, *RFE/RL Feature Articles*, October 11, 2004.

¹⁰⁷ *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, September 15, 2004; Vladimir Ignatov, *Trud*, September 15, 2004; Jonathan Riggs and Peter Schraeder, *Demokratizatsiya*, Spring 2004.

amendments would ban “extremists” from becoming candidates in elections and would resurrect the practice of early voting (balloting before Election Day, ostensibly for those unable to get to the polls).

Advocates of the legislation argued that democratic liberals constituted the real extremists in society, since in the past they had supported the breakup of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin’s violence against the legislature in 1993, and “unconstitutional” excesses that the Putin administration had reversed.

One advocate warned that democratic liberals were currently providing arms training to youth in preparation for a “color revolution” in Russia. Democratic liberals raised concerns about the broadening of the definition of extremism to include debasing national dignity, publicly slandering an official, obstructing the lawful activities of the government, and advocating or “prompting” such extremism.

They warned that such vague provisions could be used to disqualify individuals disfavored by the government from participating in elections. In a surprise move, the head of the CEC, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, denounced the proposed electoral changes, asserting that they reflect a view that “everything must be regulated. In that way, no candidate the government does not like will be permitted to participate in an election.” He warned that if the changes become law, “we will have elections without choices, as it was in fact in Soviet times.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ *OSIC*, June 28, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-11004; July 12, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-21005; July 18, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-19002.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Political powers are separated and exercised by institutions that check and balance each others' powers, hence impairing a tyranny of power. In structural Russia government the system check and balance which rows the interior structure does not give a mutual relation.

A huge power of Vladimir Putin has been blocked his opposite in political arena. He made Duma much filled by the people from United Russia Party and the other member party which is pro-Putin. Their faction took control over agenda-setting for the chamber and introduced a streamlined process for passing government bills that precluded the introduction of amendments on the floor by opposition deputies. After the Duma convened, it has handily passed Kremlin-sponsored legislation requiring a two-thirds majority, including changes to federal boundaries.

Putin administration highlighted the government's "extensive" aid and use of media to favor United Russia and Motherland and to discourage support and positive media coverage of the opposition parties. Such favoritism, they stated, "undermined" the principle of equal treatment for competing parties and candidates and "blurred the distinction" between the party and the state. Putin administration is pressing political

opposition, and aimed to eliminate both. With structured Duma, Putin has authority (autocracy) and Duma is under controlled by Vladimir Putin.

Beside that, Putin influence people in Russia by using the media to support him and his party in the election. *A political system with mixed features of democracy and authoritarianism they label “managed democracy. In a managed democracy, the leaders use government resources and manipulation to ensure that they will not be defeated in elections, although they permit democratic institutions and groups to function to a limited extent.* Regional television stations followed suit, because a majority of regional leaders backed Putin and United Russia. Media were further constrained by laws enacted in mid-2003 that strictly limited the reporting of news about candidates for political office.

Putin has constrained the operations and financing of human rights NGOs that lobbying for a reforms, and declining public participation in political parties and NGOs weaken their influence over government policy. By using Duma to made consideration of a draft NGO bill banning the presence of branches of foreign NGOs in Russia, forbidding foreigners from belonging to Russian-based NGOs, and strengthening the auditing functions of the government to monitor and control foreign and domestic funding of NGOs. Other onerous provisions included a requirement for any group of three persons or more to register and report their aims, goals, and sources of funding. NGOs. could be blocked if they were deemed to contravene Russia’s interests.