

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

According to Dorsey in his book intitled historical dictionary of Rwanda, Rwanda officially the Republic of Rwanda is a sovereign state in East Africa. Located a few degrees south of the Equator, Rwanda is bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda is in the African Great Lakes region and is highly elevated; its geography dominated by mountains in the west and savanna to the East, with numerous lakes throughout the country. The climate is temperate to subtropical, The population is young and predominantly rural, with a density among the highest in Africa. Rwanda is drawn from just one cultural and linguistic group, the Banyarwanda, within this group there are three subgroups: the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa .

conflicts between Rwanda ethnic groups had origins in Belgium's colonial rules, which favored only the minority Tutsis. According to Belgium rules in Rwanda during the colonial time, education, administration and other administration training were only for Tutsi and they were rich with many cattle. Hutu were only farmers and were not allowed to go to school and to participate in any other training. The Hutu were farmers not really happy with that and this really fostered differences between Hutu and Tutsi. When the Tutsi reclaimed independence from Belgium, immediately Belgians changed the system and started supporting Hutu who were the majority and in 1959 the Hutu revolted and killed many Tutsi and other Tutsi have been forced to exile in neighboring countries of Rwanda. In 1962, when the country gained independence, Gregoire Kayibanda headed the first recognized Hutu government. Juvenal Habyarimana another Hutu extremist seized power in a military coup a decade later. For nearly twenty years under Habyarimana, ethnic relations simmered with sporadic outbreaks of violence. In 1990 the Tutsi exiled in neighboring countries organized themselves and founded what is Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the current Rwanda political party headed by Kagame

paul the current president of Rwanda and they invaded Rwanda from the north in 1990 under the support of Uganda to stop the violence against tutsi by hutu led government which was still happening in Rwanda. In 1993, Habyarimana juvenal who was the president of Rwanda signed a short-lived power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis, aiming to end the fighting. In April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana the president of Rwanda and the President of Burundi from Tanzania after signing peace agreement with Rwanda patriotic front (RPF) composed by tutsi was shot down by hutu extremists who were not happy in power sharing with tutsi. The event triggered the notorious genocide. Extremist Hutu militia aided by the Rwandan army and supported by France government launched systematic massacres against Tutsis accusing them to shoot down the plane curring president of Rwanda from Tanzania . Despite reports of mass killings Around 1000,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed within 100 days.

the UN failed to take immediate action to stop the massacres due to opposition from France which was protecting its interests in Rwanda by supporting hutu government to exterminate tutsi who were against France colonialism in Rwanda and the USA had no interests in Rwanda to deploy its military after a big loss of soldiers and money in Somalia . During these events and in their aftermath, the United Nations (UN) and countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium were criticized for their inaction, including failure to strengthen the force and mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers, and observers criticized the government of France for support of the genocidal regime after the genocide had begun.

The failure of the UN is clear: the permanent members did not supply the mission with enough resources and gave unclear directions which led to the peacekeepers not being able to use force to even defend themselves, They knew what was happening, yet many countries did not want to do anything to stop it.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by Security Council in April 20th 1994 after genocide begun. It was intended to assist in peace keeping in Rwanda. The mission lasted from April 1994 to March 1996. due to the

limitations of its [rules of engagement](#) insufficient resources and lack of personnel , UNAMIR mission failed in the [Rwandan Genocide](#) . The mission is thus regarded as a major failure.

UNAMIR mandate was :

- To contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda,
- To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.
- To contribute to the security and peace of the Rwanda country.
- To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government leading up to the elections.
- To assist with [mine clearance](#), primarily through training programmes.
- To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.
- To assist in the coordination of [humanitarian assistance](#) activities in conjunction with relief operations.
- To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the [gendarmarie](#) and police. Its authorised strength was 2,500 personnel, but it took some five months for the mission to reach this level.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or head of the mission, was [Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh](#) of [Cameroon](#). At the beginning of July 1994, [Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh](#) was replaced by [Shaharyar Khan](#) of [Pakistan](#). The military head, and Force Commander was [Canadian Brigadier-General](#) (promoted [Major-General](#) during the mission) [Roméo Dallaire](#). In August 1994, General [Roméo Dallaire](#), suffering from severe stress, was replaced as Force Commander by Major-General [Guy Tousignant](#), also from Canada. In December 1995, Tousignant was replaced by Brigadier General [Shiva Kumar](#) from India. Troop contributing countries were Belgium, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Tunisia. Around 400 of the troops in this early part of the mission were [Belgian](#) soldiers, despite the fact that Rwanda had been a Belgian colony, and normally the UN bans the former colonial power from serving in such peace-keeping roles.

1. [Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order](#). University of Toronto Press

2. *BBC News (1) (1998-03-04)*. ["French parliament inquiry into Rwandan genocide"](#). Retrieved 2014-07-12.

Today, Rwanda has two public holidays commemorating the genocide. The national commemoration period begins with Genocide Memorial Day on April and concludes with Liberation Day on July 4. The week following April 7 is designated an official week of mourning. The Rwandan Genocide served as the impetus for creating the International Criminal Court to eliminate the need for ad hoc tribunals to prosecute those accused in future incidents of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

3. [The A to Z of the United Nations](#). Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. ISBN 9780810870208. (subscription required (help))

4. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-171-1.2 Dorsey, Learthen (1994).

5. *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda*. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.

6. Aptel, Cicile (2008). ["Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues"](#) (PDF).

7. *New England Journal of International and Comparative Law* **14** (2): 169–188.

B. Research question.

The study intends to answer the following research question:

Why United Nations forces (UNAMIR) failed to stop the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994?

C. The objectives

The objectives of this study were:

1. To identify origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda and the causes of the 1994 tutsigenocide.
2. To describe the military intervention of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop the Tutsi genocide.
3. To identify the factors which contributed to the failure of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda to stop Tutsi genocide

D. Significance of the study

The knowledge of this research will be significant to different range of people from the researcher to governments, to the United Nations and to the University.

To the United Nations and governments: this research will be useful for United Nations in the fact that it will get aware of the errors committed in Rwanda and learn from mistakes where failed to protect people from genocide and more than one million people massacred in eyes of international community. In future United Nations will take all necessary precautions to protect people from all kinds of crimes against humanity.

the governments also will learn how to solve their own problems after reading this research, and stop depending on assistance of international organisations for solving their problems because in some circumstances international organisation have no will to intervene.

To the University: this research may be useful for the students who will be doing research in future, they will consult this thesis for more information.

To the researcher, the research can be beneficial in so many ways such as expansion of knowledge and being awarded the master degree in international relations.

E. Originality of the research

The research related to this has been done before by the government of Rwanda to assess the involvement of United Nations and French government in the 1994 Tutsi genocide. Since 1994 the United Nations sent troops in Rwanda for peace keeping due to ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi dated from 1959 where the colonialists gave leverage to Tutsi and Hutu started killing tutsi and expelling them outside the country. Due to violence against Tutsi by Hutu, many Tutsi have been killed and others exiled in neighbouring countries of Rwanda such as Burundi , Uganda , Tanzania and democratic republic of Congo and United Nations failed to stop the genocide of tutsi .

The government of Rwanda did this research before to examine the involvement of United Nations forces and French government in genocide. finally United Nations didn't stop genocide , more than one million tutsi have been murdered by hutu and two million people displaced from their home due to conflict whereas United Nations forces UNAMIR and French government armies were there to end conflict .

The researcher was interested also in doing this research to find out the reason why United Nation forces UNAMIR didn't end genocide when they were present in Rwanda when genocide occurred and it was their mission to protect people from crimes against humanity as it has been agreed in UN charter since 1948.

F.Literature review.

F.1 Cases of failure of United Nations forces in protecting people from crimes against humanity and reason why failed.

F.1.1 case of Bosnia (Srebrenica massacres)

This 1995 Bosnian War massacre was the single worst act of mass murder on European soil since World War II. After an ethnic cleansing campaign led by the Serbs targeted the Bosniaks, a largely Muslim community, the United Nations designated Srebrenica a safe-zone in 1993. Militarized units in the zone were forced to disarm, and a peacekeeping force was put in place, consisting of six hundred Dutch soldiers. The Serbs then surrounded the safe-zone with tanks, soldiers, and artillery pieces.

With the zone surrounded, supply lines were slow-moving at best. The UN forces were running low on ammunition, fuel, and food, as the Serbs continued to build an army around Srebrenica.

In July, Serbian forces invaded the area, forcing the small UN team back. As many as 20,000 Bosniak refugees fled to the UN compound in Potocari, seeking protection from the advancing Serbs. Despite the UN peacekeeping force present, Serbian soldiers entered the camp, raping Bosniak women and murdering freely while the Dutch peacekeepers did nothing. By July 18th, 7,800 Bosniaks were dead, due largely to an ill-equipped and unprepared UN force.

Why United Nations forces failed in Bosnia (poor design, lack of equipments)

United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia failed due to the fact that the plan to protect Bosnian people was not well designed. United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were ill equipped and unprepared. Despite the UN peacekeeping force present, Serbian soldiers entered the camp, raping Bosniak women and murdering freely while the Dutch peacekeepers did nothing. By July 18th, 7,800 Bosniaks were dead, due largely to an ill-equipped and unprepared UN force.

F.1.2 Case of Somalia

the Battle of Mogadishu or Day of the Rangers ([Somali](#): *Maalintii Rangers*), was part of [Operation Gothic Serpent](#) and was fought on 3 and 4 October 1993, in [Mogadishu, Somalia](#), between forces of the [United States](#) supported by [UNOSOM II](#), and Somali [militiamen](#) loyal to the self-proclaimed president to be [Mohamed Farrah Aidid](#) who had support from armed civilian fighters.

A U.S. Army force in Mogadishu, consisting primarily of [U.S. Army Rangers](#) from Bravo Company, [3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment](#); C Squadron, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), better known as "[Delta Force](#)"; as well as Air Force Combat Controllers and [Air Force Pararescuemen](#) and helicopters from 1st Battalion, [160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment](#), and an attached Naval Corpsman from Seal Team 4, attempted to seize two of Aidid's high-echelon lieutenants during a meeting in the city. Shortly after the assault began, Somali militia and armed civilian fighters shot down two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of

both helicopters drew the raid, intended to last no more than an hour, into an overnight standoff in the city. The battle resulted in 18 deaths, 73 wounded, and one helicopter pilot and Naval Corpsman captured among the U.S. raid party and rescue forces. At least one Pakistani soldier and one Malaysian soldier were killed as part of the rescue forces. American sources estimate between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, including civilians; [SNA](#) forces claim only 315 killed, with 812 wounded. The battle is also referred to as the **First Battle of Mogadishu** to distinguish it from the [Second Battle of Mogadishu](#) of 2006.

F.1.2.1 Why United Nations forces (UNOSOM) and USA failed in Somalia in 1992.

due to the shot down two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters by Somali militia and armed civilian fighters where it caused 18 deaths (American soldiers) the president of united states bill Clinton lobbied USA army to leave Somalia as soon as possible .The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters drew the raid, intended to last no more than an hour, into an overnight standoff in the city. The battle resulted in 18 deaths, 73 wounded, and one helicopter pilot and Naval Corpsman (on BeachHead after EaE) captured among the U.S. raid party and rescue forces. At least one Pakistani soldier and one Malaysian soldier were killed as part of the rescue forces. American sources estimate between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, including civilians; [SNA](#) forces claim only 315 killed, with 812 wounded.

F.1.3 Cambodia (Khmer Rouge)

Ruling Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge practiced an extreme form of Communism, as dictated by their borderline-psychotic leader Pol Pot. Any suspected enemies were executed, including professionals and intellectuals. Ethnic Vietnamese, Ethnic Chinese, and Christians were executed en masse.

In 1979, the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge and end the massacre. Pol Pot was forced in exile, and a new government was put in place in Cambodia. Shockingly, the United Nations refused to recognize this new government because it was backed by Vietnam, which had recently ended a decade-long conflict with the United States. Until 1994, the United Nations recognized the Khmer Rouge as the true government of Cambodia, despite the fact that they had killed 2.5 million Cambodians, amounting to 33% of their total population.

F.1.4 Sri Lanka

The small island nation of Sri Lanka experienced a bloody civil war lasting from 1983 to 2009, pitting the militant, separatist Tamil Tigers against government forces. In the final months of the war, the opposing sides were fighting in the heavily populated northeast coastline, a designated safe zone.

The fighting forced 196,000 people to flee, and trapped over 50,000 civilians. Independent experts urged the Human Rights Council of the UN to investigate claims of war crimes, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged being “appalled” by the situation, but the United Nations made no attempts to intervene on behalf of the civilian population. From January to April of 2009, over 6,500 civilians were killed in this so-called “safe-zone”.

F.1.5 Darfur

In 2003, the unstable nation of Sudan erupted in conflict, as various militia groups criticized and attacked the government for oppressing non-Arabs. Early in the war, rebel forces defeated the Sudanese military in more than thirty battles. Seeing that defeat was imminent, the government funded the Janjaweed, a group of Arab militants. By 2005, the Janjaweed were carrying out attacks on populated villages using artillery and helicopters, prompting condemnation by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Despite this condemnation, the UN did not enter Sudan, instead urging members of the African Union to intervene.

As the African Union attempted an intervention, it became apparent that the Sudanese military was destroying civilian populations. Reports emerged revealing that Sudanese military planes were painted white, to resemble UN humanitarian aircraft, only to drop bombs on villages. It was not until 2006 that 200 UN soldiers were dispatched to the area. Despite their limited presence, fighting continued until 2010. In seven years, an estimated **300,000 Sudanese** civilians were killed

8. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2000. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford University Press.

9. [Human Rights Developments](#), retrieved on 10 November 2009.

F.2. cases of successful peacekeeping and why successful

F.2.1 War in Kosovo

The Kosovo War was an armed conflict in [Kosovo](#) that lasted from 28 February 1998 until 11 June 1999. It was fought by the forces of the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia](#), (by this time, consisting of the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia) which controlled Kosovo before the war, and the [Kosovo Albanian](#) rebel group known as the [Kosovo Liberation Army](#) (KLA), with air support from the [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation](#) (NATO) from 24 March 1999, and ground support from the Albanian army.

The KLA, formed in 1991, initiated its first campaign in 1995 when it launched attacks targeting Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo, and in June 1996 the group claimed responsibility for acts of [sabotage](#) targeting Kosovo police stations. In 1997, the organisation acquired a large amount of arms through [weapons smuggling](#) from [Albania](#), following a [rebellion](#) which saw large numbers of weapons looted from the country's police and army posts. In 1998, KLA attacks targeting Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo resulted in an increased presence of Serb paramilitaries and regular forces who subsequently began pursuing a campaign of retribution targeting KLA sympathisers and political opponents in a drive which killed 1,500 to 2,000 civilians and KLA combatants. After attempts at a diplomatic solution failed, NATO intervened, justifying the campaign in Kosovo as a "humanitarian war". This precipitated a mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians as the Yugoslav forces continued to fight during the [aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia](#) (March–June 1999). By the year 2000, investigations had recovered the remains of almost three thousand victims of all ethnicities, and in 2001 a [United Nations](#) administered Supreme Court, based in Kosovo, found that there had been "a systematic campaign of terror, including murders, rapes, arsons and severe maltreatments", but that Serb troops had tried to remove rather than eradicate the Albanian population.

The war ended with the [Kumanovo Treaty](#), with Yugoslav forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence. The Kosovo Liberation Army disbanded soon after this, with some of its members going on to fight for the [UÇPMB](#) in the [Preševo Valley](#) and others joining the [National Liberation Army](#) (NLA) and [Albanian National Army](#) (ANA) during [the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia](#), while others went on to form the [Kosovo Police](#).

The NATO bombing campaign has remained controversial, as it did not gain the approval of the [UN Security Council](#) and because it caused at least 488 Yugoslav civilian deaths, including substantial numbers of Kosovo [refugees](#).

F.2.1.1 why peacekeeping succeeded in Kosovo.

It has been successful in Kosovo due to the interest of the United States which was the only superpower left standing and simply cannot avoid getting involved. The United States has an obligation to fight communism and to do whatever it takes to create a world where it dominates, the thinking goes. In this view, the United States has a "window of opportunity to shape the world in its image," Fareed Zakaria, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and a skeptic of this approach, explains.

Experts call it "grand strategy." During the cold war, containment was the grand strategy; American policy was based on fighting any expansion of Communism. Yet almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is still no consensus over how this new world should be structured and what role the United States should play in it. If the Kosovo crisis does nothing else, Mr. Mearsheimer and others agree, its resolution will affect whose ideas about United States national interests will prevail.

The American involvement in Kosovo has started the most furious debate since the end of the cold war over what constitutes United States strategic interests. Not since the Persian Gulf war in 1991 have foreign policy analysts filled the nation's airwaves, newspapers and policy journals with such passion. "The Kosovo crisis has sharpened and intensified what was a largely theoretical debate within think tanks and seminar rooms," said John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

10. [Kosovo rebels to disarm](#)". BBC News. 1999-06-21. Retrieved 2012-11-08.12Daniszewski, John (1999-04-14).

11. [Yugoslav Troops Said to Cross Into Albania](#)". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2012-02-13Daly, Emma (1999-04-14).

12. [War In The Balkans: Serbs enter Albania and burn village](#)". The Independent (London). Retrie

13. Robert M. Cassidy (Ph.D.) (2004). [Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After the Cold War](#). Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 157. ISBN 978-0-275-97696-5

G. Theoretical framework.

G.1 One question, two answers theory

According to Arild Anderdal in his book intitled one question to answers, international organisations are the actors of international problems solving, however some international organisations including United Nations succeed in some international problems solving and others fails. it is more important to understand the conditions for success and the causes of failure. People still wonder why some efforts at developing and implementing joint solutions to international problems succeed while others fail. **some efforts are more successful than others because more powerful tools are used or because greater skill or energy is used to attack the problem (problem-solving capacity)** . The organisation is successful in operation when the members have the will to contribute to operations, when the members have no will to contribute the organisation fail in its operation. This is what happened in Rwanda when the united nations members states had no political will to contribute financially and deploying military for united nations assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stop genocide and protect tutsi population from violence of hutu population supported by Rwanda government and France to exterminate all tutsi .

All organizations can serve as arenas, but only some can also qualify as significant actors in their own right. International organizations can be considered actors to the extent that they provide independent inputs into the problem-solving process or somehow amplify outputs of these processes. To qualify as actor, an organization must have a minimum of internal coherence (unity), autonomy, resources, and external activity. Without a certain minimum of coherence, an organization cannot be considered one actor. Without some autonomy (notably in relation to its members), it would be a mere puppet commanded by its masters.

The facts that some international organisations including United Nations have **no autonomy, they depend on the members contributions either finance or staff. Even decision making depends on the member states. All depends on the willing of member states.**

The lack of political will of member states to contribute in peacekeeping operations, United Nations will not perform effectively due to the lack of resource and staff which should be contributed by members to succeed in operation. This is what happened in Rwanda when United Nations members had no political will to contribute to the operation of UNAMIR in stopping the genocide in Rwanda.

The great members of United Nations which had no political will to intervene in UNAMIR operation in Rwanda were USA, France, UK, and Belgium contributed to the failure of United Nations operations in Rwanda. This is due to the fact that United Nations hasn't its own military, finance and staff, if an organization has not a certain minimum of resources at its disposal, its own contributions to its activities would tend to be inconsequential. on the autonomy and resources dimensions) to achieve actor status, and some even fail to meet that .

lack of political will to give UNAMIR the personnel and materiel resources the mission needed. Even after the Security Council decided to act to try and stop the killing, and reversed its decision to reduce UNAMIR, the problems that the Secretariat had faced since UNAMIR's inception in getting contributions of troops from Member States persisted. This was the case throughout during the urgent attempts to set up UNAMIR .The lack of will to send troops to Rwanda continued to be deplorably evident in the weeks following the decision by the Security Council to increase the strength of UNAMIR . For weeks, the Secretariat tried to solicit troop contributions, to little avail . Although a few African countries did express a willingness to send troops, they did so with the proviso that they will be provided with equipment and financed. By the time

operation started, UNAMIR only had the bare minimum number of troops. Recognition is due here to those troop contributing countries, in particular Ghana and Tunisia, which allowed their troops to remain throughout the terrible weeks of the genocide, despite the withdrawal of other contingents. In sum, while criticisms can be leveled at the mistakes and limitations of the capacity of UNAMIR's troops, one should not forget the responsibility of the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not prepared to send any troops or materiel at all to Rwanda.

The political will of Member States to send troops to peacekeeping operations is of course a key to the United Nations capacity to react to conflict. The stand-by arrangements initiative is a welcome one in that it attempts to address the problem of the lack of available troops when missions are to be set up. Yet the standby arrangement system is equally dependent on the will of Member States to commit troops and other personnel in particular instance.

A general point about the need for political will is that such will must be mobilized equally in response to conflicts across the globe. It has been stated repeatedly during the course of the interviews conducted by the Inquiry that the fact that Rwanda was not of strategic interest to countries and that the international community exercised double standards when faced with the risk of a catastrophe there compared to action taken elsewhere.

G.1.1 United States of America (USA)

The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partly because since the end of the Cold War, “no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States” .As early as 1993, CIA studies warned of imminent massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims. Before the genocide began, major powers

knew “that something terrible was underway in Rwanda” and that there were plans for genocidal killings states that by April 20, the US must have known about the genocide. **However, since the death of its rangers in Somalia, the US had decided to “stop placing the agenda of the UN before the interests of the US” (Clinton in Melvern 2000: 78).**

G.1.2 Belgium

Belgium, as the former colonial master of Rwanda, had a deep political connection with that country. When UNAMIR was formed in October 1993, they contributed the largest Western contingent . There were further reasons for Belgian involvement in the mission. After the Cold War, Belgium needed a rationale for keeping a large and well-equipped national army; in order to preserve its status, Belgium tried to present itself as the African peacekeeping specialist. Early on, Belgium knew of the ethnic and political killings so it began to argue for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but no other state was interested in supporting the mission (Des Forges 1999: 176). After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on April 7, one day after the genocide had begun, Belgian public opinion that had been uninterested before, began to lobby for “the boys to be sent home” (African Rights 1995: 1113).

G.1.3 France

France, the country with the longest and deepest political and military involvement in Rwanda and whose *actions* directly contributed to the genocide. Although France knew that there were ethnic massacres going on in Rwanda, it continued to give military and political support to the interim government (Melvern 2000: 24; Wallis 2006: 103).

In October 1993, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda, France sent troops and weapons in order to support their francophone ally against an “Anglo-Saxon invasion” (Prunier 1997: 101; Wallis 2006: 104). France, worried about its “prestige

and international stature”, sees Anglo-Saxon countries as a threat to its position . This led to quick and deep intervention in Rwanda . Janvier Afrika, a former Rwandan Hutu supporter, remembers French involvement in 1992 in Rwanda .

14. Aggarwal, V. 1985. *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

15. Andresen, S., and J. Wettestad. 1995. “International Problem-Solving Effectiveness: The Oslo Project Story So Far.”

16. *International Environmental Affairs* 7: 127–149. Axelrod, R. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Axelrod, R., and R. O.

G.2 Compliance bargaining Theory.

G.2.1 Origin of compliance bargaining : poor design of agreement

As we know the non compliance of agreement between the signers can be caused by different reasons, the main reason is the agreement which is not well designed (poor design), not really based on the needs of signatories. This poor design or ambiguous formulation of agreement leads to non compliance of agreement by signers which at the end needs compliance bargaining by intervention of third part. It is in this frame work the poor design of United Nation Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) led to the failure in stopping the 1994 tutsi genocide in Rwanda. The poor design of mission of United Nation forces Mission in Rwanda and other factors which contributed to the failure of mission which will be examined in chapter four of this research.

Compliance bargaining typically stems from the ambiguity of most international agreements. Ambiguous formulations may stem from the fact that these are necessary in order for the parties to reach a minimum level of consensus and come to an agreement at all (Lebow 1996). Broad and general language may also offer a “veil of uncertainty,” which permits a number of parallel interpretations and visions as to the future development of a cooperative endeavor (Young and Osherenko 1993). Also related to the future, imprecision and ambiguity can serve the function of insurance policy or escape clause, when gains and costs from an agreement are unpredictable (Lebow 1996).

Yet another reason may be the inability of drafters to foresee all possible applications and to plan for all contingencies, with an ensuing mismatch between the coverage and formulations of the treaty and the practice it seeks to regulate (Chayes and Chayes 1995). In sum, the consequence of treaty ambiguity is that, “more often than not, there will be a considerable range within which parties may reasonably adopt differing positions as to the meaning of the relevant treaty language” (Chayes and Chayes 1995:11). Diverging interpretations of treaty language provide a fertile ground for bargaining regarding what actions do and do not constitute compliance.

G.2.2 Forms of compliance bargaining.

One basic distinction can be made between self-help and third-party compliance bargaining. These two forms constitute ideal types, and concrete conflicts and bargaining situations may exhibit features of both or may oscillate between the two.

Self-help

bargaining refers to bargaining between the parties to the treaty, now taking place in the post-agreement phase. Lack of a common authority to enforce rules is the defining characteristic of the setting within which self-help bargaining occurs.

Thirdparty

bargaining has as its defining and unique characteristic the existence of an international institution which interacts with the signatories of an agreement in the interpretation of compliance and the settling of disputes.

Third-party bargaining, in turn, may be of two kinds, depending on whether the international institution acts as “judge” or “prosecutor.” The traditional conception of international institutions as third parties is that of a judge. Member states in conflict over treaty compliance and interpretations bring the case before a dispute-settlement body. Bargaining, in this context, takes place between the disputing states within the framework of the dispute-settlement process. International institutions as judges are a common form of third-party enforcement in international trade. GATT/WTO as well as NAFTA dispute-settlement mechanisms are cases in point.

An alternative conception of international institutions as third parties is that of a prosecutor. Institutions as prosecutors do not issue interpretations as much as they act independently and strike down on member states suspected of violating the treaty. Bargaining, in this context, primarily takes place between the international enforcement institution and the signatory suspected of non-compliance. Institutions as prosecutors are a less common form of third-party enforcement, with the prime examples being the European Commission of the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which both have enforcement powers that can be used against member states in breach of EC law and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, respectively. Under third-party enforcement generally, bargaining results from

the combination of a “sanctioning ladder” and the interest of all parties to settle disputes at an early stage, rather than letting cases or conflicts run their full course.

The term sanctioning ladder is used to denote the consecutive steps, which may be taken to induce compliance, and which typically are characterized by a progressive increase of pressure and costs of non-compliance.

G.2.3 Effects of compliance bargaining

Compliance bargaining may alter outcomes and affects future rounds of bargaining in three principal ways:

(1) by influencing the level of compliance,

(2) by defining what constitutes compliance and non-compliance, and

(3) by affecting the distribution of gains in future bargaining. First, and most fundamentally, compliance bargaining influences the level of compliance. In the search for mutually acceptable solutions, it might put an end to actions perceived to be in breach by one of the parties. From the perspective of the guardians, compliance bargaining serves to induce and persuade violators to step into

line, to the extent that it raises the cost of non-compliance. From the perspective of the violators, compliance bargaining serves to test the limits of the other parties' tolerance of deviant behavior. The second effect of compliance bargaining is to provide definitions of what constitutes compliance and what actions are or are not in line with a treaty. Compliance as defined in post-agreement bargaining may not correspond to compliance as perceived by the parties when entering into the agreement. In other words, states settle for agreements and negotiation outcomes whose terms and distribution of gains they believe they understand and foresee, but which often are substantially altered when compliance is ultimately defined through post-agreement bargaining.

The third essential effect of compliance bargaining is its influence on how gains are distributed in future rounds of bargaining. In a context where states interact on a regular basis, other states are more likely to enter into future agreements with a state, and on more favorable terms, if it carries a reputation for keeping commitments. Therefore, a good reputation is

crucial to the realization of future benefits from cooperation (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Keohane 1984; Chayes and Chayes 1995). Compliance bargaining reinforces and contributes to the distribution of positive and negative reputational effects, a distribution which ultimately rests on how well states comply. Consequently, compliance bargaining does not only alter the distribution of gains in agreements already entered into, but also in those to come.

17. Dispute settlement in world politics: States, supranational prosecutors, and compliance. *European Journal of International Relations* November 1, 2015 20: 118-144

18. Abbott, Frederick M. (2000) "NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study," *International Organization* 54 (3): 519-547.

19. Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal (2000) "The Concept of Legalization,"

G.3 Humanitarian intervention theory

According to James (2010) in his book entitled humanitarian intervention, since 1945 protecting people from genocide and other crimes against humanity was the responsibility of United Nations as it appears in UN charter. United Nations peacekeeping have been failing to protect people from crimes against humanity, there are many cases including Srebrenica massacres (Bosnia), Tutsi genocide in Rwanda which took the lives of more than one million people, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and so on. All those massacres occurred in presence of United Nations peacekeepers and fail to protect people from those massacres. It is in this framework the researcher was interested in determining why United Nations forces didn't stop genocide in Rwanda whereas they were present in Rwanda when the massacres of Tutsi were occurring and humanitarian intervention is the responsibility of UN as it is agreed in UN charter since 1945 after the World War Two.

Humanitarian intervention has been defined as a state's use of "military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending [human-rights](#) violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed. This definition may be too narrow as it excludes non-military forms of intervention such as [humanitarian aid](#) and [international sanctions](#). On this broader understanding, "Humanitarian intervention should be understood to encompass non-forcible methods, namely intervention undertaken without military force to alleviate mass human suffering within sovereign borders. James (2010).

There is no one standard or legal definition of humanitarian intervention; the field of analysis (such as law, ethics or politics) often influences the definition that is chosen. Differences in definition include variations in whether humanitarian intervention is limited to instances where there is an absence of consent from the host state; whether humanitarian intervention is limited to punishment actions; and whether humanitarian intervention is limited to cases where there has been explicit UN Security Council authorization for action.

G.3.1 characteristics of humanitarian intervention.

According to Wikipedia, Humanitarian intervention involves the threat and use of military forces as a central feature. It is an intervention in the sense that it entails interfering in the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state.

The intervention is in response to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to states' strategic interests, but instead is motivated by humanitarian objectives.

The subject of humanitarian intervention has remained a compelling foreign policy issue, especially since [NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999](#), as it highlights the tension between the principle of state [sovereignty](#), a defining pillar of the [UN](#) system and [international law](#), and evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force. Moreover, it has sparked normative and empirical debates over its legality, the ethics of using military force to respond to human rights violations, when it should occur, who should intervene, and whether it is effective.

To its proponents, it marks imperative action in the face of human rights abuses, over the rights of state sovereignty, while to its detractors it is often viewed as a pretext for military intervention often devoid of legal sanction, selectively deployed and achieving only ambiguous ends. Its frequent use following the end of the [Cold War](#) suggested to many that a new norm of military humanitarian intervention was emerging in international politics, although some now argue that the [9/11 terrorist attacks](#) and the US "[war on terror](#)" have brought the era of humanitarian intervention to an end. James Pattison, however, has recently argued that the NATO intervention in Libya has bucked this trend.

H. Conceptual framework.

The poor design of agreement can lead to the failure of compliance by signatories, and then after the compliance bargaining is requested, this is very related also to the poor design of UNAMIR mission in Rwanda caused by misunderstanding in UN security council to give support for intervention in Rwanda .

one question two answers is the case also where some international organisations succeed in problem solving and others fail due to the lack of political will of members to contribute for finance and staff to intervene, it is the case in Rwanda where permanent members of UN security council had no political will to support UN in its mission in Rwanda which led to the failure of mission and more than one million tutsi people have been killed in presence of UN inactive troops.

United Nations mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to intervene in the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda due to poor design of mission caused by misunderstanding in Security Council and reluctance of Security Council permanent members to contribute funds and military.

The mission was confused and army was not trained, had not enough equipment to stop Rwanda national army which was implementing genocide and also was not able to destroy their weapons and jam all the radio in Rwanda which was motivating Hutu to kill Tutsi. The reason behind that reluctance to intervene and poor design of United Nations mission for Rwanda was that the very important member of United Nations, USA and its ally UK

1. Had no defined interests in Rwanda, the landlocked country with no minerals and oil.
2. The shadow of Somalia war where USA lost soldiers and money, USA feared that what happened in Somalia could happen again in Rwanda. The USA president Bill Clinton adopted the policy of saving money after the loss in Somalia and not intervening again.
3. Rwanda was French colony, where France was protecting its territory by supporting Hutu to exterminate Tutsi who were against France domination in Rwanda.

I. Hypothesis.

The assumption taken to be true that United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed because of:

1. Mission's poor design
2. The lack of political will by dominant member states of the United Nations to deploy military.
3. Inadequate financial resources of mission.

J.Research methodology

J.1 Introduction

According to wikipedia, Methodology is the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study. It comprises the theoretical analysis of the body of methods and principles associated with a branch of knowledge. this chapter presents the research design, methods in data collection and analysis of the data from documentation. It describes how the research was carried out, its procedures and strategies in data collection. It entails the area of study, Research design, data collection instrument, and data collection procedure and data analysis.

J.2 Area of the study

The researcher focused on the 1994 tutsi genocide happened in Rwanda. Rwanda was the area of study even if the researcher was in Indonesia; he used many documents from Rwanda and got information from Rwanda people which helped him to get a conclusion for the research. The reason why the researcher chose this topic related the role of United Nation forces in stopping the 1994 Tutsi genocide is that the researcher is originated from Rwanda and is genocide survivor aware of what happened in Rwanda when United Nations forces were there inactive and didn't do anything to protect Tutsi who were being massacred by Hutu supported by Rwanda and French governments .

J.3 Research design

The study is qualitative by the fact that it is viewed to study behavior of the United Nation force in Rwanda while peacekeeping .the qualities of United Nations forces in Rwanda as far leads to the failure to protect Tutsi from massacres by Hutu supported by Rwanda government

As supported by Campbell (1986) who asserted that a qualitative study is a research involving analysis of data which are descriptive in nature and not readily quantifiable the researcher didn't get opportunity for collecting primary data because he was so far from the field where genocide took place (Rwanda). Second data was collected from the commission national de lutte contre genocide (CNLG) records, magazines, journals and books .

Published studies related to the study, internet and other documentation whose findings are useful to the study.

J. 4 Data collection instruments

J.4.1 Documentation

The instrument of data collection used in this research is documentation. Commission national de lutte contre genocide in Rwanda (CNLG) website , reports , books , journals, other websites and other documents that were relevant to the topic of this research were based on for analysis. The central focus of this instrument was for the researcher to be resourceful. As supported by Blaxter L. and Hughes. C (2002), as saying that documentation is the act of creating citations to identify sources used in writing a book.

J.4.2 Observation

This is monitoring with the eyesight of the coming and going around events on the field. According to Kulbil as cited by Campbell (1986). Observation seeks to ascertain what people think and do by watching them in action as they express themselves in various situation and activities. Observational research is a style of research usually used with a case study design, where the researcher attempts to see the social world through the eyes of the research subject by taking the role that will place him/her as close to the thinking and behaviors of the research subjects as possible. It is. in this respect that the researcher observed the behavior of United Nation forces UNAMIR in action during 1994 tutsi genocide as the researcher is Rwandan by nationality and was in Rwanda during genocide . He observed the United Nation forces on the field in Rwanda where he got useful information related to the roles of forces in stopping the 1994 tutsi genocide in Rwanda. Observation looked appropriate for this research.

J.5 Data collection

The researcher collected data through documentation where the researcher visited different libraries such as University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) library and Gadjah Mada university (UGM) library. He also visited different websites related to Rwanda genocide like gisozi genocide memorial centre website and *commission national de lutte contre genocide in Rwanda* (CNLG) website , on these websites there are useful

information related to Rwanda genocide such as history and origin of genocide in Rwanda , the role of United Nation forces in stopping genocide and so on . different articles and journals have been consulted by the researcher to get information especially Human Right Watch reports about Rwanda genocide and the report of United Nations about Rwanda genocide . Further, information got from observation by the researcher during 1994 was used to supplement documentation. This instrument helped the researcher to get more information as he observed some activities as they were occurring. Because of limited funds and time, documentation was carried out by the researcher himself.

J.6 Data analysis

According to Donald .R. Cooper and Pamela S.Schindler (1999). Data analysis involves reducing accumulated data to a manageable size. Developing summaries looking for patterns and applying techniques.The analysis of the researcher is qualitative in nature by the fact that he analyses the qualities and activities of United Nations forces in Rwanda (UNAMIR) for stopping genocide which are not quantifiable.

J .7 Validity and reliability of the research

According to Joppe (2000) Validity determines whether the research truly measured what was intended to be measured or how truthful the research results are. In other words, does the research instrument allow you to hit "the bull's eye" of your research object? Researchers generally determine validity by asking a series of questions, and will often look for the answers in the research of others. Wainer and Braun (1998) describe the validity as "construct validity". The construct is the initial concept, notion, question or hypothesis that determines which data is to be gathered and how it is to be gathered.

Joppe (2000) defines also reliability as the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable. Insofar as the definitions of reliability and validity in qualitative research reveal two strands: Firstly, with regards to reliability, whether the result is replicable. Secondly, with regards to validity, whether the means of measurement are accurate and whether they are actually measuring what they are intended to measure.

For the purpose of reliability and validity in this research, it was better to use more than one instrument for data collection. It is in this regard that the researcher conducted documentation and observed United Nations forces on the field during 1994 .

Writing system

CHAPTER I: will include the back ground of the study , research question , research objectives , theoretical frame work , literature review , hypothesis , research methodology and system of writing .

CHAPTER II: Rwanda profile and dynamics of conflicts

CHAPTER III:, understanding United Nations and its assistance mission (UNAMIR) to stop Tutsi genocide in Rwanda during 1994.

CHAPTER IV: answering the research question: why United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to stop the Tutsi genocide during 1994?

CHAPTER V: conclusion and recommendation.

REFERENCE**APPENDICES**