

**JOURNAL**

**THE FAILURE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES (UNAMIR) TO STOP  
TUTSI GENOCIDE IN RWANDA DURING 1994**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*This study is about describing the causes of the failure of United Nations forces (UNAMIR) to stop the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994, the case study was the tutsi genocide in Rwanda .the Specific objectives of this study were to identify origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda and the causes of the 1994 Tutsi genocide, to describe the military intervention of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda and to identify the factors which contributed to the failure of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop Tutsi genocide. Research question was why United Nations forces (UNAMIR) failed to stop the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994. The researcher was pushed by the fact that most of United Nations peacekeeping missions in world fail and he was interested in finding the causes of the failure of those peacekeeping missions and at the end of the researcher gave useful recommendations. Rwanda genocide was chosen as a case study to determine the failure of United Nations peacekeeping mission and the related research has been conducted by Rwanda government before. Different books, web sites, journals and reports related to the failure of United Nations in peacekeeping missions in the world have been consulted in literature review and Descriptive research design was used. The findings revealed that the main reasons behind the failure of the United Nations forces (UNAMIR) in stopping Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994 are: Lack of political will of dominant Member States of United Nations (UN) to intervene , inadequate financial resources and mission's poor design .The researcher concluded that the UN really failed to take immediate action and strengthen UNAMIR to stop the massacres, due to opposition from dominant member states such as France , USA and UK and he recommended that The United Nations and its member states must be prepared to mobilize political will to act in the face of gross violations of human rights which have not reached the ultimate level of a genocide and the UN Secretary-General should initiate an action plan to prevent genocide involving the whole UN system and aiming to provide input to the World Conference against Racism ,Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance .*

*Key terms: genocide and failure*

## INTRODUCTION

### A. Background

According to Dorsey in his book entitled historical dictionary of Rwanda, Rwanda officially the Republic of Rwanda is a sovereign state in East Africa. Located a few degrees south of the Equator, Rwanda is bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda is in the African Great Lakes region and is highly elevated; its geography dominated by mountains in the west and savanna to the East, with numerous lakes throughout the country. The climate is temperate to subtropical, The population is young and predominantly rural, with a density among the highest in Africa. Rwanda is drawn from just one cultural and linguistic group, the Banyarwanda, within this group there are three subgroups: the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa .

Conflicts between Rwanda ethnic groups had origins in Belgium's colonial rules, which favored only the minority Tutsis. According to Belgium rules in Rwanda during the colonial time, education, administration and other administration training were only for Tutsi and they were rich with many cattle. Hutu were only farmers and were not allowed to go to school and to participate in any other training .the hutu were farmers not really happy with that and this really fostered differences between hutu and tutsi. When the Tutsi reclaimed independence from Belgium, immediately Belgians changed the system and started supporting hutu who were the majority and in 1959 the hutu revolted and killed many tutsi and other tutsi have been forced to exil in neighbouring countries of Rwanda. In 1962, when the country gained independence, Gregoire Kayibanda headed the first recognized Hutu government. Juvenal Habyarimana another hutu extremist seized power in a military coup a decade later. For nearly twenty years under Habyarimana, ethnic relations simmered with sporadic outbreaks of violence. In 1990 the tutsi exiled in neighbouring countries organised themselves and founded what is Rwanda patriotic front (RPF), the current Rwanda political party headed by kagame Paul the current president of Rwanda and they invaded Rwanda from the north in 1990 under the support of Uganda to stop the violence against tutsi by hutu led

government which was still happening in Rwanda. In 1993, Habyarimana Juvenal who was the president of Rwanda signed a short-lived power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis, aiming to end the fighting. In April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana the president of Rwanda and the President of Burundi from Tanzania after signing peace agreement with Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) composed by Tutsi was shot down by Hutu extremists who were not happy in power sharing with Tutsi. The event triggered the notorious genocide. Extremist Hutu militia aided by the Rwandan army and supported by France government launched systematic massacres against Tutsis accusing them to shoot down the plane carrying president of Rwanda from Tanzania. Despite reports of mass killings around 1,000,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed within 100 days.

The UN failed to take immediate action to stop the massacres due to opposition from France which was protecting its interests in Rwanda by supporting Hutu government to exterminate Tutsi who were against France colonialism in Rwanda and the USA had no interests in Rwanda to deploy its military after a big loss of soldiers and money in Somalia. During these events and in their aftermath, the United Nations (UN) and countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium were criticized for their inaction, including failure to strengthen the force and mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers, and observers criticized the government of France for support of the genocidal regime after the genocide had begun.

The failure of the UN is clear: the permanent members did not supply the mission with enough resources and gave unclear directions which led to the peacekeepers not being able to use force to even defend themselves. They knew what was happening, yet many countries did not want to do anything to stop it.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by Security Council in April 20<sup>th</sup> 1994 after genocide began. It was intended to assist in peacekeeping in Rwanda. The mission lasted from April 1994 to March 1996. Due to the limitations of its rules of engagement, insufficient resources and lack of personnel, UNAMIR mission failed in the Rwandan Genocide. The mission is thus regarded as a major failure.

UNAMIR mandate was :

- To contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda,
- To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.
- To contribute to the security and peace of the Rwanda country.
- To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government leading up to the elections.
- To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes.
- To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.
- To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.
- To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police. Its authorised strength was 2,500 personnel, but it took some five months for the mission to reach this level.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or head of the mission, was Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon. At the beginning of July 1994, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh was replaced by Shaharyar Khan of Pakistan. The military head, and Force Commander was Canadian Brigadier-General (promoted Major-General during the mission) Roméo Dallaire. In August 1994, General Roméo Dallaire, suffering from severe stress, was replaced as Force Commander by Major-General Guy Tousignant, also from Canada. In December 1995, Tousignant was replaced by Brigadier General Shiva Kumar from India. Troop contributing countries were Belgium, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Tunisia. Around 400 of the troops in this early part of the mission were Belgian soldiers, despite the fact that Rwanda had been a Belgian colony, and normally the UN bans the former colonial power from serving in such peace-keeping roles.

Today, Rwanda has two public holidays commemorating the genocide. The national commemoration period begins with Genocide Memorial Day on April and concludes with Liberation Day on July 4. The week following April 7 is designated an official week of mourning. The Rwandan Genocide served as the impetus for creating the International

Criminal Court to eliminate the need for ad hoc tribunals to prosecute those accused in future incidents of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

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  3. *The A to Z of the United Nations*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. ISBN 9780810870208. (subscription required (help))
  4. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-171-1.2 Dorsey, Learthen (1994).
  5. *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda*. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.
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  7. *New England Journal of International and Comparative Law* 14 (2): 169–188

**B. The objectives of journal**

The objectives of this journal are:

1. To identify origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda and the causes of the 1994 Tutsi genocide.
2. To describe the military intervention of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop the Tutsi genocide.
3. To identify the factors which contributed to the failure of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda to stop Tutsi genocide

## **C. Literature review**

### **C.1 Cases of failure of United Nations forces in protecting people from crimes against humanity.**

#### **C.1.1 case of Bosnia (Srebrenica massacres)**

This 1995 Bosnian War massacre was the single worst act of mass murder on European soil since World War II. After an ethnic cleansing campaign led by the Serbs targeted the Bosniaks, a largely Muslim community, the United Nations designated Srebrenica a safe-zone in 1993. Militarized units in the zone were forced to disarm, and a peacekeeping force was put in place, consisting of six hundred Dutch soldiers. The Serbs then surrounded the safe-zone with tanks, soldiers, and artillery pieces.

With the zone surrounded, supply lines were slow-moving at best. The UN forces were running low on ammunition, fuel, and food, as the Serbs continued to build an army around Srebrenica.

In July, Serbian forces invaded the area, forcing the small UN team back. As many as 20,000 Bosniak refugees fled to the UN compound in Potocari, seeking protection from the advancing Serbs. Despite the UN peacekeeping force present, Serbian soldiers entered the camp, raping Bosniak women and murdering freely while the Dutch peacekeepers did nothing. By July 18th, 7,800 Bosniaks were dead, due largely to an ill-equipped and unprepared UN force.

#### **Why United Nations forces failed in Bosnia (poor design, lack of equipments)**

United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia failed due to the fact that the plan to protect Bosnian people was not well designed. United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were ill equipped and unprepared. Despite the UN peacekeeping force present, Serbian soldiers entered the camp, raping Bosniak women and murdering freely while the Dutch peacekeepers did nothing. By July 18th, 7,800 Bosniaks were dead, due largely to an ill-equipped and unprepared UN force.



### C.1.2 Case of Somalia

the Battle of Mogadishu or Day of the Rangers (Somali: *Maalintii Rangers*), was part of Operation Gothic Serpent and was fought on 3 and 4 October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, between forces of the United States supported by UNOSOM II, and Somali militiamen loyal to the self-proclaimed presidenttobe Mohamed Farrah Aidid who had support from armed civilian fighters.

A U.S. Army force in Mogadishu, consisting primarily of U.S. Army Rangers from Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; C Squadron, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), better known as "Delta Force"; as well as Air Force Combat Controllers and Air Force Pararescuemen and helicopters from 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and an attached Naval Corpsman from Seal Team 4, attempted to seize two of Aidid's high-echelon lieutenants during a meeting in the city. Shortly after the assault began, Somali militia and armed civilian fighters shot down two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters drew the raid, intended to last no more than an hour, into an overnight standoff in the city. The battle resulted in 18 deaths, 73 wounded, and one helicopter pilot and Naval Corpsman captured among the U.S. raid party and rescue forces. At least one Pakistani soldier and one Malaysian soldier were killed as part of the rescue forces. American sources estimate between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, including civilians; SNA forces claim only 315 killed, with 812 wounded. The battle is also referred to as the **First Battle of Mogadishu** to distinguish it from the Second Battle of Mogadishu of 2006.

#### C.1.2.1 Why United Nations forces (UNOSOM) and USA failed in Somalia in 1992.

due to the shot down two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters by Somali militia and armed civilian fighters where it caused 18 deaths (American soldiers) the president of united states bill Clinton lobbied USA army to leave Somalia as soon as possible .The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters drew the raid, intended to last no more than an hour, into an overnight standoff in the city. The battle resulted in 18 deaths, 73 wounded, and one helicopter pilot and Naval Corpsman (on BeachHead after EaE) captured among the U.S. raid party and rescue forces. At least one Pakistani soldier and one Malaysian soldier were killed as part of the rescue forces. American sources estimate between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, including civilians; SNA forces claim only 315 killed, with 812 wounded.

### **C.1.3 Cambodia (Khmer Rouge)**

Ruling Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge practiced an extreme form of Communism, as dictated by their borderline-psychotic leader Pol Pot. Any suspected enemies were executed, including professionals and intellectuals. Ethnic Vietnamese, Ethnic Chinese, and Christians were executed en masse.

In 1979, the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge and end the massacre. Pol Pot was forced in exile, and a new government was put in place in Cambodia. Shockingly, the United Nations refused to recognize this new government because it was backed by Vietnam, which had recently ended a decade-long conflict with the United States. Until 1994, the United Nations recognized the Khmer Rouge as the true government of Cambodia, despite the fact that they had killed 2.5 million Cambodians, amounting to 33% of their total population.

### **C.1.4 Sri Lanka**

The small island nation of Sri Lanka experienced a bloody civil war lasting from 1983 to 2009, pitting the militant, separatist Tamil Tigers against government forces. In the final months of the war, the opposing sides were fighting in the heavily populated northeast coastline, a designated safe zone.

The fighting forced 196,000 people to flee, and trapped over 50,000 civilians. Independent experts urged the Human Rights Council of the UN to investigate claims of war crimes, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged being “appalled” by the situation, but the United Nations made no attempts to intervene on behalf of the civilian population. From January to April of 2009, over 6,500 civilians were killed in this so-called “safe-zone”.

### C.1.5 Darfur

In 2003, the unstable nation of Sudan erupted in conflict, as various militia groups criticized and attacked the government for oppressing non-Arabs. Early in the war, rebel forces defeated the Sudanese military in more than thirty battles. Seeing that defeat was imminent, the government funded the Janjaweed, a group of Arab militants. By 2005, the Janjaweed were carrying out attacks on populated villages using artillery and helicopters, prompting condemnation by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Despite this condemnation, the UN did not enter Sudan, instead urging members of the African Union to intervene.

As the African Union attempted an intervention, it became apparent that the Sudanese military was destroying civilian populations. Reports emerged revealing that Sudanese military planes were painted white, to resemble UN humanitarian aircraft, only to drop bombs on villages. It was not until 2006 that 200 UN soldiers were dispatched to the area. Despite their limited presence, fighting continued until 2010. In seven years, an estimated **300,000 Sudanese** civilians were killed

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8. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2000. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford University Press.

9. [Human Rights Developments](#), retrieved on 10 November 2009.

## **C.2. cases of successful peacekeeping and why successful**

### **C.2.1 War in Kosovo**

The Kosovo War was an armed conflict in Kosovo that lasted from 28 February 1998 until 11 June 1999. It was fought by the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (by this time, consisting of the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia) which controlled Kosovo before the war, and the Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from 24 March 1999, and ground support from the Albanian army.

The KLA, formed in 1991, initiated its first campaign in 1995 when it launched attacks targeting Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo, and in June 1996 the group claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage targeting Kosovo police stations. In 1997, the organisation acquired a large amount of arms through weapons smuggling from Albania, following a rebellion which saw large numbers of weapons looted from the country's police and army posts. In 1998, KLA attacks targeting Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo resulted in an increased presence of Serb paramilitaries and regular forces who subsequently began pursuing a campaign of retribution targeting KLA sympathisers and political opponents in a drive which killed 1,500 to 2,000 civilians and KLA combatants. After attempts at a diplomatic solution failed, NATO intervened, justifying the campaign in Kosovo as a "humanitarian war". This precipitated a mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians as the Yugoslav forces continued to fight during the aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia (March–June 1999). By the year 2000, investigations had recovered the remains of almost three thousand victims of all ethnicities, and in 2001 a United Nations administered Supreme Court, based in Kosovo, found that there had been "a systematic campaign of terror, including murders, rapes, arsons and severe maltreatments", but that Serb troops had tried to remove rather than eradicate the Albanian population.

The war ended with the Kumanovo Treaty, with Yugoslav forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence. The Kosovo Liberation Army disbanded soon after this, with some of its members going on to fight for the UÇPMB in the Preševo Valley and others joining the National Liberation Army (NLA) and Albanian National Army (ANA) during the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia, while others went on to form the Kosovo Police.

The NATO bombing campaign has remained controversial, as it did not gain the approval of the UN Security Council and because it caused at least 488 Yugoslav civilian deaths, including substantial numbers of Kosovo refugees.

### C.2.1.1 why peacekeeping succeeded in Kosovo.

It has been successful in Kosovo due to the interest of the United States which was the only superpower left standing and simply cannot avoid getting involved. The United States has an obligation to fight communism and to do whatever it takes to create a world where it dominates, the thinking goes. In this view, the United States has a "window of opportunity to shape the world in its image," Fareed Zakaria, the managing editor of *Foreign Affairs* magazine and a skeptic of this approach, explains.

Experts call it "grand strategy." During the cold war, containment was the grand strategy; American policy was based on fighting any expansion of Communism. Yet almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is still no consensus over how this new world should be structured and what role the United States should play in it. If the Kosovo crisis does nothing else, Mr. Mearsheimer and others agree, its resolution will affect whose ideas about United States national interests will prevail.

The American involvement in Kosovo has started the most furious debate since the end of the cold war over what constitutes United States strategic interests. Not since the Persian Gulf war in 1991 have foreign policy analysts filled the nation's airwaves, newspapers and policy journals with such passion. "The Kosovo crisis has sharpened and intensified what was a largely theoretical debate within think tanks and seminar rooms," said John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

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10. *Kosovo rebels to disarm*". *BBC News*. 1999-06-21. Retrieved 2012-11-08.12Daniszewski, John (1999-04-14).

11. *Yugoslav Troops Said to Cross Into Albania*". *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved 2012-02-13Daly, Emma (1999-04-14).

12. *War In The Balkans: Serbs enter Albania and burn village*". *The Independent (London)*. Retrie

13. Robert M. Cassidy (Ph.D.) (2004). *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After the Cold War*. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 157. ISBN 978-0-275-97696-5

## D. Theoretical framework.

### D.1 One question, two answers theory

According to Arild Anderdal in his book entitled one question to answers, international organisations are the actors of international problems solving, however some international organisations including United Nations succeed in some international problems solving and others fails. it is more important to understand the conditions for success and the causes of failure. People still wonder why some efforts at developing and implementing joint solutions to international problems succeed while others fail. **some efforts are more successful than others because more powerful tools are used or because greater skill or energy is used to attack the problem (problem-solving capacity)** . The organisation is successful in operation when the members have the will to contribute to operations, when the members have no will to contribute the organisation fail in its operation. This is what happened in Rwanda when the united nations members states had no political will to contribute financially and deploying military for united nations assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop genocide and protect tutsi population from violence of hutu population supported by Rwanda government and France to exterminate all tutsi .

All organizations can serve as arenas, but only some can also qualify as significant actors in their own right. International organizations can be considered actors to the extent that they provide independent inputs into the problem-solving process or somehow amplify outputs of these processes. To qualify as actor, an organization must have a minimum of internal coherence (unity), autonomy, resources, and external activity. Without a certain minimum of coherence, an organization cannot be considered one actor. Without some autonomy (notably in relation to its members), it would be a mere puppet commanded by its masters.

The facts that some international organisations including United Nations have **no autonomy, they depend on the members contributions either finance or staff. Even decision making depends on the member states. All depends on the willing of member states.**

The lack of political will of member states to contribute in peacekeeping operations, United Nations will not perform effectively due to the lack of resource and staff which should be contributed by members to succeed in operation. This is what happened in Rwanda when United Nations members had no political will to contribute to the operation of UNAMIR in stopping the genocide in Rwanda.

The great members of United Nations which had no political will to intervene in UNAMIR operation in Rwanda were USA, France, UK, and Belgium contributed to the failure of United Nations operations in Rwanda. This is due to the fact that United Nations hasn't its own military, finance and staff, if an organization has not a certain minimum of resources at its disposal, its own contributions to its activities would tend to be inconsequential. on the autonomy and resources dimensions) to achieve actor status, and some even fail to meet that .

lack of political will to give UNAMIR the personnel and materiel resources the mission needed. Even after the Security Council decided to act to try and stop the killing, and reversed its decision to reduce UNAMIR, the problems that the Secretariat had faced since UNAMIR's inception in getting contributions of troops from Member States persisted. This was the case throughout during the urgent attempts to set up UNAMIR .The lack of will to send troops to Rwanda continued to be deplorably evident in the weeks following the decision by the Security Council to increase the strength of UNAMIR . For weeks, the Secretariat tried to solicit troop contributions, to little avail . Although a few African countries did express a willingness to send troops, they did so with the proviso that they will be provided with equipment and financed. By the time

operation started, UNAMIR only had the bare minimum number of troops. Recognition is due here to those troop contributing countries, in particular Ghana and Tunisia, which allowed their troops to remain throughout the terrible weeks of the genocide, despite the withdrawal of other contingents. In sum, while criticisms can be leveled at the mistakes and limitations of the capacity of UNAMIR's troops, one should not forget the responsibility of the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not prepared to send any troops or materiel at all to Rwanda.

The political will of Member States to send troops to peacekeeping operations is of course a key to the United Nations capacity to react to conflict. The stand-by arrangements initiative is a welcome one in that it attempts to address the problem of the lack of available troops when missions are to be set up. Yet the standby arrangement system is equally dependent on the will of Member States to commit troops and other personnel in particular instance.

A general point about the need for political will is that such will must be mobilized equally in response to conflicts across the globe. It has been stated repeatedly during the course of the interviews conducted by the Inquiry that the fact that Rwanda was not of strategic interest to countries and that the international community exercised double standards when faced with the risk of a catastrophe there compared to action taken elsewhere.

#### **D.1.1 United States of America (USA)**

The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partly because since the end of the Cold War, “no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States” .As early as 1993, CIA studies warned of imminent massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims. Before the genocide began, major powers



knew “that something terrible was underway in Rwanda” and that there were plans for genocidal killings states that by April 20, the US must have known about the genocide. **However, since the death of its rangers in Somalia, the US had decided to “stop placing the agenda of the UN before the interests of the US” (Clinton in Melvern 2000: 78).**

### **D.1.2 Belgium**

Belgium, as the former colonial master of Rwanda, had a deep political connection with that country. When UNAMIR was formed in October 1993, they contributed the largest Western contingent . There were further reasons for Belgian involvement in the mission. After the Cold War, Belgium needed a rationale for keeping a large and well-equipped national army; in order to preserve its status, Belgium tried to present itself as the African peacekeeping specialist. Early on, Belgium knew of the ethnic and political killings so it began to argue for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but no other state was interested in supporting the mission (Des Forges 1999: 176). After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on April 7, one day after the genocide had begun, Belgian public opinion that had been uninterested before, began to lobby for “the boys to be sent home” (African Rights 1995: 1113).

### **D.1.3 France**

France, the country with the longest and deepest political and military involvement in Rwanda and whose *actions* directly contributed to the genocide. Although France knew that there were ethnic massacres going on in Rwanda, it continued to give military and political support to the interim government (Melvern 2000: 24; Wallis 2006: 103).

In October 1993, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda, France sent troops and weapons in order to support their francophone ally against an “Anglo-Saxon invasion” (Prunier 1997: 101; Wallis 2006: 104). France, worried about its “prestige

and international stature”, sees Anglo-Saxon countries as a threat to its position . This led to quick and deep intervention in Rwanda . Janvier Afrika, a former Rwandan Hutu supporter, remembers French involvement in 1992 in Rwanda .

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14. Aggarwal, V. 1985. *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

15. Andresen, S., and J. Wettestad. 1995. “International Problem-Solving Effectiveness: The Oslo Project Story So Far.”

16. *International Environmental Affairs* 7: 127–149. Axelrod, R. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Axelrod, R., and R. O.

### **D.3 Humanitarian intervention theory**

According to James (2010) in his book entitled humanitarian intervention, since 1945 protecting people from genocide and other crimes against humanity was the responsibility of United Nations as it appears in UN charter. United Nations peacekeeping have been failing to protect people from crimes against humanity, there are many cases including Srebrenica massacres (Bosnia), Tutsi genocide in Rwanda which took the lives of more than one million people, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and so on. All those massacres occurred in presence of United Nations peacekeepers and fail to protect people from those massacres. It is in this framework the researcher was interested in determining why United Nations forces didn't stop genocide in Rwanda whereas they were present in Rwanda when the massacres of Tutsi were occurring and humanitarian intervention is the responsibility of UN as it is agreed in UN charter since 1945 after the world war two.

Humanitarian intervention has been defined as a state's use of "military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed. This definition may be too narrow as it excludes non-military forms of intervention such as humanitarian aid and international sanctions. On this broader understanding, "Humanitarian intervention should be understood to encompass non-forcible methods, namely intervention undertaken without military force to alleviate mass human suffering within sovereign borders." James (2010).

There is no one standard or legal definition of humanitarian intervention; the field of analysis (such as law, ethics or politics) often influences the definition that is chosen. Differences in definition include variations in whether humanitarian intervention is limited to instances where there is an absence of consent from the host state; whether humanitarian intervention is limited to punishment actions; and whether humanitarian intervention is limited to cases where there has been explicit UN Security Council authorization for action.

### **D.3.1 characteristics of humanitarian intervention.**

According to Wikipedia, Humanitarian intervention involves the threat and use of military forces as a central feature. It is an intervention in the sense that it entails interfering in the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state.

The intervention is in response to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to states' strategic interests, but instead is motivated by humanitarian objectives.

The subject of humanitarian intervention has remained a compelling foreign policy issue, especially since NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, as it highlights the tension between the principle of state sovereignty, a defining pillar of the UN system and international law, and evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force. Moreover, it has sparked normative and empirical debates over its legality, the ethics of using military force to respond to human rights violations, when it should occur, who should intervene, and whether it is effective.

To its proponents, it marks imperative action in the face of human rights abuses, over the rights of state sovereignty, while to its detractors it is often viewed as a pretext for military intervention often devoid of legal sanction, selectively deployed and achieving only ambiguous ends. Its frequent use following the end of the Cold War suggested to many that a new norm of military humanitarian intervention was emerging in international politics, although some now argue that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the US "war on terror" have brought the era of humanitarian intervention to an end. James Pattison, however, has recently argued that the NATO intervention in Libya has bucked this trend.

## **D. Conceptual framework.**

The poor design of agreement can lead to the failure of compliance by signatories, and then after the compliance bargaining is requested, this is much related also to the poor design of UNAMIR mission in Rwanda caused by misunderstanding in UN Security Council to give support for intervention in Rwanda .

one question two answers is the case also where some international organisations succeed in problem solving and others fail due to the lack of political will of members to contribute for finance and staff to intervene, it is the case in Rwanda where permanent members of UN security council had no political will to support UN in its mission in Rwanda which led to the failure of mission and more than one million Tutsi people have been killed in presence of UN inactive troops.

United Nations mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to intervene in the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda due to poor design of mission caused by misunderstanding in Security Council and reluctance of Security Council permanent members to contribute funds an military.

The mission was confused and army was not trained, had not enough equipment to stop Rwanda national army which was implementing genocide and also was not able to destroy their weapons and jam all the radio in Rwanda which was motivating Hutu to kill Tutsi. The reason behind that reluctance to intervene and poor design of United Nations mission for Rwanda was that the very important member of United Nations, USA and its ally UK

1. Had no defined interests in Rwanda, the landlocked country with no minerals and oil.
2. The shadow of Somalia war where USA lost soldiers and money, USA feared that what happened in Somalia could happen again in Rwanda. The USA president Bill Clinton adopted the policy of saving money after the loss in Somalia and not intervening again.
3. Rwanda was French colony, where France was protecting its territory by supporting Hutu to exterminate Tutsi who were against France domination in Rwanda.

## ANALYSIS

### **THE FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES (UNAMIR) TO STOP THE TUTSI GENOCIDE IN RWANDA DURING 1994**

According to United Nations and Human Right watch reports in 1996 about the role of United Nations in stopping the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda and Walter Dorn and Jonathan Matloff in their journal entitled preventing the Bloodbath, the main reasons behind the failure of the United Nations forces (UNAMIR) in stopping Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994 are:

#### **A. Lack of political will of dominant Member States of United Nations (UN) to deploy military**

One among reasons behind the failure of United Nations Assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop Tutsi genocide was the lack of political will to give UNAMIR the personnel. The problems that the Secretariat in United Nations had faced since UNAMIR's inception is to get contributions of troops from Member States persisted. This was the case throughout in May and June during the urgent attempts to set up a strong UNAMIR. The lack of will to send troops to Rwanda continued to be deplorably evident in the weeks following the decision by the Security Council to intervene in Rwanda. It was planned to send 5,500 peacekeepers but only 400 have been sent. For weeks, the Secretariat tried to solicit troop contributions, although a few African countries did express a willingness to send troops, they did so with the hope that they will be provided with equipments and financed. UNAMIR only had the minimum number of troops to permit it to take over the few areas. Recognition is due here to those troop contributing countries, in particular African countries: Ghana and Tunisia, which allowed their troops to remain throughout the terrible weeks of the genocide. In sum, while criticisms can be leveled at the mistakes and limitations of the capacity of UNAMIR's troops, one should not forget the responsibility of the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not willing to send any troops or materiel at all to Rwanda.

**The political will of Member States to send troops for peacekeeping operations is of course a key to the United Nations capacity to react to conflict.** The stand-by arrangements initiative is a welcome one to address the problem of the lack of available troops when missions are to be set up. Yet the stand by arrangement system is equally dependent on the will of Member States to commit troops and other personnel in particular instance.

A general point about the need for political will is that such will must be mobilized equally in response to conflicts across the globe. It has been stated repeatedly during the course of the interviews conducted by the Inquiry that Rwanda was not of strategic interest to countries and that the international community was going to face the risk of a catastrophe there compared to action taken elsewhere like in Somalia .

#### **A.1 United States of America (USA)**

The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partly because since the end of the Cold War, no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States. As early as 1993, CIA studies warned of imminent massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims in Rwanda . Before the genocide began, major powers knew that something terrible was underway in Rwanda and that there were plans for genocidal killings by April 20, 1994. The USA must have taken this seriously however, since the death of its rangers in Somalia; the USA had decided to stop placing the agenda of the UN before the interests of the USA (Clinton in Melvern 2000: 78).

President Clinton, who was worried about his poll ratings after bringing home body bags of USA soldiers died on battle in Somalia , had decided that a range of factors must be met in order for the US to approve future UN peacekeeping missions .

The Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), although not published until May 1994, strongly influenced US decision-making in April 1994 . Unfortunately for the people of Rwanda, their country did not qualify for a US-sponsored peacekeeping operation under PDD-25 (Power 2003: 332).

In addition to the memories of Somalia, the United States had never had national interest in Rwanda, one of PDD-25's many requirements contends that Washington simply remembered Somalia and heeded no American demands for intervention. Citizens have a

powerful voice in lobbying their government to place topics on the policy agenda. (Power 2003: 375-361).

Reports about the conflict also demonstrate Western misunderstandings of African conflicts: Instead of seeing the killings as extraordinary, there was the belief that “these people do this from time to time”. Government officials realised that they would look ridiculous calling the killings in Rwanda genocide and then do nothing. Apart from moral obligations, there are also legal requirements. Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, the international community is obliged to act if genocide occurs anywhere in the world (Genocide Convention 1948). This led to a dance to avoid the genocide-word in the US .The US’ response to the Rwandan genocide demonstrates all three major reasons for inaction: the shadow of Somalia as well as inaction because of a lack of national interest and internal pressure(Power 2003: 359).

On a visit to the Rwandan capital, Kigali, in 1998 Mr Clinton apologised for not acting quickly enough or immediately calling the crimes genocide.In what was widely seen as an attempt to diminish his responsibility, he said: "It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family,but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day who did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.

## **A.2 Belgium**

Belgium, as the former colonial master of Rwanda, had a deep political connection with that country. When UNAMIR was formed in 1994, they contributed the largest Western contingent . There were further reasons for Belgian involvement in the mission. After the Cold War, Belgium needed a rationale for keeping a large and well-equipped national army; in order to preserve its status, Belgium tried to present itself as the African peacekeeping specialist. Early on, Belgium knew of the ethnic and political killings so it began to argue for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but no other state was interested in supporting the mission (Des Forges 1999: 176). After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on April 7, one day after the genocide had begun, Belgian public opinion that had been uninterested before, began to lobby for the boys to be sent home (African Rights 1995: 1113).



In order to save face and not to lose its status as African peacekeeping specialist, Belgium began to petition for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, which was supported at the Security Council as no other state had an interest in the mission. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali said that Belgium was afflicted with the Somalia Syndrome: pull out at the first encounter with serious trouble. After the death of Belgian peacekeepers, French and US soldiers came to rescue experts between April 7 and 10. The quick and effective rescue mission of foreigners demonstrated that the international community was able to stop genocide and would have been serious about stopping the genocide. Belgium knew about the nature of the killings and had the capacity to prevent and stop the genocide, However, its concerns about losing face and satisfying voters at home stopped them from doing so (African Rights) 1995: 1112.

### A.3 France

France, the country with the longest and deepest political and military involvement in Rwanda and whose actions directly contributed to the genocide. Although France knew that there were ethnic massacres going on in Rwanda, it continued to give military and political support to the government (Melvern 2000: 24; Wallis 2006: 103).

In October 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from the north under the support of Uganda to throw away the hutu led government, **France sent troops and weapons in order to support their francophone ally ( hutu led government ) against an Anglo-Saxon invasion** (Prunier 1997: 101; Wallis 2006: 104).

France, worried about its prestige and international status, sees Anglo-Saxon countries as a threat to its position ( Rwanda ). This led to quick and deep intervention in Rwanda to support hutu led government to kill tutsi which were against France national interests in Rwanda ( Janvier Afrika, French involvement in Rwanda genocide) 1996 .

A few days after the genocide had begun, the French embassy was abandoned and the only thing left behind was a heap of shredded documents and at least seventy French soldiers. These French soldiers continued to hand out firearms, train the hutu militia and even control check-points and demand to see identity cards, arresting Tutsi and handing them over to the Rwandan hutu army to kill them. In France, between April and May, like elsewhere, there was virtually no media coverage about the genocide. (Prunier 1997: 277).

As the only Western country willing to send a force, it could have supported UNAMIR. Rather, France's role in the genocide was that of a “**silent accomplice**” to support Rwanda government to kill Tutsi who were against French interests in Rwanda . (Wallis 2006) .

### **B. Inadequate financial resources of the mission .**

the lack of financial resources and logistics had been a serious problem for UNAMIR from its inception, and continued to be so during the mission. It is significant that even the resolution establishing UNAMIR already included an invitation to the Secretary General to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR. The Secretary- General was asked to seek economies in planning and executing the phased deployment, and to report regularly on what had been achieved in this regard. Even the Belgian contingent, which was the strongest in UNAMIR, faced problems with recycled materiel and lack of arms. The Bangladeshi contingent arrived without even the most basic supplies. Troops lacked necessary weapons and training in a number of respects due to insufficient financial resources .

In his report to the Security Council dated 30 April 1994, the Secretary-General argued against a reduction of resource levels, writing that such a reduction would negatively affect the performance and credibility of UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate. Although the Council did approve the deployment of the battalion to the DMZ in its resolution 893(1994) of 6 April 1994, again the Secretary General was requested to monitor the size and cost of the mission to seek economies. The Same request was reiterated in the Council's last resolution on Rwanda before the genocide, resolution 909(1994) of 5 April 1994.

The logistical problems facing UNAMIR run like a constant thread throughout the correspondence between the Force Commander and Headquarters. Contingents arrived without normal materiel. UNAMIR only received 8 APCs out of 22 requested, of which only five were road-worthy. The mission had a medical unit, but complaints were raised against the quality of the care.

In the genocide, UNAMIR was still facing serious logistical problems. When the Secretary-General was to present his report to the Council in late March, the draft sent to

Headquarters by Booh Booh highlighted both logistical difficulties and the need for more military observers. The Inquiry notes in this context that the final version of the report did not include the request from the field for an increase in the number of military observers by 48 which was contained in the original draft from Kigali.

The logistical situation facing the mission once the genocide started was summarized in a cable from Booh Booh and Dallaire to Annan and Goulding dated 8 April. Even as early as this, the cable described developments as a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror initiated principally by the Presidential Guard. The cable went on to describe aggressive action taken against opposition leaders, against the RPF, the massacre of Tutsi, against the general civilian population as well as direct and indirect fire against UNAMIR. The RPF had by then broken out of their compound, and UNAMIR describes full hostilities between the Presidential Guards and RPF. The cable asked the question "Is the mandate of UNAMIR still valid?"

The infantry in Kigali is described as being separated into camps isolated by fighting, and separated from their logistical support. The mission is desperately short of life and operational sustaining support. The reserves required by the UN for this mission were either not brought by troop contributing countries or have not been provided to this mission. Most units are described as having between 1-2 days of drinking water, between 0 to 2 days of rations, and about a 2-3 day reserve of fuel. Furthermore, the lack of ammunition and small arms was described as the largest single deficiency.

Finally, a more determined effort should have been made to provide the United Nations with its own radio facility in Rwanda. Moreover, the political will and financial means should have been mustered to jam the notorious inciting radio station Radio Mille Collines which was motivating hutu to kill tutsi. In the future, however, counteracting hate radio may not be enough. Attention must also have been paid to the distribution of genocidal messages of hate over the internet.

The responsibility for the logistical problems faced by UNAMIR lies both with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in particular its Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), and with individual troop contributors. FALD should not have allowed UNAMIR to have the dire lack of resources described above. These fundamental logistics problems should have been

dealt with .However, the Inquiry also finds that troopcontributors to UNAMIR did not provide their contingents with basic weapons and other materiel for which they were responsible. **The constant pressure by the Security Council on UNAMIR to save money and cut resources also created problems in a situation where the mission was too weak to start with.**

### **Composition of UNAMIR and financial aspects**

As of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR included 5,442 military personnel and 80 civilian police officers from the following countries:

#### **Country, police, troops, observers**

Argentina, , , 1

Australia, , 308,

Austria, , , 15

Bangladesh, , , 29

Canada, , 376, 20

Chad, , 132,

Congo, , 38,

Djibouti, 15, ,

Ethiopia, , 805,

Fiji, , , 1

Ghana, 10, 829, 57

Guinea, , , 15

Guinea Bissau, 20, 35,

India, , 326, 16

Jordan, 5, ,

Malawi, , 170, 10

Mali, 10, 200, 29

Niger, , 43,  
 Nigeria, 10, 338, 15  
 Poland, , , 2  
 Russian Federation, , , 15  
 Senegal, , 241,  
 Tunisia, , 844, 10  
 United Kingdom, , 7,  
 Uruguay, , , 24  
 Zambia, 10, 455, 10  
 Zimbabwe, , , 26  
 TOTAL, 80, 5,147, 295

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

### **UNAMIR Financial aspect**

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNAMIR in 1994 was approximately **\$197.5 million**. Costs are met by the assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account of UNAMIR for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 October 1994 amounted to approximately **\$18.2 million**.

### **Comparing UNAMIR financial aspects to other United Nation peacekeeping financial aspects**

#### **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)**

In Western Sahara since April 1991

**Strength: 495 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 242
  - Troops: 26
  - Military observers: 216
- Civilian personnel: 241

- International civilians: 84
- Local civilians: 157
- UN Volunteers: 12

**Fatalities: 15**

**Approved budget (07/2015– 06/2016): \$53,190,000**

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)**

In the Central African Republic since April 2014

**Strength: 12,627 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 11,686
  - Troops: 9,639
  - Military observers: 164
  - Police: 1,883
- Civilian personnel: 760
  - International civilians: 518
  - Local civilians: 242
- UN Volunteers: 181

**Fatalities: 19**

**Approved budget (07/2015– 06/2016): \$814,066,800**

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)**

In Mali since April 2013

**Strength: 13,170 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 11,781
  - Troops: 10,645
  - Military observers: 39
  - Police: 1,097
- Civilian personnel: 1,246
  - International civilians: 585
  - Local civilians: 661

- UN Volunteers: 143

**Fatalities: 81**

**Approved budget (07/2015– 06/2016): \$923,305,800**

**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)**

In Haiti since June 2004

**Strength: 6,092 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 4,750
  - Troops: 2,368
  - Police: 2,382
- Civilian personnel: 1,245
  - International civilians: 304
  - Local civilians: 941
- UN Volunteers: 97

**Fatalities: 183**

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$380,355,700**

**United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)**

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo since July 2010

**Strength: 22,492 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 18,618
  - Troops: 16,938
  - Military observers: 454
  - Police: 1,226
- Civilian personnel: 3,470
  - International civilians: 816
  - Local civilians: 2,654
- UN Volunteers: 404

**Fatalities: 100**

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$1,332,178,600**

### **African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)**

In Darfur since July 2007

**Strength: 21,022 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 17,453
  - Troops: 14,345
  - Military observers: 179
  - Police: 2,929
- Civilian personnel: 3,412
  - International civilians: 811
  - Local civilians: 2,601
- UN Volunteers: 157

**Fatalities: 230**

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$1,102,164,700**

### **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

In Syria since June 1974

**Strength: 928 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 788
  - Troops: 788
- Civilian personnel: 140
  - International civilians: 50
  - Local civilians: 90

**Fatalities: 46**

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$51,706,200**

### **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

In Cyprus since March 1964

**Strength: 1,067 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 916
  - Troops: 861
  - Police: 55
- Civilian personnel: 151
  - International civilians: 33
  - Local civilians: 118



**Fatalities:** 183

Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$52,538,500

**United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**

In Lebanon since March 1978

**Strength: 11,369 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 10,521
  - Troops: 10,521
- Civilian personnel: 848
  - International civilians: 257
  - Local civilians: 591

**Fatalities:** 309

Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$506,346,400

**United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)**

In Abyei, Sudan since June 2011

**Strength: 4,795 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 4,497
  - Troops: 4,410
  - Military observers: 135
  - Police: 17
- Civilian personnel: 202
  - International civilians: 130
  - Local civilians: 72
- UN Volunteers: 31

**Fatalities:** 20

Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016): \$268,256,700

**United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)**

In South Sudan since July 2011

**Strength: 15,509 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 12,733
  - Troops: 11,782

- Military observers: 185
- Police: 1,105
- Civilian personnel: 1,973
  - International civilians: 787
  - Local civilians: 1,215
- UN Volunteers: 435

**Fatalities: 42**

Approved budget(07/2015 – 06/2016): \$1,085,769,200

**United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)**

In Côte d'Ivoire since April 2004

**Strength: 7,120 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 6,022
  - Troops: 4,457
  - Military observers: 185
  - Police: 1,380
- Civilian personnel: 961
  - International civilians: 301
  - Local civilians: 660
- UN Volunteers: 137

**Fatalities: 137**

Approved budget (07/2015 - 06/2016): \$402,794,300

**United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)**

In Kosovo since June 1999

**Strength: 366 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 16
  - Military observers: 8
  - Police: 8
- Civilian personnel: 328
  - International civilians: 109
  - Local civilians: 219
- UN Volunteers: 24

**Fatalities: 55**

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016):** \$40,031,000 [[A/C.5/69/24](#)]

**United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)**

In Liberia since September 2003

**Strength: 5,224 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 5,157
  - Troops: 2,626
  - Military observers: 77
  - Police: 1,179
- Civilian personnel: 1,159
  - International civilians: 358
  - Local civilians: 801
- UN Volunteers: 183

**Fatalities:** 196

**Approved budget (07/2015 – 06/2016):** \$344,712,200

**United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)**

In India and Pakistan since January 1949

**Strength: 116 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 44
  - Military observers: 44
- Civilian personnel: 72
  - International civilians: 25
  - Local civilians: 47

**Fatalities:** 11

**Appropriation (biennium 2014-2015):** \$19,647,100

**United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**

In Middle East since May 1948

**Strength: 384 total, including:**

- Uniformed personnel: 150
  - Military observers: 150
- Civilian personnel: 234
  - International civilians: 88

- Local civilians: 146

**Fatalities: 50**

**Appropriation (biennium 2014 - 2015): \$74,291,900**

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47. Barnett, Michael. 2002. *Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*, London: Cornell University.

48. Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, eds. 2010. *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, Cambridge: Polity Press.

49. Caplan, Gerald. 2004. "Why we must never forget the Rwandan genocide", *Pambazuka News* 150. Available at <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/21165>. Accessed 16 September 2011.

50. Dallaire, Roméo. 2004. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, London: Arrow Book

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[http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir\\_b.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm)

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>

## C. Mission's Poor design

### C.1 Confusion over the rules of engagement

The Force Commander submitted a draft set of Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR to Headquarters in New York on 23 April 1994, seeking Headquarters' approval. Headquarters never responded to that request. The Inquiry was told by General Baril that the Rules were considered guidelines. While General Baril stated that he considered the draft a good one, he also said that at the time, Headquarters did not have a procedure in place for the formal approval of draft Rules of Engagement. To the Force Commander, in the absence of a formal reply, the Rules of Engagement must be considered approved and in effect, a conclusion which the Inquiry believes was reasonable. At the same time, another senior member of the UNAMIR command told the Inquiry that the Rules of Engagement did not conform to reality and he ignored them.

The same draft was sent again to Headquarters after the genocide began, under the description "the different permutations of the rules of engagement". Headquarters did not object to paragraph 17 concerning crimes against humanity. However, this paragraph removed from subsequent versions of the rules of engagement applicable to UNAMIR. In actual fact, UNAMIR did not put this particular element of the rules of engagement into effect when the situation on the ground fit the description. Other problems, such as lack of resources and problems related to command and control, have been cited by the Force Commander and others to explain why UNAMIR did not stop the massacres. **It is disturbing, however, there was such a lack of clarity in the communications between UNAMIR and Headquarters regarding which rules to follow.**

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51. Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 2000. *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: International Panel of Eminent Personalities*. Accessed 14 September 2011. Available at <http://www.visiontv.ca/old/RememberRwanda/Report.pdf>.

## C.2 Organizational problems

Organizational problems existed both within UNAMIR and within Headquarters

This affected the capacity of the United Nations to respond to the events in Rwanda. Within UNAMIR, it is clear that there were problems in the relationship between Booh Booh and Dallaire. The difficulties were known to the Department heads in New York, who did not however intervene. The difficulties may in part be traced to the fact that the Force Commander arrived first in the mission area and was the person to setup UNAMIR to begin with. Much later on, when the genocide began, their respective roles do not seem to have been clear. **UNAMIR seems to have suffered from a lack of political leadership on the part of the Special Representative, but also from problems with regard to the military leadership because of the multitude of tasks the Force Commander had to cover during those first chaotic days. The archives of the mission also show that internal cooperation was problematic in key areas, one example being the difficulties in the cooperation between Booh Booh and his office and the Chief Administrative Officer, Mr Hallqvist, who resigned after a few months in service.**

The relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council is a unique feature of the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has the opportunity, but also the responsibility, to bring to the attention of the Council issues which require action. The Secretary-General can have a decisive influence on decision-making in the Council, and has the capacity to mobilize political will among the membership on key issues on the agenda. **Boutros-Ghali was absent from New York during much of the key period of the genocide.** The Inquiry understands that Secretaries-General cannot be present at every meeting of the Security Council. The archives show almost daily cables informing the Secretary-General of the unfolding events in Kigali and Headquarters related to Rwanda, and sometimes reply to Headquarters with comments. The Inquiry concludes that the Secretary-General was kept informed of key developments in Rwanda. However, the role of the Secretary-General in relation to the Council in true crisis situations such as that of the Rwandan genocide, is one which can only to a limited extent be performed by proxy. **Without the opportunity of direct personal contacts between the Secretary-General and the Security Council as a whole, and with its members, the role of the Secretary-**

**General in influencing Council decision-making can be as effective or powerful as if he were present.**

### **C.3 The inadequacy of UNAMIR's mandate**

The decisions taken with respect to the scope of the initial mandate of UNAMIR were an underlying factor in the failure of the mission to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. The planning process failed to take into account remaining serious tensions which had not been solved in the agreements between the parties. The United Nations mission was predicated on the success of the peace process. **There was no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process may not succeed.**

The overriding failure to create a force with the capacity, resources and mandate to deal with the growing violence and eventual genocide in Rwanda had roots in the early planning of the mission. The signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 was generally hailed with optimism and relief following the years of difficult negotiations between the Rwandan parties. Although tensions clearly persisted below the surface, not least within the Government delegation, the international community received the Accords as the starting point towards peace and power-sharing in Rwanda.

The over-optimistic assumption by the parties to the Arusha Agreement that an international force could be deployed in about a month meant that the United Nations was fighting the clock from the first days of preparing for UNAMIR. **The initial planning process suffered from insufficient political analysis.** Dallaire has acknowledged that his reconnaissance mission, which he headed, lacked the necessary political competence to make a correct in-depth analysis

of the political situation and the underlying realities between the x-belligerents of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The mission was apparently not even aware of the disturbing report published only a couple of weeks before by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Summary and Extra judicial Executions about the situation in Rwanda. In The report, the Rapporteur supported the findings of a number of human rights NGOs earlier that year. He pointed to an extremely serious human rights situation, and discussed at some length the possibility that a genocide was being committed in Rwanda. **That a report of this nature was not taken into account in the midst of planning a large United Nations peacekeeping presence in Rwanda shows a serious lack of coordination on the part of the United Nations organs concerned**. Indeed, Dallaire informed the Inquiry that, had there been more depth in the political assessment and had been aware of the points, he would have reconsidered the force level recommendations by the reconnaissance mission. The responsibility for this oversight in the planning of UNAMIR lies with the parts of the UN Secretariat concerned, in particular the Center for Human Rights and DPKo.

The reconnaissance mission had estimated that a force of 4,500 troops was required to fulfil the mandate in Rwanda. However, the Secretariat believed that it would not be possible to get Council support for that number of troops. This picture of the political commitment at the time was probably correct: the United States delegation had suggested to the United Nations that a symbolic presence of 100 be sent to Rwanda. Even France, which had been pushing for a United Nations presence in Rwanda, felt that 1,000 would suffice. Dallaire's figures were pared down even before they were presented to the Council. On 24 September, by then two weeks after the end of the original transitional period, the Secretary-General recommended a peacekeeping force numbering 2,548 military personnel. If the mandate which the Security Council gave



UNAMIR in its resolution 872(1993) was more limited than the Secretary-General's proposal to the Council, then it was even more distant from the original broad concept agreed on by the parties in the Arusha Accords. The difference was not without importance. The interpretation of the real scope of the mandate given by the Council became a debated issue months before the genocide broke out. The limitation of the mandate in relation to the KWSA was an early and public sign of the limits to the engagements which the Security Council was prepared to assume in Rwanda. The United States presented a number of amendments to the draft resolution which weakened the mandate, including in relation to the disarmament of civilians. The original wording in relation to the KWSA was also weakened with the specification that the weapons secure area be established by the parties.

The responsibility for the limitations of the original mandate given to UNAMIR lies firstly with the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General and responsible officials within the DPKO for the mistaken analysis which underpinned the recommendations to the Council. and/or recommending that the mission be composed of a fewer troops than the field mission considered necessary. The Member States which exercised pressure upon the Secretariat to limit the proposed number of troops also bear part of the responsibility.

The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources, a lack of political will and mission's poor design to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the United Nations presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble. The mission was smaller than the original

recommendations from the field suggested. It was slow in being set up, and was to be set by debilitating administrative difficulties. It lacked well-trained troops and functioning materiel. The mission's mandate was based on an analysis of the peace process which proved erroneous, and which was never corrected despite the significant warning signs that the original mandate had become inadequate. By the time the genocide started, the mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole: in the real hours and days of deepest crisis, consistent testimony points to a lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and lack of coordination and discipline.

A force numbering 2,500 should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres of the kind which began in Rwanda however, the Inquiry has found that the fundamental capacity problems of UNAMIR led to the terrible and humiliating situation of a UN peacekeeping force almost paralysed in the face of a wave of some of the worst brutality humankind

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52. Des Forges, Alison. 1999. *Leave none to tell the story*, New York: Human Rights Watch.

53. Des Forges, 2000. 'Response: Rationalising Western Apathy on Rwanda'. *Foreign Affairs* 79(3): 141-144.

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## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, Ethnic conflict and divisions among Rwanda people had origins in Belgium's colonial rules, which favored the minority Tutsis and fostered differences between the two groups. In 1935, Belgium introduced identity cards labelling each individual as Tutsi, Hutu, and Twawhich contributed to divisions among Rwanda ethnic groups. In 1994 the tension escalated until where the hutu led government supported by France exterminated tutsi people.

the UN failed to take immediate action and strengthen UNAMIR to stop the massacres, due to opposition from dominant member states such as France , USA and UK . More than one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed within 100 days, and over three million people fled to neighboring countries.

From the previous sections, it should be clear that the UN could have developed a better information system and could have taken a range of preventive measures to forestall or at least mitigate an anticipated genocide. What, then, prevented the UN from doing so? The simple answer is a lack of political will, UNAMIR mission' poor design and inadequate resources . In the words of the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the Rwandan experience highlighted "the crucial importance of swift intervention in a conflict and, above all, of political will to act in the face of a catastrophe."

The lack of willingness at the time to consider swift and bold measures was shared by almost all the players at the UN, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and presumably his Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, and the political leaders in the capitals of major member states. The main reason for this broad lack of resolve was that the leading and dominant member of the UN, the United States, was viewing UN peacekeeping cautiously, in an introverted manner, and with fear of over-involvement. Without US leadership and support, other states were hesitant to commit themselves

politically or militarily. And no nation was willing to step forward to take the place of the United States, even on high moral grounds or in such an extreme emergency. The lack of US commitment was the result of several factors. First, in Somalia the previous year the United States had to withdraw from a disastrous mission after over one score of US soldiers had been killed and the UN/US objective of apprehending one of the clan leaders (Mohammed Aideed) had failed. As a result of that experience, Washington officials were developing a new, less friendly approach to UN peacekeeping. This was enunciated in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which was finalized in April 1994, at the worst possible time for any progressive peacekeeping actions in Rwanda. The directive, which President Clinton signed on 3 May 1994 while the Rwandan genocide was in full swing, proposed "increasingly rigorous standards of review for US support and participation" in UN peacekeeping. **Support was normally to be provided only to those UN missions with clear time-bound objectives which "advance US interests," where the means are available and little risk need be taken by the United States.** To make matters worse, the doctrine of only using "overwhelming force" was popular in US government circles at the time. But moving large US forces to a remote, land-locked African country was far beyond what the United States was willing to do for strictly humanitarian reasons. As stated in PDD 25, the United States cannot be the "**world's policeman.**"

France, another permanent member of the Security Council, was not politically disposed to prevent this genocide. It had long-standing links to the genocidal Hutu regime, links that existed on a personal as well as institutional level. France had turned a blind eye to many government atrocities committed in the past. It had even helped provide abundant arms to the future genocidaires. Only after the genocide had run almost its full course, and the Hutu regime had fallen, did France intervene with troops, mostly to protect and assist the fleeing Hutus. This was not necessarily a wrong act, but it shows that the willingness to act

was based strongly on favoritism. The United Kingdom, another European member of the Security Council, was not inclined, as it seldom is, to take the lead or a contrary position on matters in Francophone Africa. Furthermore, neither Russia nor China assume leadership roles in human rights, having their own share of internal abuses and external accusations to defend.

In the UN Secretariat, officials were cautious to move, knowing that Security Council members, to whom they felt ultimately responsible, were not in the mood to adopt bold measures. Kofi Annan writes: "the consequences of the retreat from Somalia and the reluctance to again commit international resources and political capital soon became evident as the international community agonized over how to respond to the tragedy that began to unfold in Rwanda."

Rwanda patriotic front (RPF), a group of tutsi exiled hutu violence since 1959 in Rwanda neighbouring countries stopped genocide through invasion of Rwanda from the north under the support of Uganda and the hutu led government fallen and exiled in congo (DRC) and in the years following the genocide, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) established a Government of National Unity, seeking reconciliation between the two ethnic groups. Hutu and tutsi. In 1995, a UN-appointed International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) began trying those responsible for the 1994 atrocities. Today Rwanda is a safe, clean and beautiful country with no corruption and is among the country which has large number of women in parliament (64%). Rwanda has attracted foreign investors by amending its foreign investment policy, investors can register and start their business in only 24 hours and the taxes are low. They are so many opportunities in Rwanda to invest in such as agriculture, tourism, estates, mining, telecommunication manufacturing and so on. Welcome to Rwanda.

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