

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Thailand southern provinces, of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province have a combined population of about 2 million people, of whom more than 1.5 million are Malay Muslims. This distinctive ethnic-religious group has a history and identity that predates the imposition of centralized rule of the Thais in the early 20th century and was once part of the independent Sultanate of Patani. The region is situated between Buddhist Thailand and Malay-Muslim states of northern Malaysia. Yet in cultural and linguistic terms, it is at home in neither country.

Thailand nation-state constructs, along with its historical narrative and the centralized structure of the Thai state agencies, have at various times been both got unable and unwilling to accommodate their unique Malay identity and historical narrative. Adding to their sense of alienation is the fact that the restive region, commonly referred to as the Deep South, is one of the most neglected regions in the country.

Over this past century, Thailand policy toward the region has centered mostly on assimilating the people of this contested region. Resistance to assimilation has taken various shapes and forms and has been based partly on ethno-religious grounds,

but partly on a historical-cultural narrative that sees the Thai state claims as an expression of a century-old occupation and colonization by a Siamese force. Since the turn of the 20th century, Thai administrations have implemented policies meant to assimilate the Malay-Muslim provinces into the wider Thai geo-political body. Local Malays in the Deep South have resisted these attempts because they feel that their cultural and religious identity is at stake. Like the Thais, the Patani Malays are immensely proud of their institutions, way of life, and their place in the Malay-speaking world. In the late 1960s, these grievances translated into organized armed resistance and separatist movements most notably the National Liberation Front of Patani (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, BNPP), National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, BRN), and the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO).¹

The problem in the South can be viewed differently. For the Thai government, the problem in southern Thailand is stated to be a domestic issue. Another view on the problem in the South of Thailand as a domestic issue was from U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph L. Boyce. Recently in January 24, 2007 Thailand, he answered questions in a USINFO web chat on U.S.-Thailand relations and stated that “both the U.S. and Thailand view the situation in the South as a domestic issue”. Thai Foreign Ministry Spokesman also said, “The causes of the situation are domestic. It’s not part of any international terrorist network but of course we are concerned about the

¹ Don Pathan, “CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN ASIA: The Role of Civil Societies in Thailand’s Deep South”, NO. 18, OCTOBER 2012, p.1

introduction of extremist ideologies among the youths. We are concerned about the possibility of extremist groups in the region connecting together and this could become a serious problem”.²

However, the issue can be viewed at the international level as it has escalated tension between Thailand and Malaysia. The situation along the frontier has become “tense enough for the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister to warn that both countries should inform each other of their troop movements in order to prevent an untoward incident.”³

Faced with an increasing threat from the British in Malaya,⁴ King Chulalongkorn decided to accelerate the process of assimilation and centralise the administration of the southern provinces under Bangkok. The creation of the “Area of the Seven Provinces” administrative body in 1901 to govern the southern provinces was a key move in this strategy. This alienated the Malay rajas and nobility in the region but most accepted the reparation offered by Bangkok. The then-Raja of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kadir, was among the few who resisted the change and jailed for his opposition, but was released a couple of years later after he signed a guarantee to

² Zachary Abuza “A Conspiracy of silence: Who is behind the Escalating Insurgency in Southern Thailand?” *Terrorism Monitor* 3, issue 9 (May 2005), <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/artical.php?articleid=2369648>

³ The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, “Thailand-Malaysia Diplomatic Row Tests ASEAN Solidarity.” *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 233 (2005), p.1, <http://www.asiapacificbusine.ca/apbn/pdfs/bulletin233.pdf>.

⁴ Omar Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," in *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 236.

renounce politics.⁵ The British also opposed the administrative rearrangement and concluded a treaty with Siam in 1909 in which Bangkok had to relinquish Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu. Although this resulted in the political segregation of the Malays, the broad cultural, commercial and personal bonds between the Malay communities on either side of the border were sustained.⁶

The Siamese government began to emphasise the use of Thai language after 1910. There was a concerted attempt to educate the Malays in Thai and this led to periodic protests in the southern provinces.⁷ The elites feared that the initiation of Thai language would lead to the erosion of the Malay language and culture, and impinge on their ethnic Malay identity. Soon after the introduction of the 1921 Primary Education Act which necessitated Malay children to attend Thai primary schools, there was a major rebellion in 1922. This revolt was orchestrated by Tengku Abdul Kadir from Kelantan, to where he had moved in 1915.⁸

In 1932, monarchical rule in Thailand came to an end. Thailand became a fledgling democracy and during this period, the Malays obtained seats in the National Assembly and Senate. These gains were however short-lived and Thailand soon fell under military rule when Marshal Phibul Songkhram came to power in 1938. In

⁵ Haemindra, "The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand," 202-3.

⁶ Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand," 236.

⁷ Uthai Dulyakasem, "Education and Ethnic Nationalism: The Case of the Muslim-Malays in Southern Thailand," in *Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia*, ed. Charles F. Keyes (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1991), 141.

⁸ Sarit Pitsuwan, "Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand" (Harvard University, 1982) 57-8.

parallel with rising Thai nationalism at the time, Phibul began an exercise to assimilate the Malays into the Thai nation-state.⁹ Although Buddhism was intricately linked to Thai nationalism,¹⁰ there were no sustained undertakings to convert the Malays of the southern provinces. But the attempt to integrate the Malays at the barrel of a gun failed.

B. Research Question

Those explanations have referred to the basic question related to this study: ***“How did Islamic identity articulation in Southern Thailand?”***

C. Objective of Research

The objectives of research are:

1. As the requirement to fulfill one of subject in international relations studies,
2. To describe and explain the history, ethnic and situation in southern border province of Thailand,
3. To solve the problem in the real problem and
4. To implement the political concept of international relation directly to explain the case that is relevant to the problem.

⁹ Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades, 1932-1957* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995) 102-62.

¹⁰ McVey, "Identity and Rebellion among Southern Thai Muslims," 36.

D. Theoretical Framework

To analyze the mechanism or device, this paper will apply Concept of Ethnicity.

Terms such as 'ethnic groups' and ethnic conflict' have become quite common. Although their meaning is ambiguous and vague. Most of the major armed conflicts in the world are internal conflict, and most of them could plausibly be described as ethnic conflicts. In addition to violent ethnic movements, there are also many important non-violent ethnic movements, such as the Quebecois independence movement in Canada. Political turbulence in Europe has also moved issues of ethnic and national identities to the forefront of political life. At one extreme, the former Soviet Union has split into over a dozen ethnically based states, and issues of nationhood and minority problems are emerging with unprecedented force. At the other extreme, the situation seems to be the opposite, as the nation-states of Western Europe are moving toward a closer economic, political, and possibly cultural integration. But here, too, national and ethnic identities have remained important. Many people fear the loss of their national or ethnic identity as a result of European integration, whereas other considers the possibilities for a pan-European identity to replace ethnic and national ones.

The word ethnicity is derived from the Greek ethnos (which in turn derived from the word ethnikos), meaning nation. It was used in this dense in English from

the mid-fourteenth century until the mid-nineteenth century, when it gradually began to refer to racial characteristics. In the United States, 'ethnic' came to be used around the Second World War as a polite term referring to Jews, Italians, Irish, and other people considered inferior to the dominant group of British descent. In everyday language, the word ethnicity still has a ring of 'minority issues' and 'race relation'. In international relation, it refers to aspects of relationships between groups that consider themselves, and are regarded by other, as being culturally distinctive.

A few words must be said about the relationship between ethnicity and race. Whereas it used to be common to divide humanity into different races, modern genetics tends not to speak of races, for two main reasons. First, there has always been so much interbreeding between human populations that it would be meaningless to talk of fixed boundaries between races. Second, the distribution of hereditary physical traits does not follow clear boundaries. In other words, there is often greater variation within a racial group than there is systematic variation between two groups.

Ethnicity can assume many forms, and since ethnic ideologies tend to stress common decent among their members, the distinction between race and ethnicity is problematic. Ideas of race may or may not form part of ethnic ideologies and their presence or absence does not seem a decisive factor in international relation.

The relationship between the terms ethnicity and nationality is nearly as complex as the between ethnicity and race. Like the words 'ethnic' and 'race', the

word 'nation' has a long history, and has been used in a variety of different meanings in English. Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents, and by implication, it draws boundaries *vis-à-vis* other, who thereby become outsiders. The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its relationship to the state. A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state. Although nationalism tends to be ethnic in character, this is not necessarily the case.

It should be noted that ethnic organization and identity, rather than being primordial phenomena radically opposed to modernity and the modern state, are frequently reactions to processes of modernization. When we talk of ethnicity, we indicate that groups and identities have developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation. But what is the nature of such groups?

The words 'ethnic group' has come to mean something like 'a people'. But what are a people? Does the population of Britain constitute a people, does it comprise several peoples, or does it form part of a Germanic, or an English-speaking, or a European people? Does this imply that ethnic groups do not necessarily have a distinctive culture? Can two groups be culturally identical and yet constitute two different ethnic groups? These are complicated questions. Contrary to a widespread commonsense view, cultural difference between two groups is not the decisive

feature of ethnicity. Two distinctive groups, say, somewhere in New Guinea, may well have widely different languages, religious beliefs, and even technologies, but that does not entail that there is an ethnic relationship between them. For ethnicity to come about, the groups must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different from themselves. Ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of an isolated group. Conversely, some groups may seem culturally similar, yet there can be a socially highly relevant (and even volatile) interethnic relationship between them. This would be the case of the relationship between Serbs and Croats following the break-up of Yugoslavia there may also be considerable cultural variation within a group without ethnicity. Only in so far as cultural differences are perceived as being important, and are made politically relevant, do social relationships have an ethnic element.

Ethnicity is therefore an aspect of a relationship between agents who consider themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of other groups. It can thus also be defined as a social identity (based on a contrast *vis-à-vis* others) characterized by metaphoric or fictive kinship.

There are four main types of ethnic groups:

1. *Urban ethnic minorities*. This category would include, among others, non-European immigrants in European cities and Hispanics in the United States, as well as migrants to industrial towns in Africa and elsewhere. Research on

immigrants has focused on problem of adaptation, on ethnic discrimination from the host society, racism, and issues relating to identity management and cultural change. Although they have political interest, these ethnic groups rarely demand political independence or statehood, and they are usually integrated into a capitalist system of production and consumption.

2. *Indigenous peoples*. This word is a blanket term for aboriginal inhabitants of a territory, who are politically relatively powerless and who are only partially integrated into the dominant nation-state. Indigenous peoples are associated with a non-industrial mode of production and a stateless political system.
3. *Proto-nation (ethnonationalist movements)*. These groups, the most famous of ethnic groups in the news media, include Kurds, Sikhs, Palestinians, and Sri Lankan Tamils, and their number is growing. By definition, these groups have political leaders who claim that they are entitled to their own nation-state and should not be said to have more substantial characteristics in common with nations than with either urban minorities or indigenous peoples. They are always territorially based; they are differentiated according to class and educational achievement and they are large groups. In accordance with common terminology, these groups may be described as nations without state.
4. *Ethnic groups in plural societies*. The term 'plural society' usually designates colonially created states with culturally heterogeneous populations. Typical plural societies would be Kenya, Indonesia, and Jamaica. The groups that

make up the plural society, although they are compelled to participate in uniform political and economic systems, are regarded as (and regard themselves as) highly distinctive in other matters. In plural societies, secession is usually not an option, and ethnicity tends to be articulated as group competition. Most contemporary states could plausibly be considered plural ones.

5. *Civil society organization.* Civil society looks at the specific challenges face in situations of conflict and assesses how they can work more effectively. Freedom and the fulfillment of political, social and economic rights are essential to achieve effective and sustainable development. Yet, in too many countries these rights are not protected and development actors and citizens face significant challenges not only to their effectiveness, but also to their safety, sustainability and livelihoods. CSOs are now considered as a vital part of this governance and development system.¹¹
6. *Military social organization.* Terrorism in Thailand is mostly relative to the South Thailand insurgency. The violent attacks are dated back to two decades ago. The escalation of violence started off in 2001, where Thai authority symbols such as police, military and schools were attacked. The campaign has intensified in 2004, where real terrorist attacks started.

¹¹ For more details about the engagement of CSOs see:
<http://www.accrahl.net/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ACCRAEXT/0,,menuPK:64861886~pagePK:4705384~piPK:4705403~theSitePK:4700791,00.html>

E. Hypothesis

Islamic Identity:

We are grateful to the Glorified Allah who guided us all to this deen (religion) and we won't be guided unless he guided us. We are grateful to the glorified Allah who made us all gather on the work of Islam and to witness that there is no God but Allah.

Neither the differences in nationalities and nationalism nor the differences in colors and languages can detach us apart. We are grateful and thankful to the glorified Allah for his many bounties and we ask His glory to help us thank him for these countless bounties.

If we tried to gather around the nationality and nationalism axis we would have disputed and split apart due to the differences in our nationalities and nationalism. If we tried to gather based on colors and/or language we would have conflicts and detach apart due to the differences in our colors and Languages. By the same token if we tried to gather based on social and educational ranks we would have disagreed and scattered away due to the differences in our social ranks and levels of education.

Ethnic Identity:

The extent to which one identifies with a particular ethnic group(s). Refers to one's sense of belonging to an ethnic group and the part of one's thinking, perceptions, feelings, and behavior that is due to ethnic group membership. The ethnic group tends to be one in which the individual claims heritage (Phinney, 1996). Ethnic identity is separate from one's personal identity as an individual, although the two may reciprocally influence each other. 4 major components of ethnic identity:¹²

- Ethnic awareness (understanding of one's own and other groups)
- Ethnic self-identification (label used for one's own group)
- Ethnic attitudes (feelings about own and other groups)
- Ethnic behaviors (behavior patterns specific to an ethnic group)

Islamic identity articulation in Southern Thailand through:

1. Military articulation such as Mujahideen Pattani Movement and RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil)
2. Social movement articulation such as BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani), BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) and PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization)

¹² http://www.uky.edu/Classes/FAM/357/fam544/ethnic_identity.htm

F. Method to Collect Data

In this writing, the writer uses several ways to collect the data in order to discuss the problem, they are as follows:

- ➔ Media research, collecting the data from media likes the internet in order to find references and source to accomplish the explanation of the problem
- ➔ Library research, this method used to study the relevant sources in order to discuss the problem and by using the qualitative research the writer also will get secondary data.
- ➔ Data analysis, the data gained for the internet and library (books), were checked for the relevancy in order to be used as the source in the final paper arrangement.
- ➔ Proving hypothesis, derived from the meaning of the title, the discussion of the problem, and data analysis.

G. Scope of the Research

Focusing more on the topic research, the writer limits the time, which the research is conducted. The scope of discussion started from the beginning of separatist movement in southern border province of Thailand in 2004 to 2013 (present). This time limitation used in order to ease the observation of the problem as well as to avoid the complexity of the further analysis.

H. System of Writing

CHAPTER I: will be explaining about the problem Background, Research Question, Purpose of Research, Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis, Method of Research, Scope of Research and System of writing.

CHAPTER II: will discuss the general description of Pattani including its geographical situation, its history of conflict.

CHAPTER III: will discuss Thailand's Policy to Islamic Articulation in Southern Thailand.

CHAPTER IV: will discuss Islamic identity articulation in southern Thailand.

CHAPTER V: will give the conclusion from all of chapter and also give a suggestion.